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Abstract. 
This thesis studies the reasoning behaviour of successful mathematicians. 
It is based on the philosophy that, if the goal of an advanced education in 
mathematics is to develop talented mathematicians, it is important to have a 
thorough understanding of their reasoning behaviour. In particular, one needs 
to know the processes which mathematicians use to accomplish mathematical 
tasks. However, Rav (1999) has noted that there is currently no adequate theory 
of the role that logic plays in informal mathematical reasoning. The goal of this 
thesis is to begin to answer this specific criticism of the literature by developing 
a model of how conditional "if... then" statements are evaluated by successful 
mathematics students. 
Two stages of empirical work are reported. In the first the various theories 
of reasoning are empirically evaluated to see how they account for mathemati- 
cians' responses to the Wason Selection Task, an apparently straightforward 
logic problem (Wason, 1968). Mathematics undergraduates are shown to have 
a different range of responses to the task than the general well-educated popu- 
lation. This finding is followed up by an eye-tracker inspection time experiment 
which measured which parts of the task participants attended to. It is argued 
that Evans's (1984,1989,1996,2006) heuristic-analytic theory provides the best 
account of these data. 
In the second stage of empirical work an in-depth qualitative interview study 
is reported. Mathematics research students were asked to evaluate and prove 
(or disprove) a series of conjectures in a realistic mathematical context. It 
is argued that preconscious heuristics play an important role in determining 
where participants allocate their attention whilst working with mathematical 
conditionals. Participants' arguments are modelled using Toulmin's (1958) ar- 
gumentation scheme, and it is suggested that to accurately account for their 
reasoning it is necessary to use Toulmin's full scheme, contrary to the prac- 
tice of earlier researchers. The importance of recognising that arguments may 
sometimes only reduce uncertainty in the conditional statement's truth/falsity, 
rather than remove uncertainty, is emphasised. 
In the final section of the thesis, these two stages are brought together. A 
model is developed which attempts to account for how mathematicians evaluate 
conditional statements. The model proposes that when encountering a math- 
ematical conditional "if P then Q", the mathematician hypothetically adds P 
to their stock of knowledge and looks for a warrant with which to conclude Q. 
The level of belief that the reasoner has in the conditional statement is given 
by the modal qualifier which they are prepared to pair with their warrant. It is 
argued that, this level of belief is fixed by conducting a modified version of the 
so-called Ramsey Test (Evans & Over, 2004). Finally the differences between 
the proposed model and both formal logic and everyday reasoning are discussed. 
xi 
Chapter I 
Plan of the Thesis 
This thesis is about mathematical reasoning, concentrating particularly on the 
types of reasoning involved in evaluating mathematical conditionals. This topic 
is interdisciplinary. During the course of this thesis, papers are referred to, and 
ideas adapted from, several different disciplines: the mathematics education, 
psychology of reasoning and informal logic literatures are all heavily cited. De- 
spite these disparate influences, the goal from the outset is clear: an integrated 
theory of the evaluation of mathematical conditionals. 
The thesis falls into several distinct parts. 
1.1 Literature. 
The thesis begins by situating itself within the mathematics education field. 
Chapter 2 briefly reviews previous work which has looked at the cognitive skills 
required for mathematics students in order to understand proof. It is argued 
that the role of logic in proof is not sufficiently understood, and that, in partic- 
ular, there is currently no satisfactory theory of logic in informal mathematical 
argumentation. 
Chapter 3 looks in detail at the various models which have been proposed 
for understanding conditional statements. The chapter concludes by discussing 
three influential tasks from the psychology and mathematics education litera- 
tures which have been used to produce these models: the Maze Task, the Truth 
Table Task and the Conditional Inference Task. 
A fourth task, the Wason Selection Task, is by far the most influential in- 
strument in the history of reasoning research, and this forms the subject of 
Chapter 4. The task is described, the main empirical results reviewed and each 
of the major theories of reasoning that have been proposed in relation to it are 
introduced. Although these theories of reasoning are discussed with particular 
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reference to the Selection Task, they are all intended to be general theories of 
reasoning, and claim domains of applicability far wider than merely the Selec- 
tion Task alone. 
1.2 Methodology. 
Chapter 5 discusses the methodologies available to conduct an investigation into 
mathematical reasoning. The validity and reliability of both quantitative and 
qualitative studies, in the form of interviews and standardised tasks, are dis- 
cussed and compared. Finally the philosophy behind the methodology adopted 
in later sections of the thesis - the so-called quasi-judicial approach to case 
study analyses - is discussed. 
1.3 Empirical research. 
The empirical research reported in this thesis falls into two parts. Firstly, in 
Chapter 6, the various theories of reasoning discussed in Chapter 4 are critically 
evaluated by comparing the performance of mathematics students with the gen- 
eral well-educated population on the Wason Selection Task. Using an inspection 
time eye-tracker based methodology, it is argued that only the heuristic-analytic 
dual process theory of reasoning can successfully account for the behaviour of 
successful mathematicians on the Selection Task. 
Having demonstrated that the heuristic-analytic dual process theory of rea- 
soning is the most suitable framework within which to study mathematical 
reasoning, Chapter 7 reviews the theory in greater detail. The heuristics and 
biases research programme in Decision Making is briefly reviewed, and the in- 
tuitive/analytical. distinction introduced by earlier mathematics education re- 
searchers is compared and contrasted with the dual process framework. 
Chapter 8 reports an qualitative interview study which attempts to apply 
the dual process framework to the specific research question that this thesis 
set out to answer: how do mathematicians evaluate conditional statements? 
There are two parts to this study. Firstly, the role of preconscious heuristics 
in realistic mathematical contexts are examined; and secondly, the conscious 
processes involved in the evaluation of mathematical conditionals are discussed 
with reference to Toulmin's (1958) argumentation scheme. 
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1.4 The theory. 
Finally, in Chapter 9, the strands of the thesis are drawn together and syn- 
thesised to form one coherent evaluative model of mathematical conditionals. 
This evaluative model is compared with both formal logic, and models that seek 
to explain how day-to-day non-mathematical indicative conditionals are evalu- 
ated. The thesis concludes by discussing the open research questions which the 
empirical work reported here has raised. 
The full structure of the thesis is shown in Figure I. I. 
Chapter 1 1 
Plan 
Literature 
Chapter 2 
Proof and logic 
Chapter 3 
Logical implication 
Chapter 4 
The Wason Selection 
Task and theories of 
reasoning 
Chapter 5 
Methodology 
I Experiment 11 
I Experiment 21 
I Experiment 31 
Chapter 7 Experiment 4 
Dual processes ýi! i: ý:!! 6!: J ý :!! 1! 
1 
Chapter 9 
The Theory 
Figure 1.1: The structure of the thesis. 
----i 
Methods 
Choosing a 
framework 
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j 
--1 
Applying the 
framework 
(Chpt 8) 
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Chapter 2 
Proof and the Role of Logic 
The concept of proof is one which leads to notorious difficulties for students. 
A wide range of literature has found that students (from primary school up to 
undergraduate level) have difficulty constructing arguments and proofs, often 
fail to understand what proofs are and have difficulty in judging whether an 
argument is a proof or not (e. g. R. Moore, 1994; Recio & Godino, 2001; Selden & 
Selden, 2003). This chapter reviews various discussions about what constitutes 
proof, and provides a summary of the research that has been conducted on 
students' difficulties with the concept. 
2.1 What is a mathematical proof? 
According to popular conceptions of the subject, mathematics is held together 
by the notion of formal proof. Mathematicians prove theorems using logically 
correct arguments; once proven the theorems are true, and cannot be challenged. 
In his popular science book 'Fermat's Last Theorem', Simon Singh summed up 
this idea: 
"Mathematical proof is far more powerful and rigorous than the 
concept of proof we casually use in our everyday language ... once 
proven [theorems] are true until the end of time. Mathematical 
proofs are absolute" (Singh, 1997, p-21). 
This essential quality of proofs - that they are the final arbiter of truth - 
has a long history. John Locke believed that mathematics (along with ethics) 
was one of only two disciplines where truth can be firmly and indisputably 
established; he noted that "mathematical proofs, like diamonds, are hard as well 
as clear" (cited in Dunham, 1994). This view of proof has been characterised as 
"rightwing" (Devlin, 2004), and is supported by some mathematics educators. 
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Selden and Selden (2003), for example, claimed that "one neither examines the 
life and times of a proof's author nor the sophistication of its readers in judging 
the truth of a theorem" (p. 7). 
Although it is possible to provide an explicit formal definition of a "rightwing" 
proof (e. g. Nagel & Newman, 2001), Thurston (1994) argued that it is impor- 
tant to recognise that few mathematicians actually construct such entities. In 
practice, much of the formal logic and trivial deductions are omitted. Some 
might argue that any mathematical proof could be translated into a complete 
formal sequence of logical deductions, but it is clear that this would be a non- 
trivial task, and may even be impossible. It has even been argued, however, 
that not only might it not be possible to do such a thing, but also that it would 
be undesirable (Fallis, 2003)_ 
Contrary to Selden and Selden's (2003) view, many mathematicians, math- 
ematics educators and philosophers believe that what constitutes a proof is, to 
a large extent, dependent on the community within which you are operating. 
The notoriously non-rightwing Bertrand Russell, for example, noted that you 
can never hope to write down the entire reasoning process behind a mathemat- 
ical result. Instead, he believed, you must write what "is sufficient to convince 
a properly instructed mind" (Russell, 1961, p. 163). This so-called "leftwing" 
conception of proof (Devlin, 2004) relies upon an agreed standard of what con- 
stitutes a "properly instructed mind". It is people-centric; far from being an 
absolute guarantor of the truth of a mathematical statement, a proof is whatever 
the mathematical community agrees a proof is (Balacheff, 1987). 
The mathematics education literature has a lot to say on the nature of proof. 
Mason believed that in order to justify a conjecture, there are three stages you 
have to go through: convincing yourself, convincing a friend and convincing 
an enemy (Mason, Burton, & Stacey, 1982). Tall agreed with this analysis, but 
noted that mathematical proof was something more. In order for an argument to 
be a proof, not only does it need to convince both friends and enemies, it needs 
to do so in a certain agreed manner involving mutually acceptable procedures 
that transmit the truth of one statement to another (Tall, 1989). 
As with Russell and Devlin, Tall placed the emphasis on the mathematical 
community agreeing on what steps can be used in a proof. The mathematical 
community, however, is a diverse thing, and the agreed conception of what 
constitutes a proof in topology, say, may not be the same as in fluid dynamics 
(P. Davis & Hersh, 1983; Thurston, 1994). Suggesting that it is difficult to 
precisely pin down exactly what a proof is, Tall aligned himself with Carroll's 
Humpty Dumpty who famously noted that "when I use a word it means just 
what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less" (Carroll, 1988; Tall, 1989). 
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Although the mathematical community seems unable to come up with a bet- 
ter definition of a proof than "it is what we say it is", there have been numerous 
attempts in the maths education literature to describe the characteristics of 
proof. 
Justification. Variously described as 'verifying' (Bell, 1976) or 'convincing' 
(Hersh, 1993; Mason et al., 1982), the primary purpose of a proof is to 
justify (either to yourself or others) that a theorem is correct. 
Explanation. Some mathematicians and mathematics educators argue that a 
proof should provide some idea to the reader why the theorem is true. 
Hanna (1991, p. 55) claimed that a proof that fails to accomplish this "is 
likely to add very little to an understanding of its subject and ironically 
may not even be very convincing". 
Communication. The'language'of proof is the way the mathematicians com- 
municate their ideas to each other, allowing new research to be built on 
old (Knuth, 2002). 
Systemisation. Proof may be used to organize the results into a coherent 
theory of axioms and theorems (Bell, 1976; de Villiers, 1990). 
Given that it is so hard to pin down exactly what the role and nature of 
proof is, it is perhaps not surprising to discover that many students have serious 
difficulties coming to terms with it. In the next section some of the research 
findings regarding the difficulties of teaching proof are discussed. 
2.2 Students' difficulties with proof 
There has been plenty of research on how exactly students go about trying to 
convince themselves of a statement's truth. Note that this question is related 
to proof validation' and conviction, as opposed to proof production, although 
these two types of student interaction with the notion of proof have often been 
confused in the mathematics education literature. Harel and Sowder (1998, 
p. 275) defined a 'proof scheme' as referring to "what convinces a person, and 
to what the person offers to convince others". In an exhaustive article they 
classified some of the common proof schemes that students may use into three 
general areas: external, empirical and analytical/deductive. In this section 
these proof schemes are discussed in turn, together with an overview of Tall and 
Vinner's (1981) influential concept image/concept definition framework. 
'Proof validation is process of checking that a purported proof is correct (Selden & Selden, 
2003; Weber & Alcock, 2004). 
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It is worth noting that since Harel and Sowder's (1998) original article their 
proof scheme taxonomy has been further developed and refined based mainly 
on epistemological, philosophical and historical analyses (Harel & Sowder, 2005; 
Harel, 2001, in press). The following summary of the different proof schemes 
uses the more recent terminology: 
9 External proof schemes (§2.2.1). 
- Ritual. 
- Authoritarian. 
- Symbolic. 
* Empirical proof schemes (§2.2.2). 
- Inductive. 
- Perceptual. 
* Deductive proof schemes (§2.2.4). 
- Mransformational. 
- Modern axiomatic. 
2.2.1 External proof schemes. 
Harel and $owder (1998) noted that some students can be convinced and per- 
suaded by some other aspect of the proof other than its contents. They labelled 
the first such method 'ritual': the actual structure or presentation of the proof 
may be sufficient to convince a student of its correctness. 
Another plausible way of being convinced of the veracity of a proof is by 
some external authority. Some students can be convinced of the correctness of 
a proof simply by virtue of who presents it to them. If a proof is in a book 
or is being presented in a lecture, then it has been checked and verified by a 
mathematician of greater powers than yourself and this, perhaps, immediately 
boosts its credibility. 
In the third of Harel and Sowder's external proof schemes, conviction is 
derived from the routine manipulation of symbols without meaning. They de- 
scribed this as "approaching the solution of a problem without first comprehend- 
ing its meaning" (p. 251). This way of doing mathematics has a long history; 
mathematicians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries often manipulated 
algebraic symbols in bizarre and (from a modern perspective) illegitimate ways, 
and in doing so derived some of the more important results in calculus. It is 
worth questioning why Harel and Sowder included this scheme in the 'external' 
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category. Where is the external source that is providing the authority? They 
appear to be suggesting the symbols in the proof are external to the proof itself, 
leaving us wondering what exactly they consider the proof to be. 
2.2.2 Empirical proof schemes. 
The next category of proof scheme that Harel and Sowder (1998) identified is 
the so-called 'empirical' scheme. Here, the student becomes convinced of the 
truth of a conjecture by appealing to observations and experiences. For, Harel 
and Sowder, this can be done in one of two ways: inductively and perceptually. 
In a perceptual proof scheme, conviction is obtained by reference to obser- 
vations of static mental (or physical) imagery. Some authors have noted that 
this form of reasoning is important when investigating new problems (Dreyfus, 
1991). But others have pointed out that using diagrams in formal proof is dan- 
gerous; Tall (1995) cautioned us that a diagrammatic proof may only be valid 
for a range of situations where the diagram is prototypical. 
When using an inductive proof scheme students attain conviction by testing 
one or more specific instances of the conjecture. Chazan (1993) characterised 
this sort of reasoning as confusing evidence with proof. Balacheff (1988) further 
subdivided this scheme into "naive empiricism" (randomly picking a few exam- 
ple cases to test), using a "crucial experiment" (picking carefully an example 
to test) and a "generic example" (where an example is chosen to be represen- 
tative of the general case). Tall (1979) found that significantly more students 
preferred a generic proof of the irrationality of 
ý§8 to the standard proof by 
contradiction. It should be noted here that a generic example based proof is not 
necessarily considered illegitimate by the mathematical community and that ex- 
amples of such arguments can be found in certain advanced mathematical texts 
(e. g. Aigner & Ziegler, 2000). Indeed, it could be argued that proof by generic 
example should be considered under the deductive proof scheme. 
Although mathematicians agree that a (non-generic) inductive argument 
isn't sufficient to prove a theorem, the importance of inductive thought in cre- 
ating mathematics has been commented on before. Bickley (1966) suggested 
that in "creative mathematics" deductive thought plays a subsidiary role to 
"the dominance of the inductive" (p. 7). Tall (1997) wrote that in order to 
succeed at university level mathematics, "the individual must make an almost 
schizophrenic separation between the intuitive appeal to the concept image that 
senses mathematical truth and the formal deduction processes that establishes 
it. " (p. 16) Thus, for Tall, the process involved in producing the mathematics is 
significantly different from that involved in proving it. 
The inductive-empirical proof scheme has been found to be widespread. 
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Across a wide range of mathematical topics, it has been found amongst sec- 
ondary school pupils (Porteous, 1990; Coe & Ruthven, 1994; Edwards, 1998; 
Healy & Hoyles, 2000; Kilchemann & Hoyles, 2004), secondary school teachers 
(Knuth, 2002) and undergraduates (R. Moore, 1994; Goetting, 1995; Recio 
Godino, 2001). 
Given that inductive reasoning appears to be so widespread, some researchers 
have tried to suggest reasons why. Recio and Godino (2001) drew (slightly su- 
perficial) parallels between such inductive proof schemes in mathematics and 
the kind of reasoning that are the norm in scientific subjects. Drawing on work 
in cognitive science, Alcock and Simpson (2002) noted that reasoning using 
prototypical examples is commonplace in day-to-day thought. When it comes 
to formal mathematics however, they argued that the student must develop 
"the rigour prefix" to emphasise the importance of working with the formal 
definition rather than their prototypical examples (Alcock & Simpson, 1999). 
This idea drew upon Tall and Vinner's (1981) important distinction between an 
individual's concept image and their concept definition. 
2.2.3 Concept image and concept definition. 
The idea that an individual has both a concept image and a concept definition 
has been an influential theoretical framework in mathematics education. It is a 
simple yet powerful idea: 
"We shall use the term concept image to describe the total cognitive 
structure that is associated with the concept, which includes all the 
mental pictures and associated properties and processes. " (Tall 
Vinner, 1981, p. 152) 
An individual's concept image then, is a potentially huge collection of struc- 
tures, properties, pictures or processes that are associated with the particular 
concept. A concept image might be completely informal, it might not be coher- 
ent. Parts of the concept image might not agree with other parts. This won't 
cause problems, however, unless the conflicting parts of the concept image are 
evoked simultaneously. 
In contrast the concept definition is 
"We shall regard the concept definition to be a form of words used 
to specify that concept. " (Tall & Vinner, 1981, p. 152) 
A further subdivision was made between a personal concept definition and a 
formal concept definition, the latter being "a concept definition that is accepted 
by the mathematical community at large. " 
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Tall and Vinner discussed some common problems that can arise with un- 
dergraduate mathematics. For example, a first year undergraduate may have 
a very strong concept image of a 'familiar' concept that was introduced at A- 
Level, but a weak understanding of the concept definition that they have only 
just met. This can cause problems for the student: 
"the difficulty of forming an appropriate concept image, and the 
coercive effects of an inappropriate one having potential conflicts, 
can seriously hinder the development of the formal theory in the 
mind of the individual student. " (Tall & Vinner, 1981, p. 169) 
In Alcock and Simpson's (1999) terms, in order to be successful, the student 
must develop the ability to 'turn on' the rigour prefix. That is to say that 
they must learn to reason with the concept definition and not their, possibly 
misleading, concept image. 
2.2.4 Analytical/deductive proof schemes. 
The last category of proof scheme that Harel and Sowder discussed is known 
as 'analytic'. However, in a later revision of the proof scheme taxonomy, Harel 
(in press) renamed the scheme, referring to it as the 'deductive' proof scheme. 
Either way, the scheme is 
"one that validates conjectures by means of logical deductions" (Harel 
& Sowder, 1998, p-258). 
It is the proof scheme that would result in what most mathematicians would 
regard as a standard mathematical proof. They further subdivided this cate- 
gory into two: transformational schemes (those that use arguments based upon 
dynamic imagery rooted in the real world) and modern-axiomatic schemes. 
Harel and Sowder (1998) noted that an axiomatic proof scheme relies heavily 
upon mathematical logic. A proof's starting point is certain undefined terms 
and axioms, and it proceeds by making logical deductions until the conjecture 
has been reached. For some students the axioms must be linked to their intuitive 
understanding of the situation (Harel and Sowder referred to this as an intuitive- 
axiomatic scheme), for others they may be able to study the axiomatic structure 
itself (a structural proof scheme). A yet deeper understanding of mathematics 
may lead to an axiomatising scheme, here the student is able to reflect on the 
consequences of varying the axioms. 
Even when students have an analytic/deductive proof scheme, the process 
of producing proofs is far from straightforward. It has been noted that students 
who understand what is required of them in a proof have great difficulty in 
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'getting started' (R. Moore, 1994). It has been suggested that one reason why 
is that students haven't operationalised the definitions of the concepts they are 
dealing with (Bills & Tall, 1998). 
Some authors have disputed Harel and Sowder's (1998) understanding of 
what a analytic/deductive proof actually is. Rav (1999), for example, pointed 
out that formal logic is not a fundamental part of constructing mathematical 
proofs at all. Rav wrote: 
"One does not even think about rules of logic in writing or reading 
a proof [ ... 
]A proof in mainstream mathematics is set forth as a 
sequence of claims, where the passage from one claim to another is 
based on drawing consequences on the basis of meanings or through 
accepted symbol manipulation, not by citing rules of predicate logic" 
(Rav, 1999, p. 13). 
Arbib (1990, p. 55) suggested that one statement in a mathematical proof fol- 
lowed from another not through formal logic but through "formal technique and 
intuitions about the subject matter at hand". 
So instead of agreeing with Harel and Sowder (1998) that mathematicians 
validate conjectures "by means of logical deductions", Arbib (1990) and Rav 
(1999) suggested that some kind of poorly understood "informal" logic is the 
dominant force (related arguments were made by Thurston, 1994). 
Rav (1999, p. 14) surnmarised his view of the situation: 
"As things stand now, we have remarkable mathematical theories of 
formal logic, but inadequate logical theories of informal mathemat- 
ics. " 
The meaning here is clear. Whereas the formal understanding of the branch 
of mathematics known as 'proof theory' is well developed, this has little or 
nothing to do with how mathematicians actually create proofs. What is needed 
is a theory of how logic is used in "informal" mathematics. 2 
In terms of Tall and Vinner's (1981) distinction, Rav (1999) was suggesting 
that whereas the formal concept definition of argumentation - formal logic - is 
well understood, there is currently no adequate understanding of mathemati- 
cians' concept images of argumentation. This thesis seeks to address this gap in 
the literature by investigating in detail the role that logic plays in mathematics. 
Specifically, the goal of this thesis is to investigate the manner in which success- 
ful mathematics students reason with conditional "if... then" statements. 
211ere, of course, Rav (1999) is using "informal" to mean normal day-to-day mathematics 
as done by algebraists, topologists etc. Not that done by formal logicians or proof theorists. 
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23 Summary of Chapter 2. 
9 Proof is recognised to be one of the most vital components of 'coming to 
know' advanced mathematics. 
e Students from all levels of education have difficulty in dealing with proofs. 
The role of logic in proof construction and proof evaluation is uncertain. 
Some researchers argue that formal logical deductions are vital to develop 
a sophisticated 'proof scheme'; whereas others suggest that whilst formal 
logic has little or no role in mathematical proofs, informal logic does have 
an important, but not currently well understood, role. 
The goal of this thesis is to fill this gap in the research literature. Specifi- 
cally, to investigate the manner in which successful mathematics students 
reason with conditional "if... then" statements. 
The next chapter begins to look in detail at literature which explores how con- 
ditionals are understood by the general population, and by mathematicians. 
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Chapter 3 
Logical Implication 
Logical thinking has long been assumed to be a vital part of mathematical rea- 
soning. This chapter summarises various different models of how conditional 
statements are understood in mathematics (and elsewhere) and introduces sev- 
eral important research tools that have been used to investigate this subject. 
The idea that learning mathematics develops clear and logical thinking has 
a long history. In the early part of the 18th century, the liberal philosopher 
John Locke wrote that mathematics ought to be taught to "all those who have 
time and opportunity, not so much to make them mathematicians as to make 
them reasonable creatures" (Locke, 1706/1971, p. 20). 
This sort of belief was once the rationale for placing mathematics at the heart 
of the school curriculum. When discussing the utility of studying mathematics, 
C. Davis (1850/1970) wrote that it was important to 
ccpoint out and illustrate the value of mathematical studies, as a 
means of mental improvement and development... [studying math- 
ematics] aids the memory at the same time that it strengthens and 
improves reasoning powers. " (pp. 60-61). 
Oakley (1946) took this idea further: 
"The study of mathematics cannot be replaced by any other activity 
that will train and develop man's purely logical faculties to the same 
level of rationality. " (p. 19). 
Similar beliefs still pervade the mathematical world today. For example, the 
QAA, the UK quality assurance agency for higher education, states that 
"[Mathematics] graduates are rightly seen as possessing considerable 
skill in abstract reasoning, logical deduction and problem solving, 
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and for this reason they find employment in a great variety of careers 
and professions. " (QAA, 2002). 
There is a widespread belief then, that studying mathematics improves your 
reasoning skills, teaches you how to think, and makes you more rational. But 
is this really correct? Although research has been conducted that has looked 
at whether subject specific knowledge can be transferred across domains (Lave, 
1988), there has been surprisingly little that has looked at whether mathematics 
actually does develop these kinds of reasoning skills at all. 
Some of the popular mathematics literature takes a clear stand on the issue 
of role of logic in mathematical thinking: 
"the ability to construct and follow fairly long causal chains [and] 
a step by step logical argument... is fundamental to mathematics. " 
(Devlin, 2001, p. 15). 
Mathematical textbooks take a similar view: 
"Everyday language is full of generalities which are vaguely true in 
most cases, but perhaps not all. Mathematical proof is made of 
sterner stuff. No such generalities are allowed: all the statements 
involved must be clearly true or false... [we must] be sure that our 
mathematical logic is flawless. " (Stewart & Tall, 1977, p. 110). 
Whilst philosophers have discussed the question (Arbib, 1990; Rav, 1999) there 
has, apparently, been little empirical research on how successful mathematicians 
behave when they are doing mathematics; and on to what extent logic is a part 
of a mathematician's thinking. Of particular interest within the field of logic is 
the role of logical implication. 
In mathematics education circles, it has been argued that an understanding 
of logical implication is one of the most important prerequisites for understand- 
ing and constructing proofs. Rodd (2000), for example, suggested that modus 
ponens reasoning is crucial to establishing mathematical truth, and Kiichemann 
and Hoyles (2002, p. 242) emphasised logical implication's "importance for suc- 
cess" in mathematics. 
However, it has also been recognised that logical implication is a topic that 
causes difficulties for students (e. g. Deloustal-Jorrand, 2002; Hoyles & Kdche- 
mann, 2002; O'Brien, 1973). One of hypothesised reasons for this apparent 
difficulty is the different models of implication' that are common in different 
lThere is a subtle philosophical distinction (described further below) between an implica- 
tion and a conditional. However, this thesis argues that, for the current purposes at least, the 
distinction is not psychologically important. For this reason the words are used interchange- 
ably. 
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P Q Material Conditional Defective Conditional 
t t t t 
t f f f 
f t t i 
f f t i 
Table 3.1: Truth tables for 'P =ý- Q' in the cases (a) the material conditional 
and (b) the defective conditional. Here t= true, f= false and i= irrelevant. 
contexts. In this section several distinct models that are mentioned in the 
mathematics education, psychology and philosophy literatures are described, 
and comparisons are drawn between them. Note that some of these models of 
the conditional have been described by different authors, and several of them 
overlap. These issues will be discussed further in a later section (§3.1.9). 
3.1 Different models of the conditional. 
3.1.1 The material conditional (T1). 
The material conditional2 model comes from the formal definition that is com- 
monly taught in first year undergraduate courses. A material conditional "if P, 
then Q" is true if and only if either -, P or Q is true. It is often introduced via 
a truth table (see Table 3.1), from which the equivalence 
-, P Q 
can be deduced. 
In their undergraduate textbook, Stewart and Tall (1977) introduce the ma- 
terial conditional using the example 'if x>5, then x> 2'. Arguing that 'if 
x>5 then x> 2' is obviously correct, they consider the case of x=4. For this 
value of x, 'x > 5' is false, but 'x > 2' is true. Strictly speaking, of course, this 
sentence is actually a generalised conditional (see §3.1.3) as neither 'x > 5' or 
(x > 2' have truth values unless x is specified. 
Here it is worth pointing out the contrast that some logicians emphasise 
between the material conditional and the (material) implication. Quine (1966) 
draws a philosophical distinction between the implication 'P implies Q' and the 
conditional 'P =* Q'. For Quine the latter is a mathematical statement in its 
own right whereas the former is a sentence that talks about the two statements 
P and Q using only their names. 'P implies Q' is not, in itself, a mathematical 
2AIso known as the 'propositional connective'. 
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statement. However it is valid "when and only when the conditional is valid" 
(p. 37). Quine writes: 
"[We may] write: 'dreary' rhymes with 'weary', but here again we are 
using names of the rhyming words in question - the names being in 
this case formed by adding single quotation marks. It would not be 
merely untrue but ungrammatical and meaningless to write: Dreary 
rhymes with weary. " (Quine, 1966, p. 37) 
This distinction is also hinted at in some undergraduate textbooks (e. g. D. L. 
Johnson, 1998), and is mentioned by Durand-Guerrier (2003) as one of her four 
"notions of the conditional", although she uses the term "logically valid condi- 
tional". Although this distinction is important from the philosophical position 
adopted by Quine (1966), it is largely irrelevant from the psychological stand- 
point that this thesis takes; namely a position that is attempting to empirically 
analYse how mathematicians use conditionals in their work. 
There are four common ways of using a material implication, two legitimate 
and two fallacious. Given P ==>- Q 
Modus Ponens is the deduction of Q from the assumption P. 
Modus Tollens is the deduction of --, P from the assumption -, Q. 
Affirming the consequent is the incorrect deduction of P from the assump- 
tion Q. 
Denying the antecedent is the incorrect deduction of ýQ from the assump- 
tion ýP. 
Modus ponens appears to be an easier deduction to make than modus tollens, 
despite the potentially serious results of failing to deduce --, P from -, Q, although 
the reasons why this might be so are controversial (see Chapter 4). Incredibly, 
it is possible that the Chernobyl disaster can be attributed to the failure of a 
workman to make this deduction (Johnson-Laird, 1999). ' 
Many studies have found that use of affirming the consequent and deny- 
ing the antecedent are widespread, even amongst highly educated populations. 
O'Brien (1973) denoted consistent use of affirming the consequent and denying 
the antecedent deductions as 'child logic', as opposed to 'maths logic'. Using in- 
ference tasks (such as that in Figure 3.1), he found that between 40 and 50% of 
undergraduate mathematics students 4 consistently used child logic as opposed 
3The Chernobyl plant had the safety regulation "if the test is to continue, then the turbine 
must be rotating fast enough", but despite the fact that the turbine wasn't rotating fast 
enough, no one deduced that the test should be stopped. 
40'Brien's paxticipants had all just completed an 'introduction to mathematics' course. It 
is not at all clear whether maths was their major subject. 
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Here is a rule: 
"if the car is shiny, then it is fast". 
For each of the following answer yes, no or can't tell. 
1. The car is shiny. Is the car fast? 
2. The car is fast. Is the car shiny? 
3. The car is slow. Is the car shiny? 
4. The car is not shiny. Is the car fast? 
Figure 3.1: A standard inference task. 
to only 5% who consistently used maths logic. This compared to a previous 
experiment that gave similar tasks to secondary school children which found 
that around 70% used child logic (O'Brien, Shapiro, & Reali, 1971). In both ex- 
periments O'Brien found that using familiar content in the questions facilitated 
modus tollens deductions. 
The claim that the conditionals in natural language can be successfully mod- 
elled using the material conditional has been referred to as Theory 1, or T1, 
by Edgington (2003) and Evans and Over (2004). T1, whilst believed by the 
likes of Boole (1854/1958) and Inhelder and Piaget (1958), has been subject to 
serious challenge by modern philosophers and psychologists alike (see Chapter 
4). 
3.1.2 The defective conditional. 
The defective conditional' occurs when "if P, then Q" is considered irrelevant 
if P takes the value false (Wason, 1966). This model's truth table is shown in 
Table 3.1 (see p. 15). Quine (1966) anecdotally noted that this is the form of the 
conditional that is general used in day-to-day life. He wrote that "'if P then 
Q' is commonly felt less of an affirmation of a conditional than as a conditional 
affirmation of the consequent" (p. 12). 
Quine's observation has been experimentally investigated by psychologists. 
The so-called 'truth table task' involves asking participants to decide whether 
certain given information makes a conditional true, false or whether the infor- 
5D. Mitchell (1962) and Durand-Guerrier (2003) use the terms "hypothetical proposition" 
and "the common understanding" respectively. 
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Which of the following situations (a) supports, (b) 
contradicts or (c) tells us nothing about the rule: 
"if the shape is a square, then it is green". 
1. A green square. 
2. A red square. 
3. A blue circle. 
4. A green circle. 
Figure 3.2: A standard truth table task. 
PQ Material Equivalence Defective Equivalence 
tttt 
tfff 
ftfi 
ffti 
Table 3.2: Truth tables for 'P =* Q' in the cases (a) material equivalence and 
(b) defective equivalence. As before, t= true, f= false and i= irrelevant. 
mation is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the rule (see Figure 3.2). Wason 
and Johnson-Laird (1969), for example, used a conditional with abstract con- 
tent and found that subjects often regarded that the information that P was 
false made the rule irrelevant. At the time this finding was used to dispute the 
Piagetian claim that children reached the stage of formal operations by the age 
of 12 (see also §4.1). 
Wason and Johnson-Laird (1969) and Evans, Newstead, and Byrne (1993) 
noted that along with the material conditional and defective conditional inter- 
pretations of implication, the closely related 'material equivalence' and 'defective 
equivalence' interpretations are also common. These occur when "P Q" is 
mixed up with "P, #> Q" (see Table 3.2 for truth tables). 
Hoyles and Kfichemann (2002) have argued that the defective conditional is 
a "more appropriate" interpretation than the material conditional because 
"in school mathematics, students have to appreciate the consequence 
of an implication when the antecedent is taken to be true. " (p. 196) 
This is a rather peculiar claim, as both the defective conditional and the material 
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conditional allow one to "appreciate the consequences" of "if P then Q" when 
P is true. The difference occurs when P is not true. 
Durand-Guerrier (2003) criticised Hoyles and Kilchemann by pointing out 
that knowing the truth value of a conditional when P is false is vital to under- 
standing definitions such as, for example, that of a diagonal matrix: 
Anxn square matrix [aij] is diagonal if and only if Vij CN such 
that 1<i, j<n, if i =7ý j, then aij = 0. 
But this argument is surely fallacious. Such a definition is perfectly under- 
standable with a defective conditional interpretation: when i =ýý j, "if i=j, 
then aij = O"is irrelevant. That is to say, nothing can be concluded about the 
truth of aij = 0. Such an interpretation does not prevent one from fully under- 
standing, and making operable (in the sense of Bills & Tall, 1998), the definition 
of a diagonal matrix. 
3.1.3 The generalised conditional. 
A generalised conditional is found in the domain of predicate rather than propo- 
sitional logic. Such a conditional has the form "Vx E X, if P(x), then Q(x)", 
where X is the set that we are working in. Here, neither P(x) nor Q(x) have a 
truth value until x is specified. This is the form that most mathematical the- 
orems are written in, albeit sometimes deceptively. For example, the theorem 
"if the diagonals of a quadrilateral bisect one another, then the quadrilateral is 
a parallelogram" is a generalised conditional of the form "for all quadrilaterals 
Q, if Q has diagonals that bisect one another, then Q is a parallelogram". One 
might argue that most of the examples of conditionals discussed so far have 
implicitly been generalised. 
3.1.4 The causal/temporal conditional. 
Deloustal-Jorrand (2002) explained that she 
"understands by 'causal conception of the implication' all the rules, 
practices and knowledges [sic] related to the interpretation of the 
sentence 'A implies B' by 'A is the cause of B'. " (p. 284) 
She went on to point out that this causality need not be a temporal relationship, 
although in many day-to-day cases it is. Here the word "cause" is problematic. 
Is it reasonable to say that event P can cause event Q even though it doesn't 
precede it? The word "cause" seems to carry with it implications of some kind 
of temporal order. The notion of causality is a hugely complex subject that 
has associated with it a vast research programme in philosophical and cognitive 
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science areas (e. g. Sperber, Premack, & Premack, 1995). Whilst noting that 
this research programme exists, it is of minor relevance to this thesis. Instead 
it suffices to remark that the question of what causality means in mathematics 
is even more problematic than in other settings. In the mathematical domain, 
temporal order is something of a meaningless notion. In no sense can "T is 
locally connected" be said to have occurred either before or after "T is con- 
nected", so it seems to be slightly odd to suggest that one is a cause and one 
is an effect. Later it is argued that a better way of characterising the notion 
of causality in mathematics is in terms of belief rather than truth (see §3.1.6). 
This naturally leads us to consider Toulmin's (1958) notion of the warrant and 
backing of an argument. 
3.1.5 Informal logic. 
Informal logic is an attempt by philosophers to accurately describe the structure 
of arguments (R. H. Johnson, 1999), and is largely based upon the work of the 
philosopher Stephen Toulinin. Writing in the fifties he suggested, against the 
prevailing orthodoxies of the time, that the best way to study argumentation 
was not to use the material conditional of formal logic (Toulmin, 1958; Toul- 
min, Rieke, & Janik, 1984). Toulmin's The Use of Avguments was very poorly 
received, with one of his colleagues branding it "Toulmin's anti-logic book" 
(Toulmin, 2001, p. 11). Since it's publication, however, Toulmin's work has be- 
come an important idea within of many academic disciplines, include rhetoric 
theory, linguistics and perhaps mathematics education. 
For Toulmin, contrary to the formal logician's beliefs, the purpose of an 
argument is to convince an audience of the conclusion's veracity. He suggested 
that an argument consists of several parts, all designed to convince the audience. 
The arguer starts by putting forward the data (D) and showing, via the warrant 
(W), that the conclusion (C) follows. A warrant tends to be a statement of the 
form "given D, one can take it that C" (Toulmin, 1958, p. 99). If the warrant is 
not immediately obvious the some justification, or backing (B), for it is required. 
The qualifier (Q) gives an indication of the level of certainty contained in the 
argument (of course, in mathematics arguments are traditionally seen as aiming 
to establish the full certainty of claims rather than a level of probability in 
them). The final part, the rebuttal (R), occurs when the conviction in the 
argument is non-absolute. Toulmin's scheme is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
An example of an argument expressed in this form is given in Figure 3.4. 
Here, the arguer is suggesting that Hislop was at fault for the goal (C), a close 
range header scored whilst he was the goalkeeper (D), because he ought to 
have caught the cross from which the goal was scored (W). This is because 
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Figure 3.3: Toulmin's model of a general argument. 
goalkeepers are expected to be able to catch crosses that are close to them (B). 
However, the arguer accepts that the argument could be rebutted if Hislop was 
fouled as the ball was crossed (R). Note that the backing in this argument, as 
in most arguments, is a general statement of "if... then" form; that is to say, 
the backing is "if a cross is close to a goalkeeper then he should catch it". 
Toulmin's (1958) argumentation scheme, and how it has been applied to 
mathematical arguments, will be discussed in greater detail in §8.6.1. For now, 
however, it suffices to note that Toulmin's work has been used by some mathe- 
matics education researchers to put forward a model of the conditional. 
3.1.6 The warranted conditional. 
Using Toulmin's (1958) scheme, Weber and Alcock (2005) introduced the notion 
of a warranted conditional .6 They wrote: 
"When one evaluates whether the implication 'if P, then Q' is war- 
ranted, P is seen as the data and Q as the conclusion. ... In de- 
termining whether 'if P, then Q' is warranted, the reader must not 
only evaluate the truth of P and Q, but also judge the soundness of 
this possibly inferred warrant. " (p. 36). 
An implication is waxranted in the sense of Weber and Alcock if it allows you 
to deduce the conclusion Q from the data P, i. e. it justifies the modus ponens 
inference. Modus tollens plays, at most, a subsidiary role. 
6Actually, they used the word 'implication' instead of 'conditional' throughout. 
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unless Hislop 
was fouled as 
the ball was 
crossed 
The goal came 
from a close range 
header when Hislop 
was goalkeeper 
so, presumably 
Hislop was H at fault 
Hislop ought to have 
caught the cross from 
which the goal was scored 
goalkeepers should be 
capable of catching crosses 
that are close to them 
Figure 3.4: An argument expressed using Toulmin's structure. 
Weber and Alcock argued that warranted implications are vital for validating 
proofs (in the sense of Selden & Selden, 2003). They pointed out that if a 
conditional is materially true but unwarranted, it cannot be used in a proof. 
They gave the example of a student who, when asked to prove that 1007 is 
prime writes "if 7 is prime, then 1007 is prime". When seen as a material 
conditional, this statement is true. However, it is not warranted. The implicit 
warrant (although, really this should be called a backing), that "if n is prime, 
1000 +n is prime", is not justified (for a relevance theoretic explanation as to 
why this particular warrant is inferred, see Inglis, 2004). 
Specifically then, a person interprets "if P, then Q" as a warranted impli- 
cation if they infer (or look for, but fail to find) a warrant that allows them to 
conclude Q from the data P. Notice that this use is subtly different to that 
adopted by both Toulmin and Weber and Alcock. For Weber and Alcock, a 
conditional is warranted only if there exists a valid warrant (although it is very 
hard to be precise about what 'valid' means in this context). In this thesis the 
term warranted conditional is used to refer a particular model of the conditional 
- in which, when evaluating the truth of a conditional sentence, one is directed 
towards looking for a warrant which may or may not be found. 
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Weber and Alcock not only argued that the warranted implication is vital 
for proof validation, but that it is not taught sufficiently in class. They wrote: 
"for students to gain conviction and understanding from ... proofs, 
they must consider the implicit warrants used to justify the asser- 
tations in the proof. However, it is not clear that students will 
naturally do this. " (Weber & Alcock, 2005, p. 38) 
However, Inglis (2004) argued that in fact it is clear that students will naturally 
do this. That is to say that the warranted implication is an entirely natural way 
of understanding "if... then" statements: it requires no special training (Inglis, 
2004; Reid & Inglis, 2005). 
3.1.7 The StaInaker conditional (T2). 
The Stalnaker (1968) conditional, a terminology adopted by Evans and Over 
(2004), is subtly different to the conditionals described in the previous sections. 
When P is false the StaInaker conditional 'P => Q' may be either true or false. 
Edgington (2003, p. 383) gave the following example: 
If you touch that wire, then you will get an electric shock. 
She points out that if you don't touch the wire the conditional might still be true 
or false. It would depend, for example, on whether the wire was insulated or not. 
In this situation, Stalnaker (1968) argued, we must make the minimal changes 
necessary to ensure our beliefs are consistent after P has been hypothetically 
added to them. That is to say, suppose we know that we didn't touch the wire, 
but also that the wire was not insulated and we were not wearing gloves. The 
conditional in this case would be true: P has been hypothetically added to our 
beliefs and, as a consequence, we have evaluated Q to be true. 
Evans and Over (2004) summed up the situation by explaining that a Stal- 
naker conditional P =* Q is true in the case where P is false and Q is true 
(denoted FT) "if and only if TT is a closer possibility to FT than TF is" (p. 26). 
Note that because of this complication, modus tollens is, not a valid deduction 
from a StaInaker conditional. The hypothesis that the Stalnaker model of the 
conditional best represents day-to-day conditionals has been called Theory 2, or 
T2 as opposed to T1 discussed in §3.1.1 (Edgington, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004). 
The Stalnaker conditional model is not the same as the warranted conditional 
model in the case when both P and Q are true. The Stalnaker conditional is 
true in this case, but the warranted conditional will not be if there is no warrant. 
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3.1.8 The suppositional conditional (T3). 
The suppositional conditional is an altogether different beast to the previous 
models of the conditional mentioned. It has no outward truth values at all, but 
instead is evaluated in terms of the so-called Ramsey Test. This test, proposed 
by Ramsey (1931/1990), suggests that the probability that a conditional is true 
is equal to the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. 
That is to say that people judge the probability of P =z> Q by "adding hypo- 
thetically P to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about Q" 
(Ramsey, 1931/1990, p. 247). Probability here should be taken to mean the 
degree of belief one has in the conditional. This relationship can be expressed 
symbolically: 
P(P ==> Q) = P(Q I P) 
Specifically, the suppositional conditional approach (as presented by Edging- 
ton, 2003; Over & Evans, 2003; and Evans & Over, 2004) suggests that people 
fix their degree of belief in a conditional statement by performing a two-stage 
Ramsey test: The probabilities of PAQ and PA-, Q are evaluated and then 
compared. If P(P A Q) is high compared to P(P A -Q), then P(Q I P) is high 
and so 1P(P =* Q) is judged to be high. Similarly, if P(P A Q) is low compared 
to P(P A -Q), then P(Q I P) is low and so P(P =* Q) is judged to be low. 
Over and Evans (2003) point out that the manner in which the probabilities 
of PAQ and PA ýQ are evaluated is highly varied. Sometimes these evaluations 
are implicit (highly influence by System I processes) and sometimes they are 
explicit (highly influenced by System 2 processes). Over and Evans write: 
"There are a number of ways in which people can [evaluate these 
two probabilities]. Sometimes they will know relevant frequency 
information, and they can use that to make an explicit comparison. 
[ 
... 
] More widely, heuristics [such as the availability heuristic] will 
sometimes be engaged. " (p. 346) 
Evidence for the role of probability judgements in evaluating conditionals was 
presented by Evans, Handley, and Over (2003). They concocted a situation 
where P(Q I P), P(P A Q) and P(--, P V Q) were all radically different. They then 
asked participants to judge "how likely" the rule P => Q was. The correlation 
between participants' evaluations of P(P =* Q) and P(-, P V Q) was found to 
be low. In a further experiment it was found that participants' evaluations of 
P(P =: >. Q) were much closer to P(Q I P) than their evaluations of P(P A Q). 
The suppositional conditional is different to the Stalnaker conditional. Sup- 
pose, on the conditional 'P =: >. Q', you have managed to rule out the case PA-, Q. 
Is the conditional true or false? T2 cannot say. The conditional may fail in the 
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F PI pý -FQI 
warrant 
exists 
Figure 3.5: The warranted conditional in terms of Toulmin's scheme, the con- 
ditional asserts the existence of a warrant/backing. 
F PI IQI p 
Figure 3.6: The material conditional in terms of Toulmin's scheme, here the 
conditional is the warrant. 
cases where --, P is the case. T3, however, says that the conditional is true. P 
is hypothetically added to your stock of knowledge and the probability of Q is 
assessed, this is certain as we have ruled out -, Q. Interestingly, when he de- 
veloped the Stalnaker conditional, Stalnaker (1968) was attempting to combine 
the intuitive correctness of T3 with the advantages of a conditional determined 
entirely by truth values. This has since been shown to be impossible (Lewis, 
1986). 
3.1.9 Comparing the different conditionals. 
There are many similarities worth noting between the these differing models. 
Firstly, it is worth pointing out explicitly the differences between the material 
and warranted conditionals. They both allow you to deduce Q from P. Phrasing 
both explanations in terms of (a reduced version of) Toulmin's (1958) scheme 
sheds some light on the matter. The warranted conditional understanding is 
shown in Figure 3.5. With this view, the sentence "if P, then Q" is making 
the claim that there exists a warrant that allows you to deduce Q from P; you 
are left to infer what the warrant might, be. This is different from the material 
understanding (see Figure 3.6). Here, the conditional itself is the warrant that 
allows you to deduce Q from P; and, for that matter, -, P from -, Q. 
However, this is not to say that all the conditionals mentioned above are 
different. Weber and Alcock's (2005) warranted conditional and Deloustal- 
Jorrand's (2002) causal conditional are different names for similar underlying 
concepts. As discussed in §3.1.4, there are difficulties with the linguistic sub- 
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tleties of claiming that one mathematical fact causes another. However there 
are no such difficulties in saying that believing P is true causes you to believe 
that Q is true. In other words, the causal conditional acts as a warrant. It 
is a warranted conditional. Conversely, a warranted conditional causes to you 
to believe Q if you believe P: it is a causal conditional. Given the similarity 
between these views, and the difficulties with the word 'causal', this thesis uses 
'warranted' throughout. 
Notice that although the warranted and the generalised views of the condi- 
tional are not identical, in virtually all practical mathematical situations they 
coincide. After all, if something having property P allows you deduce that it 
also has property Q, then the same better be true for all things which have 
property P (i. e. all warranted conditionals are generalised). It is not the case 
that "for all x, P(x) =ý Q(x)" means there must be a warrant that links P and 
Q, but in the vast majority of cases a mathematician meets there is. Indeed, one 
might see most direct proofs as chains of warrants that indicate how having one 
property leads to having another. Without such links the only way of proving 
a statement such as "for all x, P(x) =* Q(x)" would be to exhaustively test all 
the x's -a procedure that is very rarely seen in advanced mathematics. 
So, to summarise, six apparently different models of the conditional have 
been identified: 
The material conditional (T1). "If P, then Q" (or P =* Q) is true if -, PVQ 
is true. 
The defective conditional. "If P, then Q" is irrelevant whenever P is false. 
The generalised condit ional. "If P (x), then Q (x) " is true if 'P (x) =* Q (x)' 
is true for all instances of x. 
The warranted conditional, also known as the causal conditional, "If P, 
then Q" asserts the existence of a warrant that allows you to conclude Q 
from the data P. 
The Stalnaker conditional (T2). Agrees with Tl for when P is true, but 
differs where Q is false. 
The suppositional conditional (T3). The degree of belief in "if P, then Q" 
is given by P(QIP). A world where P is true is imagined, and the likelihood 
of Q is evaluated. 
Given these different models of the conditional, it is natural to ask which ver- 
sions, if any, best match the way people understand and use conditionals, and 
what methods are there to measure this? 
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A person named X managed to pass through a maze and never used the same 
door twice. We can write down sentences about the situation. For each of the 
sentences you must decide whether it is true, false, or whether there are not 
enough clues to tell. For example, the sentence 'X crossed C' is a true sentence, 
as C is the only entrance to the maze. 
t 
Exit 
TsRQp 
i+ 
KLmN0 
+ 
IHGF 
4- 
EDC 
t 
Entrance 
Place each of the following into the categories: true (T), false (F) or not enough 
clues (N). 
9X crossed P. e if X crossed 0, then X crossed F. 
*X crossed N. * if X crossed K, then X crossed L. 
9X crossed M. 9 if X crossed L, then X crossed K. 
Figure 3.7: The maze task. 
3.2 Standard logic tasks. 
There are several standard logical tasks that have been used in the literature. 
The most famous and widely researched is the so-called Wason Selection Task, 
and this will be discussed at length in Chapter 4, together with the various 
theories of reasoning that have been developed to explain it, and other results 
from the literature. In this section, however, other common but less widely used 
logic tasks are briefly introduced and discussed. 
3.2.1 The maze task. 
The maze, or labyrinth, task was first given to 15-16 year old Rench schoolchil- 
dren, they were presented with the task shown in Figure 3.7 (APMEP, 1992; 
Durand-Guerrier, 2003). 
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The last sentence, "if X crossed L, then X crossed K", is the most interest- 
ing. Durand-Guerrier (1996) reported that 71% of the pupils answered "can't 
tell", which she argues is the correct answer. 7 For some routes (e. g. CDIJKLM- 
NQR) the material conditional is true, and for some (e. g. CDILMNQR) it is 
false. Thus, suggested Durand- Guerrier, we cannot be sure which it is. 
However, the teachers who administered the task thought that the answer 
to be "false". They explained that "the important matter is the link between 
the two sentences and not the particular truth value of each one" (Durand- 
Guerrier, 2003, p. 9). Durand-Guerrier suggested that the teachers were viewing 
the sentence as a generalised conditional - they were inferring an illicit "for 
all" at the front of the sentence. When the sentence is seen like this, it is 
indeed false. However, in the teacher's quote, they speak of the link between 
the statements being of primary importance. This sounds more like a warranted 
conditional interpretation than the generalised conditional that is suggested by 
Durand-Guerrier. 
Durand-Guerrier went further by concluding that all analyses of logical rea- 
soning using propositional, rather than predicate, logic is bound to fail. She 
argued that such an approach (including that adopted by, for example, Toul- 
min, 1958) ignores the possibility of contingent sentences, and thus is neces- 
sarily inaccurate. Inglis and Simpson (2006) found that posing the maze task 
in a mathematical context biases participants away from responding with what 
Durand-Guerrier considered to be the mathematical correct answer, and sug- 
gested that Durand-Guerrier's focus on such narrow logical concerns missed 
some of the psychological subtleties of the task. 
3.2.2 The truth table task. 
The truth table task has been used by many experimenters. It comes in two 
flavours: evaluative and constructive. A standard evaluative version is given 
in Figure 3.2 (p. 18). Participants are given a rule "if P, then Q" (often with 
rotated negatives 8) and are asked to identify which combinations of P, -, P, Q and 
--, Q support the rule, contradict the rule or are irrelevant to the rule (Wason 
& Johnson-Laird, 1969). In the constructive version, participants are asked to 
construct combinations that support or contradict the rule themselves (Evans, 
1972). Wason and Johnson-Laird's (1969) findings regarding the defective truth 
table (see §3.1.2) were found in both versions of the task. 
7Durand-Guerrier (2003) indicates that the "can't tell" answer was given more frequently 
by "those deemed good at mathematics" (p. 9), although she offers no data to support this. 
8Rotating the negatives here refers to using four different versions of each rule: instead of 
just using "if P, then Q", the rules "if P, then ýQ", "if -P, then Q" and "if -P, then -Q" 
would also be used. 
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The vast majority of experiments with the truth table task have used ab- 
stract content (like that shown in Figure 3.2). But Newstead, Charles Ellis, 
Evans, and Dennis (1997) asked participants to solve the task with thematic 
content. They used rules that were classified as either promises, threats, tips, 
warnings, temporals, causals, and universals. 9 They found that the type of 
content had a significant effect upon the response. For example, promises and 
threats seemed to increase the frequency of the material equivalence interpre- 
tation. The effect of thematic content on the participants' responses to logical 
tasks is discussed further, with reference to the Wason Selection Task, in Chap- 
ter 4. 
There are no examples of mathematics education researchers who have used 
the truth table task. However, another classic logical problem, the so-called 
inference task, has been used with various mathematical populations. 
3.2.3 The inference task. 
The inference task involves participants being asked to judge the validity of 
deductions from a conditional. O'Brien's (1973) version is shown in Figure 
3.1.10 
Typically almost all participants succeed in making the modus ponens, far 
fewer successfully use modus tollens (between 40-80%), and the numbers that 
incorrectly deny the antecedent and confirm the consequent varies considerably 
between studies. Evans, Newstead, and Byrne (1993) summarised the research 
in the field and noted that the percentage of participants found in different 
studies to deny the antecedent varied between 17 and 73%. Newstead et al. 
(1997) attributed this variation to subtle differences in the way the task was 
presented. In any case, they note that the frequency of denying the antecedent 
and confirming the consequent deductions is roughly equal. As with the truth 
table task, Newstead et al. (1997) found that the type of thematic content 
makes a significant difference to the results. 
Hoyles and Michemann (2002) gave a mathematically based inference task to 
schoolchildren in years 8 and 9. They were given the rule "if the product of two 
whole numbers is odd then their sum is even" and were told that the product of 
two numbers is 1271.47% correctly made the modus ponens deduction, whereas 
47% suggested that they needed to know what the numbers were before they 
would know. 
'For example, one of the 'warning' rules was "if you wear Everton's colours to the match 
you'll be beaten up on the train". Options included: "Sandy didn't wear Everton's colours to 
the match; he wasn't beaten up on the train" and "Sandy did wear Everton's colours to the 
match; he wasn't beaten up on the train". 
10O'Brien's version is slightly unusual in that it has neither abstract nor realistic-thematic 
content. 
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A slightly modified non-mathematical, thematic content inference task" was 
given to two mathematical populations, maths students and maths education 
students, by Stylianedes, Stylianedes, and Philippou (2004). They only tested 
the modus tollens deduction and the denial of the antecedent fallacy. 67% of 
rnaths education students and 76% of maths students successfully identified 
the modus tollens deduction as correct. Surprisingly the figures for identifying 
the incorrect nature of denying the antecedent were 76% and 60% respectively. 
These figures are only moderately higher than for the closest equivalent question 
given by Newstead et al. (1997), who found that 60% and 48% respectively cor- 
rectly answered the denial of the antecedent and modus tollens questions (with 
causal content). Barring the (seemingly inconclusive) differences between the 
two groups it is difficult to see what can be concluded from Stylianedes et al. 's 
(2004) work, as they failed to have either a control group of non-mathematicians, 
or an isomorphic task with mathematical content. 
Although, as discussed here, several mathematics education researchers have 
studied logical implication using the inference, truth table and maze tasks, few 
have used by far the most famous deductive reasoning instrument: the Wason 
Selection Task. The long history and literature surrounding this task forms the 
subject of the next chapter. 
3.3 Summary of Chapter 3. 
Many researchers, philosophers and curriculum bodies have assumed that 
studying mathematics develops logical reasoning skills (C. Davis, 1850/1970; 
Locke, 1706/1971; Oakley, 1946; QAA, 2002). 
9 Conditional 'if... then' statements form one of the most important parts 
of logic. 
9 Several different models for how conditional statements are understood 
have been proposed by researchers from various communities. Many of 
these models overlap with one another. 
Several different 'standard' tasks has been used to investigate the issue of 
how conditional statements are used and understood. The most famous 
of these, the Wasdn Selection Task, is the subject of the next Chapter. 
"The rules were "if Costas suffered from pneumonia, he would have high fever" and "if the 
car doesn't have fuel, it will not move", both would seem to fall into NewsteaA et al. 's (1997) 
'causal' category. 
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Chapter 4 
The Wason Selection Task 
and. Theories of Reasoning 
The Wason Selection Task has been consistently used by reasoning researchers 
for the last forty years. Over this time it has influenced the development of 
many competing theories of reasoning, and led to the rejection of many oth- 
ers. The goal of this chapter is to set out the context in which the task was 
introduced, to describe the main empirical findings, and to review the major 
theories of reasoning that attempt to account for these findings. It is important. 
to emphasise, however, that the reasoning theories discussed in this chapter are 
not intended to apply only to the selection task, their proponents would claim 
far wider domains of applicability. 
4.1 The brain-computer metaphor. 
Boolean logic was first described in detail by the British mathematician George 
Boole in the middle of the nineteenth century. His work is often considered as 
forming the basis of logic and computing. But at the time, following Aristotle, 
Boole believed that his logical laws were an accurate description of the thought 
processes of human beings. The title of his book - 'An Investigation into the 
Laws of Thought' (Boole, 1854/1958) - provides a succinct summary of his 
thesis. Although, of course, people sometimes make mistakes in their reasoning, 
Boole saw these as an aberration. On the whole, for him, the brain worked 
along the same lines as correct Boolean logic. 
This view, that the brain was a some kind of logical machine, was widespread 
throughout much of the first half of the twentieth century. It was significantly 
boosted by the development of the first computers in the post-war years. In 1943 
31 
McCulloch and Pitts managed to prove mathematically that a sufficiently large 
network of formal neurons (equivalent to the base logical units of the brain) 
formed a Turing machine. That is to say that, anything a computer could do, 
could, in theory, also be done by a network of neurons, in other words a brain 
(McCulloch & Pitts, 1943). 
Piaget agreed with Boole, claiming that by the age of twelve children would 
have reached the stage of 'formal operations' and that their thinking would be 
abstract, formal and logical. He wrote: 
"reasoning is nothing more than the propositional calculus itself. " 
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 305) 
So, at the beginning of the sixties many cognitive scientists were convinced 
that the human brain reasoned along the lines described by Boole; in effect it 
was just a complicated logical machine. It took the work of psychologists such 
as Peter Wason to cast doubt upon this claim. 
The Selection Task, one of the most widely studied experiments in psycholog- 
ical research, was piloted, and then reported, by Wason (1966,1968). According 
to Johnson-Laird (2003), the Selection Task "has launched more investigations 
than any other cognitive puzzle". There have been literally thousands of papers 
written using data from various different versions of the task. By necessity then, 
the following review can only begin to give a broad overview. 
4.2 The task. 
Participants in the standard abstract version of the task are shown a selection 
of cards each of which have a letter on one side and a number on the other. 
The participants can see: 
D 
They are given the following instructions: 
Here is a rule: 
"if a, card has aD on one side, then it has a3 on the other. " 
Your task is to select all those cards, but only those cards, which 
you would have to turn over in order to discover whether the rule is 
true or false. 
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selection 
p 33 
P, Q 46 
P, -Q 4 
P, Q, -Q 7 
others 10 
Table 4.1: Wason's initial results for the rule "if P, then Q" (Wason & Johnson- 
Laird, 1972, p. 182). 
The correct answer is to pick the D card and the 7 card, but across a wide 
range of published literature less than 10% of the general population do. Instead 
most choose D and 3 (denoted P, Q in Table 4.1). 
Wason's results came as something of a surprise. ' As noted above, Piaget 
had claimed that adult humans reason in ways that are abstract, formal and 
logical. If this were true, one would expect adults to perform nearly flawlessly 
on the Selection Task. Instead the 'failure' rate was over 90%. Wason wrote: 
"Some of the highly intelligent subjects tested in [my] experiments 
took a considerable time before they saw [the answer] was correct, 
and a few continued to dispute its correctness. And yet a computer 
could readily be programmed to solve the problem, as some sub- 
jects have been quick to point out after they had failed to solve it. " 
(Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972, p. 173) 
Wason was concerned that his results were due to some methodological prob- 
lem. To counter this he began to tinker with the details of the task. To demon- 
strate that the task was sufficiently simple to be understood by the popula- 
tion he was dealing with, he reversed the experiment. Participants were given 
the question and the answer, and were asked to explain why the solution was 
correct. All twenty participants managed this successfully. From this result 
Wason concluded that the task is "deceptive rather than complex" (Wason & 
Johnson-Laird, 1972, p. 174). Indeed it has since been found that participants 
will readily justify any answer given to them by the experimenter: correct or 
incorrect (Evans & Over, 1996a). 
In another experiment the wording and symbols used in the question was 
tweaked. Instead of presenting the rule as "if a card has aD on one side then 
it has a3 on the other", it was phrased "every card which has a red triangle 
'In Wason's (1968) original experiment, paxticipants (all psychology undergraduates) were 
interviewed in person. The instructor pointed to each of the four cards in turn and asked the 
participant whether knowing what was on the other side would enable him or her to find out 
whether the sentence was true or false. Administering the task on paper rather than verbally 
has been found not to affect the results and is now the norm in Selection Task research. 
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on one side has a blue circle on the other". The options were then red triangle, 
red circle, blue triangle and blue circle. No change in performance was detected 
(Wason, 1969). 
Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970) modified the task so that all the informa- 
tion was included on one side of the cards, but so that some of it was covered 
up by a mask. Again, no improvement in performance was detected. ' 
Clearly then, Wason's worries about methodological flaws were unfounded. 
His abstract version of the Selection Task has been found to be highly robust. 
4.3 Accepted results from the Selection Task. 
The Selection Task is controversial, as some interpret the finding that partic- 
ipants fail to find the logically correct answer as being an attack on human 
rationality (see §4.5). Over the years, however, there have been several stable 
findings that are not in dispute, and in this section four of the most important 
are described. 
4.3.1 Matching bias. 
First noted by Evans and Lynch (1973), matching bias is the tendency to select 
cards that are mentioned in the rule, regardless of the presence of negatives. So 
with a rule "if P then Q", participants tend to select P and Q. However, if the 
rule is "if P then -, Q" they also tend to select P and Q, which is in this case the 
correct answer. Evans and Lynch found, for example, that 61% of respondents 
answered correctly on the rule ccS =: ý, --, gi)3 compared to only 13% on the rule 
"S =: ý- 9". Extraordinarily, the standard mistake, that of selecting P and Q, was 
made by nobody when confronted by aS =* --, 9 rule. 
Evans, Clibbens, and Rood (1995) used three different types of rule, together 
with rotated negatives: "if P, then Q", 'T only if Q" and "Q if P". All three 
showed significant matching bias effects. Evans et al. also found that instructing 
participants to verify or falsify the rule does not appear to reduce the effect of 
matching bias, and that the effect is more pronounced on abstract versions 
of the task (as opposed to thematic versions, see §4.3.2). Evans, Ellis, and 
Newstead (1996) found that varying the instruction type does not limit the 
2Curiously, this experiment appears to have anticipated and dealt with Durand-Guerrier's 
(1996) later criticism. Durand-Guerrier argued that the reason why participants perform 
poorly on the task is that dealing with "hidden sides" complicates the logic involved. However, 
as we have seen, Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970) showed that placing all the information on 
one side does not improve performance. 
3The implication symbol here is used to save space, in farct Evans and Lynch used the rule 
"if there is an 'S' on one side of the card then there will be a '9' on the other". A similar 
convention is adopted throughout this thesis. 
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effect of matching bias. Both instructing participants to verify the rule and to 
falsify the rule results in significant matching bias effects. 
The logical structure of the rule used in the task appears to be important 
in determining whether matching bias is an important effect or not. Ormerod, 
Manktelow, and Jones (1993) found that matching bias was present on rules 
such as "P only if Q" and "Q if P". Roberts (2002) compared the effect be- 
tween conditional rules ("if P then Q") and disjunctive rules ("P or Q"), both 
with rotated negatives. He found that although, in line with Evans's work, the 
conditional rules resulted in a large matching bias effect, the disjunctive rule 
appeared to produce a reverse matching bias effect. Roberts concluded that 
matching bias is not always generalisable beyond conditionals and that existing 
theories do not account for it. 
Evans (1998b) noted that not all the existing theories of conditional rea- 
soning can begin to offer an explanation of matching bias. As we shall see, 
pragmatic reasoning schemas (§4.4.3) and social contract theory (§4.4.5) do not 
even attempt to offer an explanation for Evans and Lynch's (1973) findings in 
their abstract contexts. In short, matching bias is an extremely robust finding 
when applied to abstract conditionals, and many theories have trouble explain- 
ing it. 
4.3.2 The thematic effect. 
Wason and Shapiro (1971) found that performance on the Selection Task could 
be improved by phrasing the task using thematic materials. Instead of using 
an abstract rule that refers to letters and numbers, Wason and Shapiro used 
the rule "every time I travel to Manchester I travel by train", with the cards 
'Manchester', 'Leeds', 'train' and 'car'. On this task 10 out of 16 participants 
selected the correct answer: Manchester and car. A similar result was found 
by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, and Legrenzi (1972), who asked participants to 
pretend they were postal workers and gave them rules such as "a letter is sealed 
only if it has a 5d stamp on it". This rule elicited a correct response rate of 
81%. 
The naive assumption in the 1970s was that any thematic materials im- 
proved performance. However, later studies threw doubt upon this belief when 
they failed to find such an effect despite using identical materials to Wason and 
Shapiro (e. g. Griggs & Cox, 1982; Manktelow & Evans, 1979). It has since 
become clear that only certain types of materials robustly facilitate: in par- 
ticular it seems that only rules which are deontic (those which convey rules, 
permissions, duties or obligations) produce higher success rates. Conversely, 
indicative rules (those which merely describe the world) seem not to facilitate 
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Rule: "If a person is drinking alcohol then they must 
be aged 18 or over. " 
You may check how old people are and what they are 
drinking. Which people in the bar would you need 
to check? There is a beer drinker, a coke drinker, a 
14 year-old and a 22 year-old. 
Figure 4.1: The drinking age version of the task. 
performance. 
The first robust finding of thematic facilitation came from Griggs and Cox 
(1982) and is shown in Figure 4.1. They found that many more people answered 
correctly on this version (,, zý 70%) than on the original abstract task. Griggs and 
Cox also looked at a transportation problem but found little facilitation. They 
concluded that when the rule was not familiar to the subjects it did not improve 
performance. 4 
Since Griggs and Cox (1982), thematic effects have been observed in many 
studies. However, as we shall see, the precise nature of the thematic content re- 
quired for facilitation, and the reason why it occurs, remains highly controversial 
(see §4.4.3-4.4.5). 
4.3.3 The training/education non-effect. 
Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Oliver (1986) compared the performance of their 
participants on the task before and after six different types of training, including 
a full term's course in logic. Intriguingly, they found that only two of their 
training types made a difference: I training in abstract logic coupled with explicit 
examples of selection problems, and training in the nature of obligations and the 
procedures needed to check whether violations of these obligations had taken 
place. The full term's course in logic had no significant effect upon performance. 
In another experiment, the Selection Task was given to two groups of par- 
ticipants, those with Bachelor degrees and those with doctorates (from four 
different subject areas). No difference in performance was found between the 
two groups (Jackson & Griggs, 1988). 
Of particular interest for the current study is the subject areas used by Jack- 
son and Griggs. Twenty participants were mathematicians (10 with bachelor 
'The large effect found by Wason and Shapiro (1971) can perhaps be put down to a small 
sample size. Interestingly, the rule used by Johnson-Laird et al. (1972) was actually a postal 
regulation in Britain prior to 1968. Griggs and Cox, therefore, argue that the effect was down 
to the familiarity with the rule rather than the thematic materials. 
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degrees and 10 with doctorates). On this very small sample, they found that 
5 participants with bachelors and 7 participants with doctorates found the cor- 
rect answer, significantly higher percentages than those found in other subject 
areas. There was no significant difference between the two levels of education 
for mathematicians. As the difference between mathematics and other subjects 
wasn't their research question, Jackson and Griggs failed to follow up on this 
finding, merely commenting that it is "probable that mathematics subjects are 
more familiar with the material conditional and the other rules in propositional 
logic" (p. 329). 
The lack of an education effect was questioned somewhat by Stanovich and 
West (2000) who found that there is a correlation between performance on the 
abstract Selection Task and SAT scores. They claimed that this showed that 
performance on the Selection Task was linked with 'cognitive abilities'. On an 
abstract problem, they found that those who found the correct answer (12% 
of their sample) had an average SAT score of 1159, compared to an average 
SAT score of 1098 for those answering incorrectly. This difference is significant 
(P < 0.05) and gives a surprisingly large effect size (d = 0.558) (Stanovich 
West, 1998, p. 210). Others, however, have noted that SAT scores are not a 
particularly good indicator of cognitive ability, and that a correlation is not 
surprising since SATs often contain similar reasoning tasks (Sternberg, 2000). 
Although no research has set out to look at the differences in performance 
on the Selection Task between mathematicians and non-mathematicians, there 
have been several studies that did just this for scientists. None has found that 
they perform significantly better than the general population on an abstract 
version of the task (Kern, Mirels, & Hinshaw, 1983; Griggs & Randell, 1986). 
Other researchers have investigated whether exposure to thematic versions of 
the Selection Task can facilitate performance on the abstract version. Very little 
transfer between the task types has been found (Evans et al., 1996; Johnson- 
Laird et al., 1972; Wason & Shapiro, 1971). However, it has been found that 
giving participants feedback regarding their answers can improve performance. 
Klaczynski, Gelfand, and Reese (1989) found that explaining the task to partic- 
ipants improved performance on the abstract version. Intriguingly, explaining 
the task to participants appeared to actually decrease their performance on 
thematic versions. 
4.3.4 Changes in the wording of the task. 
There is some evidence that performance on thematic versions of the Selection 
Task can be affected considerably by sinall changes on the wording of the task. 
For example, Griggs and Cox (1982) found that when participants were given 
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thematic materials and were asked to pick the cards that might be "violating 
the rule" - as opposed to picking the cards that would help determine "where 
the rule is true or false" - performance increased. Interestingly, the same change 
in wording on the abstract task had no effect (Manktelow, 1999). Jackson and 
Griggs (1990) had similar findings. On thematic versions of the task, instruc- 
tions to pick out violators facilitated performance when compared to "true or 
false" instructions. However, the same was not the case on abstract versions of 
the task. As mentioned above, Wason (1969) found that changing the rule on 
the abstract task from "if a card has aD on one side then it has a3 on the 
other side" to "every card with aD on one side has a3 on the other" had no 
effect on performance. 
4.3.5 Summary of §4.3. 
Although there are many highly controversial results from Selection Task re- 
search, several robust findings stand out. Any theory that attempts to account 
for people's performance on the task must provide an account for these findings. 
* On the standard task typically less than 10% of the well educated popu- 
lation select the normatively correct answer. 
Matching bias - the tendency for people to select the cards mentioned in 
the rule, regardless of the normatively correct answer - is a widespread 
phenomena on the Selection Task. 
The thematic effect: participants tend to select the normatively correct 
answer in significantly higher numbers when the task is phrased in realistic 
contexts, with thematic content. 
The training/education non-effect: there appears to be no correlation be- 
tween level of education and performance on the Selection Task. However, 
it has been found that there is a correlation between solving the task cor- 
rectly and achieving high SATs scores. 
In the next section seven theoretical frameworks that try to account for these 
results are discussed. 
4.4 Theories of reasoning. 
There have been many theories proposed to explain the Selection Task. Most 
have been discredited since they were first proposed. However, there are several 
that still attract supporters. In this section the most important theories are 
described, in rough chronological order. It is important to note that all of these 
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theories are attempts to explain general reasoning, they do not simply apply to 
the Selection Task. However, since the task has become so ubiquitous in the 
literature the review particularly concentrates on explaining how each theory 
accounts for the surprising results the task has uncovered. 
4.4.1 Mental models theory. 
Mental models theory (e. g. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird, 2001) 
proposes that instead of following logical rules during reasoning, people con- 
struct models in their minds which they modify and reason from. When a new 
situation is encountered, the reasoner goes through three stages: 
9 They look at the premises ("world knowledge") and create a mental model 
of the possible situation they find themselves in. 
9 They form a non-trivial conclusion that is based upon the premises of 
their model. 
* They look for counterexamples to their model and conclusion. If they 
cannot find any, then they accept the conclusion. 
To explain the different models reasoners may construct, Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (1991) use the so-called 'mental models notation'. In this notation, each 
line represents a different modelled case, and each item is represented in a 
column. The absence of an item simply means that it does not feature in 
that particular model. For example, the statement "there is A and B" would 
probably be modelled as: 
AB 
Whereas the statement "there is A, or there is B" might be represented with 
two alternative models: 
A 
B 
To represent that an item has been exhaustively modelled, Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne's (1991) use square brackets. Thus, a model of "either there is A or there 
is B, but not both" might be initially modelled: 
[A] 
[B] 
But since 13 is exhaustively represented in the second model, the first model 
could be "fleshed out" to become: 
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[A] [-B] 
and similarly for the second model. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) explain that the rule "if P then Q" can 
result in several different models, and that, in the Selection Task, participants 
will consider selecting "only those cards that are explicitly represented in their 
models of the rule" (p. 79). They explain that this is a consequence of the 
so-called principle of truth, a fundamental assumption of the mental models 
theory: 
"Individuals minimize the load on working memory by tending to 
construct mental models that represent explicitly only what is true, 
and not what is false. " (Johnson-Laird, 1999, p. 116). 
So, from cards explicitly represented in the model, only the cards that have a 
hidden value which might effect the truth/falsity of the rule will be selected. ' 
So, for example, the rule "if P then Q" often results in this model: 
[P] Q 
Here the ". .. " represents a model with no explicit content. Note that this 
model is, in the terminology adopted in §3.1.9, a version of TI. The mental 
models theory argues that the material model of the conditional is correct, and 
that the problems with it discussed earlier can be explained away by which 
aspects of the reasoner's model have been 'fleshed out' (Over, 2004). 
As a consequence of the model above, the reasoner considers the P and Q 
cards, but picks only the P card. The majority of participants who interpret the 
rule as a biconditional form the following model, and pick the P and Q cards: 
IQ] 
The --Q card will only be picked if the reasoner has fleshed out their original 
model sufficiently so as to represent it explicitly: 
Q 
-IQ 
Since P is represented exhaustively in the first model, it is tacit that the situa, 
tion must be: 
[P] Q 
-1p -, Q 
5This explanation is an adaptation of the no/partial/complete insight explanation detailed 
by Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970). 
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Thus, the mental model theory attributes poor performance on the task 
to the rarity of participants fleshing out their model of the implication. The 
frequency of the P and Q selection can be explained by the large proportion of 
participants who initially model "if P then Q" as the bi-conditional "P if and 
only if Q". Exactly why so many people misinterpret the conditional like this 
is left unexplained. 
Mental models theory accounts for the matching bias effect by suggesting 
that when a negated sentence is involved in the rule the model is expanded to in- 
clude the non-negated sentence. So, for example, P -, Q might be represented 
by: 
[P] -iQ 
Q 
Here the second model is incomplete, meaning that the reasoner is thinking 
about the situation that Q is true, but is not considering whether P or ýP is 
true in this case. Thus, by some creative application of the theory, the matching 
bias effect can be accounted for. However, the mental models theory has been 
criticised by Evans and Over (1996a) for its inability to parsimoniously explain 
biases. 
As a consequence of their theory Johnson-Laird and Byrne made several 
predictions of facilitative changes that could be made to the Selection Task. 
The most striking was that changing the rule to an "only if" structure should 
improve performance, as it has a different typical initial representation. However 
it doesn't. Instead, both Evans et al. (1996) and Evans, Legrenzi, and Girotto 
(1999) found that it increased the frequency of -, P and Q selections, and slightly 
depressed performance overall. The theory has also been criticised for not being 
specific about how reasoners translate "world knowledge" into mental models. 
It should be noted that mental models theory has been applied to a vast 
array of reasoning tasks, not just the Selection Task. In general it accounts for 
most of the effects reported on these tasks successfully. 
4.4.2 Mental logic (mental rules) theory. 
An alternative to Johnson-Laird and Byrne's (1991) mental models theory is 
the mental logic theory' (e. g. Rips, 1989,1994) which claims that there is an 
inbuilt logical system that guides human's reasoning. He explained that 
"a person faced with a task involving deduction attempts to carry 
it out through a series of steps that take him or her from an initial 
6The mental logic theory is also sometimes referred to as 'natural deduction theory', 'in- 
ference rule theory' or 'mental rules theory'. 
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Given that: 
If the letter is aK then the number is a 7. 
The number is not a 7. 
Therefore? 
Figure 4.2: A standard modus tollens inference task. 
description of the problem to its solution. These intermediate steps 
are licensed by mental inference rules, such as modus ponens, whose 
output people find intuitively obvious. " (Rips, 1994, p. x) 
So, a person constructs a sort of mental proof and then verifies it. That many 
people answer non-normatively to reasoning tasks is because they are not flaw- 
less at their proof construction. 
Rips developed this theory using the "knights and knaves" puzzle. 7 He ar- 
gued that the logical system was formed of abstract inference rules and schemas 
that are used across-all domains, for all reasoning problems. Evidence for this 
theory came from qualitative 'think aloud' interviews that Rips conducted with 
participants on knights and knaves tasks. ' By constructing a computer model 
of the supposed natural deduction system, he was able to accurately predict 
how long participants would take to solve problems based upon how many steps 
his computer program required. 
The mental logic theory argues that the modus ponens rule is universal - it is 
one of the rules that can be applied directly. Modus tollens, however, requires a 
complicated argument to justify it. For example, consider a standard inference 
task such as that shown in Figure 4.2. Here, according to the theory, the 
question can only be answered by using a complicated contradiction argument 
as follows: "Suppose the letter is a K. It follows (by modus ponens) that the 
number is a 7. The number is not a7 (by assumption). Therefore the letter 
cannot be a K. " Naturally, the success rate at completing this argument is lower 
than for the straight forward modus ponens question. 
Rips (1994) explained data from the Selection Task by pointing out that his 
theory suggests people should only pick the P card. As there is no conclusion to 
test, only forward rules can be used to solve the task. In particular, he claimed, 
7This puzzle, beloved of recreational mathematics books, involves an island populated 
solely by knights and knaves. Knights always tell the truth, and knaves always lie. A vast 
array of problems such as the following can be posed: "We have three inhabitants, A, B, and 
C, each of whom is a knight or a knave. Two people are said to be of the same type if they 
are both knights or both knaves. A and B make the following statements: A: 'B is a knave'. 
B: 'A and C axe of the same type. ' What is CT' (Rips, 1989, p. 86). 
81nterestingly, Rips is one of the few psychologists to have used a clinical interview method- 
ology in the area of logical reasoning (see also Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2001). 
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orily the fundamental 'if-elimination' rule is used, and only with reference to 
the P card. The modal selection, that of the P and Q cards, is explained in 
Rips' scheme by suggesting people who answer this read the "if P then Q" rule 
as a biconditional. In this respect, the theory is similar to the mental models 
account. Indeed Oaksford and Chater (1995b) have argued that the two theories 
are, on a fundamental level, the same. 
However there are problems with the mental logic account. Evans et al. 
(1995), for example, noted that because of the structure of the natural deduc- 
tion system, mental logic theory suggests that participants in the Selection Task 
should make the mistakes of denying the antecedent and of affirming the con- 
sequent in roughly the same frequency. This does not happen. Participants 
affirm the consequent (select the 3 card) much more frequently than they deny 
the antecedent (select the K). 
Chao and Cheng (2000) argued against the mental logic theory by showing 
that, for young children, modus tollens and modus ponens inferences were much 
more likely to be made on a permission based thematic task than on the abstract 
version. They used this result to argue that pragmatic rules (see §4.4.3) develop 
before generalised logical rules. This finding would appear to contradict Rips' 
claim that his natural deduction system is innate. 
4.4.3 Pragmatic reasoning schemas theory. 
According to the pragmatic reasoning schemas theory (Cheng et al., 1986), 
rather than reason according to logic rules, individuals use pragmatic reasoning 
schemas: abstract structures of knowledge derived from day-to-day life experi- 
ences. Examples of important experiences that give rise to prominent schemas 
would be permissions, obligations and causations. 
Cheng and Holyoak (1989) propose four rules that they claim participants 
have as part of a conditional permission pragmatic reasoning schema that may 
be used when tackling a thematic version of the Selection Task, such as the 
drinking age problem: 
1. If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied. 
2. If the action is not to be taken, then the precondition need not be satisfied. 
3. If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken. 
4. If the precondition is not satisfied, the the action must not be taken. 
(Cheng & Holyoak, 1989, p. 287) 
They note that this conditional permission schema maps successfully onto 
the material conditional, but write: 
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"When an 'if-then' statement evokes a schema that does not map 
onto the material conditional, or when no schema is evoked at all, 
then performance will be less likely to conform to the specification 
of formal logic. " (Cheng & Holyoak, 1989, p. 287) 
Thus the reason why participants fare so poorly on the traditional abstract ver- 
sion of the task is that they do not evoke a pragmatic reasoning schema; the 
question is simply too far removed from their everyday lives. Conversely, how- 
ever, if the task involves a permission or obligation conditional then performance 
will be facilitated. One of the predictions of the theory, that as long as partici- 
pants have had experience of permission and obligation rules, performance will 
be facilitated, was tested by Chao and Cheng (2000) (mentioned above). They 
found that young children, who have had experience with these rules had their 
performance facilitated. 
Another important prediction of the theory is that facilitation should result 
from permission and obligation rules rather than just from cost-benefit rules 
(see §4.4.5). Cheng and Holyoak (1989) tested this prediction by using so-called 
precautionary rules of the form "If one is to, engage in hazardous activity P, then 
one must have protection Q". Despite having no obvious cost-benefit structure, 
these rules resulted in significant facilitation. 
Despite this finding, Cosmides (1989) and Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) both 
argue the opposite case, that cost-benefit (or deontic) materials are necessary 
for facilitation. For proponents of this idea, precautionary rules are a special 
form of a more general cost-benefit rule structure (Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
2000). This so-called social contract theory will be described in more detail in 
§4.4.5. 
The other two main criticisms that are levelled against the pragmatic rea- 
soning schemas theory can also be deployed against all domain specific theories 
(including social contract theory, §4.4.5). Firstly, by concentrating entirely on 
the context the task is set in, the theory cannot hope to be a complete account 
of reasoning. When the task is given in an abstract context, reasoning is still 
going on, but no domain specific theory can explain it. Furthermore, no such 
theory can account for matching bias in an abstract context. Given the dra- 
matic level of facilitation that results from rotating the negatives in the rule, 
this is a serious omission for any theory that attempts to explain the Selection 
Task. 
Secondly, there are methodological problems with comparing thematic and 
abstract versions of the task. Jackson and Griggs (1990) looked at differences 
in wording between permission rules and abstract problems. They found that 
when wording changes (instructions to look for violators) were eliminated, per- 
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formance on the permission rules was just as poor as for the abstract version. 
In addition, it can be argued that Wason's original question and (for ex- 
ample) the drinking age task are in fact two subtly different questions. In the 
original, the participants are being asked to test the rule (Manktelow & Over, 
1990). In most thematic versions the rule is a given and participants are being 
asked to test the cards. For example, the rule "if there is aD on one side then 
there is a3 on the other" is in doubt, the participants are being asked to test 
whether it is the case or not. However, the rule "If a person is drinking alcohol 
then they must be aged 18 or over" is not up for dispute, here the task is to 
evaluate whether the cards satisfy the rule, not to test whether the rule satisfies 
the cards (see also the categorisation task given by Sperber & Girotto, 2002). 
4.4.4 Information value theory. 
First proposed by Oaksford and Chater (1994), information value theory' starts 
from the idea that the Selection Task is a problem about decision making, not 
about logical reasoning. According to the theory, the key aim of participants is 
to increase the amount of information they have about the situation by reducing 
uncertainty. Indeed, for Oaksford and Chater, extra information is defined to 
be less uncertainty. Oaksford and Chater argue that it is unreasonable to label 
participants who fail to make the logically correct selection as 'irrational'. They 
suggest that participants will only turn over cards that have a high probability 
of resulting in a substantial information gain, by reducing uncertainty. 10 This, 
for them, is an entirely rational strategy. 
Uncertainty is measured using information theory, and the expected informa- 
tion gain associated with each card is measured with Bayes' theorem, allowing 
for errors through a so-called 'noise' factor. Ordering cards by expected infor- 
mation gain reveals the same order (P >Q>-, Q > -, P) as the frequency of 
selection by samples in most studies. 
Importantly for this theory, the amount of information a card can be ex- 
pected to reveal is heavily dependent upon whether or not it is part of a large 
or small sample. The theory only makes sense if participants interpret the con- 
ditional as describing the situation of an entire population of cards, of which 
the four in front of them are merely a sample. 
In this respect the theory has a close connection with the notorious ravens 
paradox (Hempel, . 1945). This is the observation that observing a non-black 
non-raven -a yellow bus, for example - provides evidence to support the claim 
9AIso known as utility theory', 'rational analysis, 'information gain theory' or 'optimal 
data selection theory'. 
10This idea has strong echoes of relevance theory's notion of cognitive effect (see §4.4.6). 
In fact, Oaksford and Chater (1995a) argue that expected information gain is a quantified 
measure of relevance. 
45 
"all ravens are black". No one, however, would go round looking for yellow buses 
if they were asked to evaluate a claim about black ravens, finding one wouldn't 
result in a sufficient information gain to make the exercise worthwhile. Note 
that the materials used by the experimenter in the Selection Task do not always 
clarify whether or not the cards are samples from a population. Despite this, 
Oaksford & Chater claim that this is the interpretation that the participants 
always make. 
These considerations can be used to explain the thematic facilitation effect. 
For example, on the drinking age task it is not reasonable to assume that the 
probability of Q is low. This increases the information value of ýQ, and Oaks- 
ford and Chater's (1994) calculations do not apply. 
One of the major predictions of information value theory then, is that the 
experimenter can alter card selections by altering the population size from which 
the antecedent and consequent conditions in the rule are drawn. This was 
experimentally demonstrated to be an accurate prediction by Kirby (1994). 
No other current theory has accounted for this. Kirby gave a rule where the 
antecedent came from either a small, medium or large population. He found 
that selections of -, Q increased as the size of the P set increased. 
However, these results are very controversial and have not been successfully 
replicated by, amongst others, Hattori (2002). Hattori found that increasing the 
P set made subjects more likely to choose P and had no effect upon the rate 
of -, Q selection, contrary to the predictions of information value theory. There 
are also other difficulties with the theory. Laming (1996) pointed out that since 
the P card will always provide the greatest information gain, it is peculiar that 
not every participant makes this selection. Only a large percentage do. 
Evans and Over (1996b) criticised the theory by wondering whether uncer- 
tainty is a useful measure of information gain. They pointed out that if one's 
belief about a hypothesis' probability changed from 0.2 to 0.8 then the amount 
of uncertainty remains constant (at 0.2) despite a dramatically altered belief. 
Despite minor alterations in the theory to account for this criticism, Evans and 
Over (1996a) reiterated it, saying that new data leads to 'epistemic utility', an 
altogether more complicated construct to measure than information gain. 
It is important to realise that the information value theory is does not at- 
tempt to explain how participants reach their conclusions on the Selection Task, 
it is merely an attempt to justify why these are not irrational responses. In this 
respect the theory is quite different to many of the others discussed in this 
chapter. 
46 
4.4.5 Social contract theory. 
As mentioned previously, social contract theory attempts to explain why perfor- 
mance on the Selection Task is facilitated by using certain thematic materials. 
Proposed by Cosmides (1989), the theory suggests that humans have evolved 
a domain specific 'cheater detection' mechanism that allows humans to easily 
detect those who 'cheat'. For Cosmides, a social contract is a situation where 
two individuals agree to exchange a benefit for a cost. A cheater is someone 
who fails to fulfil their part of the bargain, i. e. sorneone who tries to take 
the benefit without paying the cost. Pinker (1997) explains that an advanced 
cheater detection unit is required if altruism was to have evolved by means of 
natural selection. In a survey of research, Cummins (1996) found that Selec- 
tion Task studies that used deontic rules had significantly higher percentages of 
participants finding the correct answer than those who had used other types of 
rules. 
Cosmides and Tooby (1992) argue that their social contract theory can ex- 
plain both the abstract and the thematic versions of the Selection Task. Since 
the abstract version has no relation to any kind of real world situation, they 
argue that the evolved mechanisms the brain has to deal with this kind of impli- 
cation aren't activated. (This explanation for poor performance on the original 
task leaves open the question as to how the people that do make the correct 
selection succeed. This omission is a common problem with Selection Task the- 
ories which concentrate on thematic versions of the task). However, when the 
rule is phrased in terms of a cost-benefit structure, the theory suggests that 
the brain's cheater detection unit is activated and performance is facilitated. 
Although, as mentioned previously, in response to Cheng and Holyoak (1989), 
Fiddick et al. (2000) modified their theory to include an evolved 'hazard man- 
agement' system that allows for Cheng & Holyoak's results. 
In the drinking age task, for example, they explain that the law "expresses 
a social contract in which one is entitled to a benefit (beer) only if one has 
satisfied a requirement (being a certain age)" (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, p-183). 
As Sterming and van Lambalgen (2004) point out however, being over 18 doesn't 
automatically entitle one to beer. Presumably Cosmides and Tooby mean that 
the benefit is the right to purchase beer rather than the beer itself. When 
phrased like this the cost-benefit structure is somewhat complex, and it could 
be argued that it requires familiarity with a very particular Westernised type of 
social contract (in the sense of Rousseau, 1762/1997) that emphasises individual 
rights. 
Social contract theory makes a couple of important predictions regarding 
the Selection Task. Firstly it claims that even an abstract Selection Task rule 
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can result in facilitation, if it is phrased in a cost-benefit structure; and sec- 
ondly, that the familiarity of the material used in the rule should have no effect 
on performance. If it is phrased in a cost-benefit structure it will facilitate 
performance, if it isn't then it won't. 
It is important to stress that social contract theory doesn't simply entail 
facilitated logical performance. It merely states that participants attempt to 
detect cheaters. For example, given the rule "if you buy a cappuccino, then you 
must pay for it", the correct selection would be "bought cappuccino" and "didn't 
pay for it" which agrees with the social contract theory prediction. However, 
switching the rule to "if you have paid for the cappuccino, then you may drink 
it" changes the logical answer (which is now "paid for the cappuccino" and 
"didn't drink it"), but the social contract cheater detection answer remains the 
same: "bought cappuccino" and "didn't pay for it". Cosmides (1989) found 
that participants do indeed perform as predicted on these so-called switched 
rule versions. She also claimed that only social contract problems exhibited 
evidence of facilitation, regardless of whether the participants were familiar or 
not with the thematic content. This finding is highly disputed. 
Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) argued that although deontic rules are neces- 
sary for facilitation, they are not sufficient. They suggest that a key issue is 
whether or not "a person is cued into the perspective of a party who can be 
cheated" (p. 127). Using the same social contract as Cosmides, they put the 
participants into the frame of mind of two groups: one group was involved in 
the social contract (they could be cheated), and one group was an impartial 
onlooker (they could watch either of the other parties be cheated). They found 
that, performance was significantly higher in the group that, was a party to the 
contract. 
Despite all this support for social contract theory, it is much criticised and 
highly controversial. Firstly, and most importantly, it is not supported by some 
of the empirical evidence. Many studies have found evidence of facilitation 
without cost-benefit or deontic materials (e. g. Almor & Sloman, 1996; Cheng 
Holyoak, 1989; Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995; Sperber & Girotto, 2002; Wason 
& Green, 1984), and several of these papers were published before Cosmides' 
own study. Rather ironically, given that the Selection Task illustrates that 
a preference for confirmation can lead to logical errors, Cosmides and Tooby 
(1992) appear to have concentrated on confirming their hypothesis rather than 
looking for data that, falsifies it. 
Others have argued that facilitation on the Selection Task in cost-benefit 
rules is down to differences in task understanding due to the linguistic features 
of each version. Liberman and Klar (1996) wrote that performance on the 
Selection Task 
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"largely depends on three aspects related to how people understand 
the task: (1) the clarity of the rule in terms of determination and 
direction; (2) the nature of the alternative to the tested rule and the 
falsifying instance it entails; (3) the perceived relevance of looking 
for violation strategy. " (p. 127) 
They modified the original cheater story by removing linguistic features that, 
they claimed would facilitate performance. Instead they added these features 
to a non-cheater story that was used by Cosmides. They found that partici- 
pants in the non-modified cheater version performed to the same level as those 
in the modified non-cheater version. In other words, the key factor was the un- 
derstanding of the purpose of the task rather than social contract rule. Similar 
results were found by Ahn and Graham (1999). 
As noted above (see p. 44), there are problems with ally domain specific 
theory. In particularly, social contract theory (and the pragmatic reasoning 
schema theory) analyses the thematic and abstract Selection Tasks as if they 
were the same question. They are not. Sperber and Girotto (2002) illustrate 
that the cost-benefit cheater detection version is merely asking participants to 
categorise cards rather than conduct logical reasoning: 
"The cheating question is not a conditional reasoning question but a 
categorization question. As explained in detail by Cosmides and her 
collaborators, cheating is commonly understood as the co-occurrence 
of the taking of a benefit and the failure to fulfil a requirement, in 
particular of paying a cost. It is, in other terms, characterized by the 
conjunction of these two features. In order to answer the cheating 
question, then, all that participants have to do is select the cards 
that exhibit one of these two features (and that might have the other 
characteristic feature on the other side). " (Sperber & Girotto, 2002, 
p. 282) 
Note that finding the conjunction of these two features is not the same as finding 
the conjunction of P and -, Q. 'Switching' the rule changes the logical answer, 
but leaves the categorisation answer the same. 
Sperber and Girotto illustrate their point by giving participants an abstract 
categorisation and a cost-benefit version of the task. (Participants were asked to 
select cards that might represent food items that were not Italian, giving them 
the options: 'food item', 'non-food item', 'Italian item', 'non-Italian item'; 91% 
made the correct selections). They found that performance was facilitated most 
for the abstract categorisation version. This led them to argue that instead of 
having found an inbuilt cheater detection unit, Cosmides had merely found that 
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humans are very good at looking for cheaters when they are asked to look for 
them. 
A final blow to social contract theory came from Stenning and van Lambal- 
gen (2004), who criticised the theory by enquiring why the supposed cheater 
detection unit fails to catch liars. They argued that lying is form of cheat- 
ing that is significantly more useful to be able to detect (from an evolutionary 
standpoint) than, for example, drinking age cheaters. However, Wason's (1968) 
original experiment demonstrated that explicit instructions to check whether 
the person putting forward the rule was "lying" or not, fails to improve perfor- 
mance. Given this, Stenning and van Lambalgen suggest that social contract 
theory "cannot plausibly" explain the difference in performance between the 
original and the thematic versions of the task. 
These criticisms of social contract theory, and of thematic versions of the 
task in general, are highly persuasive. It is methodologically flawed to regard 
thematic versions of the Selection Task as being isomorphic to abstract ver- 
sions. Whilst studying how people respond to these thematic versions may be 
interesting in its own right, it should not be of interest for those who want to 
concentrate on abstract reasoning. Consequently, no thematic Selection Tasks 
are used in the research presented in this thesis. 
4.4.6 Relevance theory. 
Relevance theory is an inferential theory of general communication (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986; Wilson & Sperber, 2004). Such theories claim that communica- 
tion takes place via a process where the audience infers the meaning that the 
communicator intended using the evidence available to them. By defining the 
notion of relevance, Sperber and Wilson can begin to explain how the inferen- 
tial process takes place. It wasn't until many years after relevance theory was 
established in linguistic fields that it was applied to the analysis of the Selection 
Task. 
The key feature of the theory is the concept of relevance. Each attempted 
communication carries with it a certain level of relevance: "an input is relevant 
to an individual when its processing in a context of available assumptions yields 
a positive cognitive effect" (Wilson & Sperber, 2004, p. 251). There are two 
main factors here: when the cognitive effect of an input (be it verbal or written) 
increases, so does its relevance; however, when the effort needed to process the 
input increases, its relevance decreases. 
The classic example from the literature is of telling a friend what time their 
train is. Saying "the next train to Dorridge is at 5: 30 p. m" is generally more 
relevant than either 
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1. "the next train to Dorridge is sometime after 4: 00 p. m. " or 
2. "the next train to Dorridge is scheduled to leave 2 hours and five minutes 
after 3: 25 p. m. " 
Sentence (1) yields less of a cognitive effect, and sentence (2), whilst yielding 
the same cognitive effect, requires more processing to reach it (Sperber, Cara, 
Girotto, 1995, p. 49). 
Suggesting that the maximisation of relevance is one of the main aims of hu- 
man cognition, the theory attempts to explain communication with the commu- 
nicative principle of relevance. The principle states that every communication 
ccconveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance" (Wilson & Sperber, 2004, 
p. 256). Optimal relevance here means two things: that every communicator 
believes that their communication is relevant enough to be worth the audiences' 
processing effort, and that the interpretation is the most relevant one that is 
compatible with their abilities and preferences. 
When a hearer receives a communication they, subconsciously and follow- 
ing a path of least processing effort, infer a meaning and test it against their 
expectations of relevance. If the meaning does not meet this expectation, it is 
enriched and expanded (again, following the path of least effort) until it does. 
Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995) used this theory to attempt to explain 
the Selection Task. According to Sperber and his colleagues, there are two sorts 
of participants. A minority that always get the task right, regardless of version. 
These select few are using a meta-inferential approach and "know the difference 
between demonstrative and non-demonstrative truth evaluation" (p. 46). The 
majority of participants, however, attempt to infer meaning from the rule in a 
relevance theoretic manner. 
They suggested that reasoners attempt to infer the consequences and conclu- 
sions from the rule, but do this from easiest to hardest in an attempt to minimise 
cognitive effort and therefore maximise relevance. Once they've reached a con- 
sequence of the rule that they deem relevant they are satisfied and select the 
cards that directly test the consequence that they've derived. There are three 
cases, in order of increasing complexity. 
1. P =* Q achieves relevance by allowing you to deduce Q from P. This 
leads you to select the P card. 
2. P =* Q achieves relevance by being interpreted as '3 x such that P(x) A 
Q(x)' (there are cases of P and Q). This leads you to select the P and Q 
cards. 
3. P =: ý, Q achieves relevance by being interpreted as '-, (3 x such that P (x) A 
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-, Q(x))' (there are no cases of P and ýQ). This leads you to select the P 
and -, Q cards. 
By following this relevance theoretic analysis, Sperber, Cara, and Girotto 
(1995) were able to predict and test three specific ways of facilitating perfor- 
mance on the Selection Task. Firstly they suggested picking P and Q such 
that PA-, Q is easier to represent than PAQ. This has the effect of reducing 
the relevance of interpretation 2 and increasing the relevance of interpretation 
3. Secondly, they suggested placing the task in a context where knowing that 
there are x that satisfy P(x) A -, Q(x) will have at least as much of a cognitive 
effect as knowing that there are x that satisfy P(x) A Q(x). 11 The last method 
they suggest is to present the rule 'if P, then Q' in such a way as to reduce 
arbitrariness in the rule. 12 
By concocting versions of the Selection Task according to their 'recipe', 
Sperber, Cara, and Girotto were able to substantially facilitate performance. 
They also found that reducing effort was a more effective manner of increasing 
performance than increasing cognitive effect, thus proving that the human brain 
rewards laziness. 
In short, Sperber, Cara, and Girotto argue that the Selection Task is not 
merely a test of formal reasoning, it is heavily dependent upon discourse com- 
prehension, a feature of human cognition that is guided by relevance. 
Several researchers have argued against the relevance theory explanation. 
Ahn and Graham (1999) found that simplifying the expression of ýQ (by using 
words such as 'unmarried' rather than 'not married') had no effect upon perfor- 
mance, contrary to the predictions of relevance theory. However, the cognitive 
effort saved (and therefore the level of facilitation gained) by transposing these 
terms must surely be minimal. Fiddick et al. (2000) also produced evidence 
that contradicted the predictions of relevance theory but, as described earlier, 
their methodology was convincingly refuted by Sperber and Girotto (2002). 
A more reasonable criticism of relevance theory is that it does not offer 
sufficient explanatory power. Why are interpretations 2 and 3 less relevant 
than I? Because they require more cognitive processing effort. But why do 
they? Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995) write 
"The conditional form 'if P, then Q' is more likely to be a felicitous 
way of conveying that there are no P-and-(not-Q) cases, when the 
fact that an item has the feature Q is inferable from the fact that it 
"One way of doing this, for example, would be to make the PAQ cases trivial, thus 
lessoning their cognitive effect. 
12They actually refer to this as "presenting the rule in a pragmatically felicitous manner" 
(p. 61). 
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has the feature P (otherwise, why not just say 'There are no P-and- 
(not-Q)s'? )" (p. 61) 
But why should saying "there are no P-and-(not-Q)s" be more relevant than 
saying "if P then Q"? Why does it require less cognitive effort? Relevance 
theory fails to answer this question in any great depth. 
4.4.7 Dual process theories of reasoning. 
Recently, the idea that there are two distinct cognitive units that deal with rea- 
soning has become fashionable amongst psychologists. Roughly speaking the 
first system corresponds with intuitive thought, and the second with abstract 
reasoning. Although there are many different versions of similar theories (e. g. 
Evans & Over, 1996a; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) the generic termi- 
nology - System 1 and System 2- adopted by Stanovich and West, has become 
commonplace. 13 
The key idea of (most versions of) dual process theory is that System 1 
heuristically selects representations that are relevant to the situation you find 
yourself in. System 2, then, slowly operates on these representations to gener- 
ate inferences and form judgements. System I filters irrelevant features of the 
environment so that the effort-intensive System 2 does not have to waste time 
on them. In short System 1 helps to form conscious thinking. 
Note that the language used here to describe and discuss System 1 and Sys- 
tem 2 is problematic. For ease of communication it is helpful to metaphorically 
talk as if each System were almost human like in its behaviours and attitudes. 
It is vital to emphasise that this is only a metaphor, used to aid to communi- 
cation. It is clear that conceptualising System 2 as if it were a person making 
decisions for the brain is not at all helpful; it merely relegates the question from 
how the person thinks to how their System 2 thinks. No progress has been 
made. This difficulty, the so-called homunculus problem, becomes an issue only 
if the language used when discussing the two Systems is taken as literal rather 
than metaphorical (for an extended discussion of the homunculus problem see 
Pinker, 1997, or Stanovich, 2004). 
System 1 is characterised by processes that are quick, operate in parallel and 
are highly context specific. These processes are preconscious in nature, only the 
end product is deposited in the conscious brain. The system is independent of 
language, and is old in evolutionary terms. System 1 is believed to be a large 
collection of subsystems that operate autonomously. 14 Most of these subsystems 
13Stanovich (2004) now refers to System I as TASS (The Autonomous Set of Systems) and 
System 2 as the Analytic System. This thesis uses the original names. 
"Hence Stanovich's (2004) recent adoption of the name TASS. 
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System 1 System 2 
Associative Rule based 
Holistic Analytic 
Parallel Serial 
Automatic Controlled 
Relatively undemanding of Relatively demanding of 
cognitive capacity cognitive capacity 
Relatively fast Relatively slow 
Highly contextualised Decontextualised 
Table 4.2: Some properties of System 1 and System 2. 
are innate. However some processes from System 2, if "habitually invoked" can, 
over time, become part of System 1 as well (Stanovich, 2004, p. 66). 
System 2, on the other hand, is slow, operates in serial and allows for non- 
contextualised hypothetical reasoning. It is controllable and conscious, has 
evolved relatively recently and it has been argued that it is unique to humans. 
It is this part of the brain that allows humans to construct complex abstract 
simulations that are context independent and depersonalised. Fluency with Sys- 
tem 2 is often measured using reasoning tests, and tends to be correlated with 
measures of general intelligence (although it is perhaps not surprising that one 
form of reasoning test correlates with another). System 2 is also involved in 
expressing the output of System 1, and it has the ability to monitor and, po- 
tentially, override these intuitive responses, although, as we shall see, this does 
not always happen. Table 4.2 summarises some of the key differences between 
System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich, 2004, p-35). 
Sloman (1996, p. 11) argues that the notorious Miiller-Lyer illusion (Figure 
4.3) illustrates that perception and knowledge are located in different systems. 
Despite knowing that the two lines are the same length, the perception that 
the higher line is longer is undiminished. Stanovich (2004, p. 41) concludes that, 
like System 1, "the perceptual input systems are another important part of your 
brain that ignores you". 
A good example of how human cognition is shaped by the two cognitive 
Systems in the brain comes from examining how chess players decide' which 
moves to make. Consider Figure 4.4. Black has just played ... 
Nx a2, what 
should be white's next move? 
Many studies on the psychology of chess have noted that when chess play- 
ers look at a position they intuitively see which moves should be considered 
(e. g. de Groot, 1978; Hartson & Wason, 1983; Kotov, 1971). For example, in 
this position it is clear to chess players that White should consider moving the 
threatened queenside rook, and possibly ought to investigate going on the attack 
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Figure 4.3: The Miiller-Lyer illusion. 
I 0 
bcdeI9h 
Figure 4.4: Black has just played 12 ... Nxa2. 
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by placing the knight on b5, threatening a fork on c7. Each of these candidate 
moves can then be analysed in detail before finally deciding which to play. 
It is clear that there are dual processes present here. System 1 heuristically 
cues which moves appear relevant, and then System 2 takes over by performing 
the slow sequential task of an in depth analysis of the different possibilities. 
No chess player when faced with this situation would for an instant analyse the 
consequences of playing their kingside rook to gl. This is not because it is a bad 
move (although it is), but rather because they do not even consider it. System 
I does not preconsciously deem it to be relevant. Thus it does not get rejected 
by System 2; it is not even contemplated. 
Without such a relevance based System 1 heuristic, chess (and indeed, life 
in general) would be impossible. There are simply too many possible moves. If 
every move had to be analysed by System 2 there would soon be a combinatorial. 
explosion, that would make the processing effort required impractical (Evans, 
1995). System 1, in this context, filters the workload of the less efficient System 
2.15 
Dual process theory suggests that there are two distinct parts of cognition 
when a participant tackles the (abstract) Selection Task. Firstly, various System 
1 heuristics preconsciously direct the participant's conscious attention to certain 
apparently relevant parts of the problem (see also Sperber & Wilson, 1986). It is 
only after attention has been directed that the slow conscious System 2 processes 
take over and analyse the problem. The nature of the System 1 heuristics and 
the extent of the post-hoc involvement of System 2 allow the theory to account 
for the different results in different types of the Selection Task experiment. 
This thesis will refer to situations such as this - where individuals are led 
to respond to a task in one manner by System 1, but then may come to realise 
(possibly with prompting) that there is an alternative more normative response 
(consistent with System 2 reasoning) - as satisfying Criterion T. This termi- 
nology is adapted from Sloman (1996), who uses the term Criterion S to refer 
to similar, yet subtly different, situations: "A reasoning problem satisfies Crite- 
rion S if it causes people to simultaneously believe two contradictory responses" 
(p. 11). Note that Criterion S and T are not necessarily identical. Few partici- 
pants in the Selection Task, for example, simultaneously believe both normative 
and non-normative responses, so the Selection Task does not satisfy Sloman's 
Criterion S; but it is clear that the Selection Task does set up a Criterion T 
15The position in Figure 4.4 is from a real game. White played 13 Nb5 and went on to 
checkmate black after a further 22 moves. 
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situation for many people. 16 
Evans and Over (2004) explain that there are two fundamental System 1 
heuristics that appear to influence behaviour: 
The if-heuristic directs your attention, when interpreting hypothetical state- 
ments of the form "if P then Q", towards situations where P is true. 
The matching-heuristic directs your attention towards the surface content 
of a statement, irrespective of the sense of that content. For example, the 
statement "I'm not a girl" is seen by this heuristic as being about girls, 
not about boys. Thus in both statements "if P then Q" and "if P then 
-Q", the matching-heuristic directs attention to P and 
So, System 1, as a consequence of these two heuristics, directs the participants 
attention towards certain apparently relevant parts of the question, the P and 
the Q cards. It is only then that System 2 takes over and analyses the relevant 
parts. 
Note that the dual process account suggests that the if-heuristic and the 
matching-heuristic have different influences in different people. So, for example, 
those who answer P may be under the influence of the if-heuristic to a greater 
degree than than the matching-heuristic and vice-versa for those who answer 
P, Q. 
Usually this System 2 reasoning does not affect the output. Most partici- 
pants tend to merely check and rationalise their System I answer and output 
it. The evidence for this is twofold. 
First, using semi-structured clinical interviews reveals that participants tend 
to construct post-hoc explanations for their selections (Wason & Evans, 1975). 
When considering statements such as "if P then Q" participants typically claim 
that they are looking to confirm the rule; whereas the same participants will 
explain that they are looking for falsifying evidence when confronted with the 
rule "if P then -, Q" (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Dual process theorists account 
for this apparently strange finding by suggesting that the participants are sub- 
consciously directed towards the P and Q cards for both rules, and then use 
System 2 to construct post-hoc rationalisations for these selections (Lucas & 
Ball, 2005). 
Second, it has been found that participants spend significantly more time 
inspecting the cards that they eventually select (Ball, Lucas, Miles, & Gale, 
2003; Evans, 1996; Roberts, 1998b), whilst the non-selected tasks have very low 
161ndeed, Sloman's (1996) notion of Criterion S suggests that his form of dual process theory 
is one where System I and 2 compete for control of behaviour. In contrast, following Evans 
(1996,2006), this thesis adopts a sequential version, where System 1 shapes the reasoning 
that takes place in System 2. 
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inspection times (although see the in depth methodological discussion on this 
paradigm in §6.5.1). This appears to confirm that participants rapidly attend 
to only those cards they eventually select, suggesting a central guiding role for 
the System 1 heuristics. Again, however, there are alternative accounts for this 
effect. Indeed the mental models theory also makes the prediction that many 
people will inspect the cards that they end up selecting, since these are the cards 
in their initial model. In this respect, the inspection time paradigm's prediction 
is perhaps not a good one. This matter is discussed at length in later sections 
(§ 6.5.1). 
To summarise, when tackling the Selection Task participants' attention is 
directed at certain cards by their System I heuristics. It is only if System 2, 
when prompted to check and rationalise the output of System 1, overrides this 
output though a slow complex analysis of the situation, that the correct cards 
can be selected. This is clearly a Criterion T situation. The lack of success on 
the task suggests this overriding process is very difficult. 
Although not specifically focussed on thematic versions of the Selection Task, 
it should be noted that the dual process theory does provide an account for the 
increased performance on these variants. It suggests that these versions of the 
task cue quite different System I heuristics - possibly even ones evolved to 
detect cheaters - and thus System 2 is cued to attend to different aspects of the 
problem (Evans & Over, 2004). 
The dual process account of the Selection Task has several significant ad- 
vantages over other theories. It can explain the matching bias result. It can 
explain the inspection time finding. By suggesting that the Selection Task is a 
complex mixture of two sorts of processing, it begins to suggest why there is 
apparently no training or education effect; perhaps education, initially at least, 
only affects System 2 processing (c. f. Pinker, 2002). 
However, it also has weaknesses. There is no explanation as to where*the 
System I heuristics come from, whether they are innate or learnt. It seems 
difficult to grasp how one could measure this. The theory is also lacking in 
details about how System 2 operates. It could be that this analytical stage 
works along the lines described by either mental models or mental logic theories. 
So, although not without its critics and problems, the dual process account 
of the abstract Selection Task is on stronger theoretical ground than many of 
the other theories discussed in this chapter. For a longer review of dual process 
theories see Chapter 7 (or Evans, 2003,2004b; Stanovich, 2004). 
58 
4.5 A note about rationality, and a defence of 
the Selection Task. 
The issue of whether human beings are 'rational' or not is a recurring feature of 
intellectual debate for the last two millennia or more. Indeed Aristotle reported 
that he believed the distinction between rationality and irrationality was the 
defining feature of humanity: man is a "rational animal". Recently, however, 
the experimental results on psychological tasks such as the Selection Task have 
cast doubt upon this claim: if people do not reason successfully on such 'simple' 
tasks then they are surely irrational. 
This sort of argument infuriates some critics who seem to have adopted a 
brief to speak on behalf of mankind's intellectual abilities. The classic response 
is of the form: "OK, people behave irrationally on these tasks, but this has 
nothing to do with the real world" (for a typical exchange along these lines see 
Reid & Inglis, 2005). 17 Evans (2004b) described this argument as "ridiculous": 
"The idea that psychologists [have] somehow contrived by incom- 
petence or malevolence to consistently provide evidence of bias in 
normally bias free people in many hundreds of independent experi- 
ments [is] frankly ridiculous. " (Evans, 2004b, p. 257) 
In a classic paper L. J. Cohen (1981) suggested that experimenters were, in 
some sense, tricking participants. He argued that if participants were prompted 
to reflect upon their response to the Selection Task then they would respond 
normatively. This argument was brutally dispatched by Wason (1983): 
"[Cohen] is obviously wrong to claim that "a few moments' prompted 
reflection" would enable subjects to admit that their reasoning had 
been invalid. ... errors are often systematic and resistant to correc- 
tion" (p. 59). 
Wason also pointed out that L. J. Cohen's (1981) theory of human rational 
competence was unfalsifiable, and thus unscientific: any new experiment that 
upset the defenders of human rationality could be explained away by alleging 
'tricks' on the part of the experimenter. 
Piattelli-Palmarini (1994) noted that although modifying the Selection Task 
slightly (by using a thematic context) can remove the apparently 'irrationality', 
this is irrelevant to the rationality debate. He pointed out that this argument 
is analogous to suggesting that the Miiller-Lyer illusion (Figure 4.3, page 55) is 
17Criticising tasks' realism is not the only way that people attempt to rescue human ra- 
tionality. Some even attribute 'poor' performance on such tasks to incompetent teaching! 
(Bringsjord, Noel, & Bringsjord, 1998). 
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not really an optical illusion because if you remove the arrow heads at the end 
of each line then the lines appear to be identical in length. Such a claim would 
of course be absurd, and yet the analogous argument in relation to reasoning 
tasks is regularly put forward by the defenders of human rationality (e. g. L. J. 
Cohen, 1981; Lopes, 1991). 18 
Commenting on the sort of responses to his work that L. I Cohen typified, 
Wason (1981) wrote: 
"There is something interesting, however, about the reaction of some 
people to my work. Jonathan Cohen is not the first academic to 
criticise it, but such criticisms have sometimes been rather affective 
in tone. In an earlier draft of the present paper [L. J. Cohen, 1981] 
Cohen referred to my experiments, not as cognitive illusions, which is 
splendid, but as conjuring tricks, which is a little derogatory. Others 
have been more impolite. Why? Those who are most concerned to 
vindicate the basic rationality of man seem to me a little worried by 
what might be construed as evidence to the contrary. " (p. 356) 
Wason (1981) went on to say that he himself would not subscribe to such a 
construal. His substantive point, however, on the improper nature of derogatory 
commentaries, is well made. 
The goal of research instruments such as the Selection Task is not to belittle 
human intelligence, it is to deepen understanding of human intelligence. When 
participants respond to the Selection Task or to other similar experimental tasks, 
they are behaving in some fashion. Our job as researchers is to understand this 
behaviour. Our job is emphatically not to criticise the situation in which they 
are behaving because the behaviour we observe does not fit with our pre-existing 
quasi-moral beliefs. 19 
The experimental results discussed in this chapter clearly demonstrate that, 
if rationality is defined as reasoning in accordance with the formal logical calcu- 
lus, then all humans, intelligent and unintelligent alike, are irrational. However, 
it is reasonable to ask whether formal logic is an appropriate normative standard 
for 'rationality'. Very few theorists would suggest it is. Simon (1983), for exam- 
ple, points out that human rationality is necessarily bounded by combinatorial 
explosion considerations. He introduced the notion of 'satisficing', the idea that 
18Although even if this argument was taken at face value it would not suggest that humans 
are 'rational'. It would suggest that they are sometimes 'rational' and sometimes 'irrational'. 
But no researcher has ever claimed that reasoning differs from normative standards in every 
conceivable situation. 
'91ndeed, Stanovich (2003) has even argued that, in fact, it is the defenders of human 
rationality who axe being immoral, by underplaying the importance of reasoning expertise: 
"For intellectuals to use their abstract reasoning skills to argue that the 'person in the street' 
is in no need of such skills of abstrarction is like a rich person telling someone in poverty that 
money is not really all that important. " (p. 55). 
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human reasoning is a trade off between 'satisfying' and 'sufficing'. Instead of 
analysing the situation you are faced with until you obtain the perfect (logical) 
answer it is more 'rational' to find a sufficient answer that requires less process- 
ing effort (see also the 'arguments put forward by evolutionary psychologists; 
e. g. Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Gigerenzer, 1991)_ 
Evans and Over (1996a) discuss human rationality in detail, and suggest that 
the construct, as traditionally understood, does not make sense. Instead, they 
argue, the word rationality has been used to mean two quite different things, and 
much of the so-called rationality debate can be attributed to people confusing 
them. Evans and Over distinguish between rationality, and rationalitY2: 
Rationality, "Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting in 
a way that is generally reliable and efficient for achieving one's goals. " 
RationalitY2 "Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting 
when one has reason for what one does sanctioned by a normative theory" 
(Evans & Over, 1996a, p. 8). 
Note that whilst rationality, and rationalitY2 are clearly linked in some 
fashion to System 1 and System 2 respectively, there is no direct mapping. 
For example, it is unreasonable to suggest that rational2 responses come only 
from System 2; but it is clear that System 1 heuristics are, in most situations, 
rational, (otherwise they would not have survived the evolutionary process). 
Note that the idea of dual rationality does not solve the problem of which the- 
ory to use as a normative system with which to judge whether something is 
rational2 (Anderson, 1991; Evans, Over, & Manktelow, 1993). 
It is possible to be rational, and irrational2 at the same time, or vice-versa. 
Indeed, irrational2 arguments that are rational, are often seen in day-to-day life. 
When politicians in parliament respond to a difficult question by joking about 
the inadequacies of the opposition they are clearly being irrational2. By any 
normative standard of political debate, ad hominem attacks are not satisfactory 
answers to difficult questions. However such attacks, by mocking and belittling 
the questioner are entirely rationall as they can potentially distract attention 
from a difficult question by challenging the credibility of the question's origin. 
Witness, for example, Tony Blair's habit, during the 2005 general election cam- 
paign, of responding to questions from Michael Howard by reminding him of 
his role in implementing the Poll Tax. Such a response is surely irrational2, yet 
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20 entirely rational,. 
According to the idea of dual rationality, irrational2 responses to tasks such 
as the Selection Task may in fact be entirely rational,. The corollary to this 
analysis, therefore, is that the critics who instinctively feel that they need to 
defend human intelligence are missing the point. When they criticise tasks that 
call into question human rationality, they need to ask themselves whether their 
brief of defending human rationality has the aim of defending human rationality, 
or defending human rationalitY2. It is impossible to do both. 
4.6 Summary of Chapter 4. 
" Wason (1968) found that on a "deceptive not complex" reasoning task 
very few of his sample performed in accordance with formal logic. 
" Rom nearly five decades of work with the Selection Task four relatively 
non-controversial findings have been established: 
- Matching bias. Participants tend to select cards that are mentioned 
in the rule, regardless of the presence of negatives. 
- The thematic effect. Phrasing the task in day-to-day contexts tends 
to facilitate performance. 
- The training/education non-effect. There appears to be no relation 
between high levels of education and performance on the task. Sim- 
ilarly, standard training methods (such as a term's course on logic) 
appear to have no effect. 
- Changes of wording. Thematic versions of the task seem to be very 
vulnerable to wording changes. Even the most minute change in 
instruction can have dramatic effects upon performance. 
9 There have been many theories that attempt to explain the results of the 
Selection Task. None has gained acceptance and the task remains highly 
controversial. . 
Dual process theory explains the Selection Task by positing the existence 
of two quite distinct methods of reasoning. It is argued that the standard 
mistake arises out of System I's automated response, and the failure of 
System 2 to adequately monitor and override it. 
20The issue of rationality is one where different versions of dual process theory differ. 
Stanovich and West (2000) and Stanovich (2004) talk of normative rationality and evolu- 
tionaxy rationality. The former refers to maximisation of the goals of the individual organism 
whereas the latter is defined in terms of the interests of the genes (see §7.1 for a longer dis- 
cussion of this point). Contrary to Evans and Over's (1996a) account, Stanovich and West 
propose a direct one-to-one mapping between System I and evolutionary rationality, and 
System 2 and normative rationality. 
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Chapter 5 
Methods and 
Methodologies 
5.1 The research question. 
The main aim of this thesis is to elaborate on how mathematicians use logic 
when reasoning mathematically. In a sense, this research can be seen as a direct 
response to Rav's (1999) assessment that 
"As things stand now, we have remarkable mathematical theories of 
formal logic, but inadequate logical theories of informal mathemat- 
ics" (p. 14). 
The goal then, is to begin to develop a theory of how logic is used in infor- 
mal mathematics, and, in particular, develop a theory of how mathematicians 
evaluate mathematical conditionals. Informal mathematics in this thesis means 
(following Rav) the type of mathematics that is done everyday by mathemati- 
cians, not the formal type of logic analysed by logicians and proof theorists. 
Given this research aim, two stages are necessary: 
Firstly to critically and empirically assess the numerous theories of rea- 
soning discussed in Chapter 4, with the aim of determining which is best 
suited to analysing mathematical reasoning. 
Secondly, to conduct a study of how successful mathematicians evaluate 
mathematical conditionals in 'realistic' mathematical situations, and to 
analyse this data using the adopted theoretical framework. 
This chapter discusses the methodological options available, both in terms 
of methods and analytical approaches. Issues associated with validity and reli- 
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ability are also assessed. The precise detail of the methods adopted, however, 
are discussed in later chapters. 
5.2 Methods of data collection. 
The options available for data collection in this study are twofold: standardised 
reasoning tasks, such as the Selection Task, or interviewing. Both of these 
methods have their strengths and weaknesses, and it is important to consider 
them in detail. 
5.2.1 Standardised tasks. 
The psychology literature is full of attempts to 'measure' participants' thinking 
and reasoning processes using standardised tests administered through question- 
naires (e. g. Manktelow, 1999). The examples of the maze task and the inference 
task were given in Chapter 2; and the Wason Selection Task was discussed at 
length in Chapter 4. 
The primary advantage of using such methods is that they are, almost by de- 
fault, highly reliable. Each participant is given exactly the same task and other 
researchers are able to repeat (and thereby confirm the reliability of) the exper- 
iment directly. There have been very few examples of psychology experiments 
that used standardised reasoning tasks being found to be unreliable. ' 
However, a significant disadvantage of the use of standardised reasoning 
tasks is the question of validity. What exactly do these tasks measure? And 
is it what we are interested in? This question has been largely absent from 
Selection Task research for many years. Since Wason's (1968) original paper, 
what exactly the Selection Task measures has become rather unclear. Instead 
the goal has shifted to explaining why people respond to it as they do, and in 
particular to explaining differences in performance between task versions. In a 
sense then, many researchers have avoided the question of validity by merely 
(and uncontroversially) assuming that the Selection Task measures how people 
respond to the Selection Task. 
This approach was criticised by Sperber and Girotto (2002) who argued 
that the Selection Task is not a reasoning task, and therefore shouldn't be 
used to analyse reasoning. However, dual process theorists argue that Sperber 
and Girotto would be wrong to say that the Selection Task does not involve 
reasoning. As Evans and Over (2004) pointed out, according to the dual process 
'One example of this that comes from Selection Task research was that of Wason and 
Shapiro's (1971) thematic version. Contradictory results with much larger samples were found 
by Griggs and Cox (1982) and Manktelow and Evans (1979). This example indicates how 
reliability can be linked to sample size. 
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theory, it does not only involve reasoning. As we have seen, dual process theory 
posits that both relevance effects (from System 1) and reasoning effects (from 
System 2) need to be considered when analysing the Selection Task. Thus, if 
one adopts a dual process (or mental logic, mental rules or information value) 
framework, the Selection Task can be considered a useful tool in researching 
reasoning. However, in order to ensure validity, extreme care must be taken 
when interpreting research results. It is not as simple as saying that if a person 
fails to correctly solve the Selection Task then they are 'bad' at reasoning. 
5.2.2 Clinical task-based interviews. 
Using interviews to discern thinking processes has a longer tradition in math- 
ematics education than it does in reasoning research. It has quite distinct ad- 
vantages and disadvantages over the standardised-reasoning-task approach. 
The clinical interview method was adopted by Piaget (1929) in an attempt to 
understand the development of childrens' minds. A clinical interview, in Piaget's 
sense, begins with the experimenter giving the participant an open ended task to 
complete, whilst 'thinking aloud'. The experimenter then asks further questions 
contingent on the participant's response. This ability to extend and develop 
themes in the interview through the use of contingent questions allows for a 
much more detailed exploration of what thinking processes may be happening. 
It can be described as a 'semi-structured' interview methodology (L. Cohen, 
Manion, & Morrison, 2001). 
Ginsburg (1981, p. 5) suggested that clinical interviews can be used to ad- 
dress three distinct aims: the discovery of cognitive processes, the identification 
of what is behind these cognitive processes and the evaluation of the partici- 
pants' competence. Ginsburg went on to describe a distinct clinical method for 
each of these aims, although also admitting that a study may have as its own 
purpose a combination of these three. The nature of this methodology naturally 
raises important validity and reliability issues (Swanson, Schwartz, Ginsburg, 
& Kossan, 1981). 
Since the manner of questioning adopted whilst clinically interviewing is 
contingent upon the participant's response, it is clear that each interview cannot 
be properly replicated. It is, of course, possible to standardise the initial task 
used, and even some of the follow up questions; however, the possibility of 
contingent follow-up questions when the participant raises an interesting issue 
is what gives this methodology its strength. Reducing the flexibility of the 
interviewer's tools in the name of reliability will, paradoxically, impact upon 
the interview's validity. 
Validity is, perhaps, an even more serious concern with the clinical interview 
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method than reliability. Several factors need to be considered. Piaget (1929) 
noted that it is very difficult to avoid asking leading questions that are based 
upon preconceived ideas of what you are looking for. This is especially problem- 
atic given the instantaneous response needed when coming up with contingent 
questions. He also pointed out that it is easy to miss opportunities for further in 
depth questioning that might have led to useful and insightful data. Recognising 
that there is no real way to deal with these problems other than through prac- 
tice and training, Piaget (1929, p. 9) noted that the clinical interview method 
was "difficult", and that it requires training lasting upwards of a year. 
One of the biggest problems with the clinical interview approach is that it 
can rely, in some situations, upon introspection: the self-reporting of mental 
activity. Introspection has been highly controversial in psychological research, 
and there has been much discussion as to its validity and reliability (Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977). The view adopted by early psychologists was the workings 
of a person's mind were transparent to them, and thus their reports could be 
trusted. Sir Francis Galton, one of the pioneers of psychology, wrote: 
"I do not see why the report of a person upon his own mind should 
not be as intelligible and trustworthy as that of a traveller upon 
a new country, whose landscapes and inhabitants are of a different 
type to any which we ourselves have seen. " (Galton, 1880, p. 256) 
This blind trust in introspective reports came under attack in the early 20th 
century. The argument was not that, as Galton seemed to suggest, participants 
might be dishonestly reporting things they had observed, but that the things 
they were reporting on were not accessible to them. 
As we have seen, dual process theory suggests that all System I processes are 
preconscious. Any introspective reports that people relay about these processes 
are, by definition, post-event rationalisations lacking in validity. 
Wason and Evans (1975) adopted a pseudo-clinical interview approach dur- 
ing a Selection Task study. They found that when participants were given a 
standard rule (P => Q) they justified their answer by explaining that they were 
trying to prove the sentence true. But when the same participants were given a 
matching bias version (P =* -, Q) they used the exact opposite explanation, that 
they were looking to prove the rule false. Wason and Evans concluded that the 
subjects were providing a System 2 post-event rationalisation for their choice 
rather than a genuine report of their (System 1) reasoning processes. 2 
It is clear, then, that not all mental processes are available to introspective 
descriptions. Proponents of the clinical interview method accept this: 
2AIthough, of course, Wason and Evans didn't phrase their explanation using the modern 
dual process theory terminology. 
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"Once it is admitted that the mind is not transparent, --- questions 
concerning the reliability and significance of introspective reports 
begin to loom large. " (Swanson et al., 1981, p. 31) 
However, Swanson et al. claimed that as long as certain safeguards are taken, 
the issues affecting clinical interviewing are not significantly greater than those 
affecting any other methodology: 
"Put simply, our position is that: 1) Verbal data do have a place 
in cognitive research; 2) there are important limits and constraints 
on their use; 3) effective use of verbal data requires paying careful 
attention to these limits and constraints; 4) provided this is done, 
any of the remaining qualms about using verbal reflections are also 
those which apply to other sorts of data collected by more standard 
research methods. " (Swanson et al., 1981, p-31-32) 
Swanson et al. (1981) went on to explain that it is unlikely, for example, that 
a person has access to the source of creative insight; but that they may well be 
able to report how they tackled a mathematical problem. They give the example 
of doing a column addition "starting at the bottom". Thus, it is fair to say that 
a person may be able to report on what they did, but perhaps not always 
why or how. Furthermore, Smagorinsky (1989) argued that 'thinking aloud' 
whilst tackling a problem does not alter internal thought processes, as long 
as the verbalisations do not require the reporting of information that wouldn't 
normally be used whilst performing the task. Thus, with careful task design and 
interpretation, it seems that valid data can be gathered using a clinical interview 
approach. Similar arguments were made by Ericsson and Simon (1980). 
5.3 The quasi-judicial method of analysis. 
Most of the research on the Wason Selection Task described in Chapter 4 was 
empirical experimental work. This sort of work, with its emphasis on repeatabil- 
ity and hypothesis testing is sometimes referred to as being within the 'scientific 
paradigm'. The somewhat cliched view of this approach to research is that sci- 
entists form hypotheses, design experiments to test them, go out into the 'real 
world', collect quantitative measurements., and then return to the office to con- 
firm or disconfirm the original hypothesis. There is some doubt as to whether 
this is actually how research is conducted, and there is even evidence that scien- 
tists are peculiarly bad at rejecting falsified hypotheses (some of this evidence, 
coincidentally, was collected by Wason, 1960). 
Despite these doubts, there are several key criteria that distinguish the sci- 
entific method. Cuff and Payne (1979), for example, wrote: 
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"A scientific approach necessarily involves standards and procedures 
for demonstrating the 'empirical warrant' of its findings, showing the 
match or fit between its statements and what is happening or has 
happened in the world" (p. 4) 
These standards and procedures typically involve the controlled manipulation 
of variables to see if the results match those predicted by various hypotheses. 
Data are then analysed with statistical tests to establish whether correlations 
and differences are either present, or if they are present, significant. The notion 
of repeatability is also important to the scientific method: experiments should be 
described in such detail as to permit other researchers to repeat the experiment 
and verify its results. 
However, for certain research questions standard scientific methods may not 
be the most appropriate. In particular, the traditional experimental view of 
science runs into difficulties when it comes to qualitative data of the form that 
is collected by clinical task-based interviews. In this section an approach to 
analysing qualitative data that stresses close connections and parallels with the 
scientific method is discussed. 
The quasi-judicial method of analysing qualitative data was developed by 
Bromley (1986) in the context of psychological case-studies. It is an attempt to 
recognise that whilst scientific experimental methods cannot be used to effec- 
tively study all real-life situations, they need not be disposed of entirely. Brom- 
ley's basic claim is that it is possible to investigate situations using a case-study 
methodology and retainboth scientific rigour and reliability. He wrote: 
"In advocating a case-study approach to psychological problems we 
are not abandoning scientific method. [ ... 
] One can generalise 
from individual cases, and many important real-life human problems 
cannot be studied as effectively, or at all, by experimental methods. 
[ 
... 
] Case-studies are not an inferior form of scientific method. On 
the contrary, they are possibly the basic method of science. " (p. 286, 
289). 
Bromley (1986) named his method of analysing case studies the 'quasi- 
judicial method'. For Bromley, a psychological case-study is simply an account 
of how and why a person behaved in a given, presumably interesting, situation. 
The account is adequate if it "contains enough empirical evidence, marshalled 
by a sufficiently cogent and comprehensive argument, to convince competent 
investigators that they understand something that previously puzzled them" 
(p. 37). The quasi-judicial method is a systematic sequence of steps through 
which to describe and interpret empirical evidence. 
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The name 'quasi-judicial' comes from an analogy with practice in jurispru- 
dence, although the analogy is with events that take place before a trial rather 
than those that happen during trial: 
"A quasi-judicial case-study, by contrast [to a well rehearsed ar- 
gument of the form found in legal trials], is more an exercise in 
problem-solving. The aim is to understand scientifically what is go- 
ing on and to manage the affair in a professional and businesslike 
manner. It is perhaps more akin to the French 'inquisitorial' system 
of judicial enquiry. " (Bromley, 1986, p. 30). 
In short, Bromley recognised that the methods of analysing qualitative case- 
study data had often been inadequate in psychology and social science research, 
and prescribed a normative structure to follow, based on notions from the legal 
profession. 
Bromley's (1986) normative structure for analysing a case, then, contains 
ten steps: 
1. State initial problems and issues clearly. 
2. Collect and state background context to the case. 
3. Propose prima facie explanations. 
4. Through examination of the prima facie explanations and solutions, search 
for additional evidence. 
5. Search for sufficient evidence to eliminate as many of the suggested explaý 
nations and solutions as possible. 
6. Closely examine the evidence, and sources of evidence, to check for con- 
sistency and accuracy (analogous to a cross-examination) - 
7. Conduct a critical inquiry into the internal coherence, logic and external 
validity of the arguments in the favoured explanations. 
8. Adopt the 'most likely' explanation given these steps. 
9. Formulate, if appropriate, what implications there are for action (this 
would be appropriate, for example, in the context of the evaluation of a 
course syllabus, or in the case of an educational psychologist attempting 
to resolve children's behavioural difficulties). 
10. Prepare a coherent case-report. (Adapted from Bromley, 1986, p. 26). 
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It is clear to see from these steps that, both philosophically and practically, 
the quasi-judicial approach is fundamentally at odds with other common meth- 
ods of qualitative data analysis such as grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), phenomenography (Marton, 1981), or the discipline of noticing (Mason, 
2002). Rather than allowing theories to emerge from the data, the quasi-judicial 
method uses the data to test pre-existing theories in a manner akin to 'standard' 
scientific experimental methods. 
Although Bromley (1986) was primarily concerned with case-study analyses, 
he introduces the notion of "case law" to deal with the weighing up of evidence 
from multiple case-studies: 
"Within a given field of inquiry there may be family resemblances 
between different, cases. By comparing and contrasting cases, a kind 
of 'case-law' can be developed. Case-law provides rules, generali- 
sations, and categories which gradually systernatise the knowledge 
(facts and theories) gained from the intensive study of individual 
cases. " 
Here, again, the analogy is with the legal profession. Case law, or common law, 
in the context of jurisprudence is a collection of prior legal judgements which 
can be cited as precedent in order to influence future legal decisions. Similarly, 
Bromley sees case law as a series of case-studies organised in such a way as 
to form theories useful for applications to future cases. Finding such case law 
is dependent upon "finding close structural similarities or identities between 
case-studies" (p. 298). 
Bromley (1986) recommended Toulmin's (1958) representational structure 
for informal argumentation as a method of analysing different case-studies to 
develop case law (see Bromley, 1986, chpt 9). By "shearing" an argument con- 
tained in a case-study "of its particular identity it can then represent a class 
of similar cases" (p. 229). That is to say, that by representing arguments from 
different case-studies using Toulmin's scheme, structural similarities and differ- 
ences between cases can be identified and explored, with the aim of constructing 
case law. 
As with all qualitative methods of data analysis, Bromley's (1986) quasi- 
judicial method naturally raises questions of validity and reliability. Having 
analysed a case-study, and even having developed a system of coherent case 
law, how can a researcher using the quasi-judicial method generalise to other 
comparable cases? Bromley argues that the issue of generalisation from single 
case-studies (or case law based on several case-studies) should be seen in terms 
of the validity of the analysis, not in terms of the representativeness of the case. 
J. C. Mitchell (1983) put forward a similax argument, writing that "the validity 
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of extrapolation depends not on the typicality or representativeness of the case 
but upon the cogency of the theoretical reasoning" (p. 207). 
The quasi-judicial method should not be compared to statistical inference, 
instead it is a "strong form of hypothetico-deductive theorising". Bromley 
(1986) concluded: 
"We do not infer things 'from' a case-study, we impose a construc- 
tion, a pattern of meaning, 'onto' the case. Ideally, the individual 
ca, se puts our theories to the test. " (p. 290) 
The quasi-judicial approach to qualitative data analysis is clearly at odds with 
other well known methods of data analysis. Rather than building theory from 
qualitative data in the manner of grounded-theorists or phenomenographers, 
the quasi-judicial researcher seeks to use qualitative case-studies to test various 
different theoretical frameworks: theory is applied to the qualitative data, not 
built from it. Theories are then accepted, refined or rejected, and case law is 
built up from comparing and contrasting several comparable case-studies. The 
reliability of the method comes from the validity of the manner in which the 
analyst applies the theory to the case, not from the representativeness of the 
case itself. 
According to this view of qualitative data analysis, threats to the validity 
and reliability of a research project come from the deficiencies of the researcher: 
if theory is incorrectly applied or evidence is marginalised or overlooked than 
the quasi-judicial approach may not result in either valid or reliable conclusions. 
Sadler (1981) listed several possible deficiencies of human analysts, including a 
tendency to rely upon first impressions, a tendency towards overemphasising 
confirmatory data and downplaying disconfirmatory data, and a tendency to 
compare to a fictional base line. Some of these defects are related to findings 
from the heuristics and biases research programme discussed in Chapter 7. A 
conscious awareness of these possible deficiencies and a concerted effort to over- 
come them is necessary if the validity and reliability of a quasi-judicial study is 
not to be threatened. 
5.4 Overview. 
The empirical research reported in this thesis falls into two parts. Firstly, in 
Chapter 6, the various theories of reasoning discussed in Chapter 4 are criti- 
cally evaluated by comparing the performance of mathematics students with the 
general well-educated population on the Wason Selection Task (Experiments 1 
and 2) Using an inspection time eye-tracker based methodology, it is argued 
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that only the heuristic-analytic dual process theory of reasoning can success- 
fully account for the behaviour of successful mathematicians on the Selection 
Task (Experiment 3). 
Having adopted the heuristic-analytic dual process account, before being 
applied in the second stage of the empirical research, the theory is reviewed in 
greater detail in Chapter 7. 
The second stage to the empirical research (Experiment 4) is reported in 
Chapter 8. It consists of a qualitative interview study which attempts to apply 
the dual process framework to the specific research question that this thesis set 
out to answer: how do mathematicians evaluate conditional statements? There 
are two parts to this study. Firstly, the role of preconscious heuristics in real- 
istic mathematical contexts is examined; and secondly, the conscious processes 
involved in the evaluation of mathematical conditionals are discussed with refer- 
ence to Toulmin's (1958) argumentation scheme. Bromley's (1986) quasi-judicial 
method is adopted throughout. 
The layout of the empirical research reported in this thesis is summarised in 
Figure 5.1. 
Experiment 1 
Pilot Study 
Experiment 2 Choosing a 
Selection Task framework (Chpt 6) 
1 
Experiment 3 
Eye Tracker Study 
T -1 
Experiment 4 Applying the 
Abundant Number Task framework (Chpt 8) 
1 
Figure 5.1: The organisation of the experimental section of the thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
Adopting a framework: 
Mathematicians, Dual 
Processes and the Selection 
Task 
This chapter reports the first half of the empirical work contained in the thesis. 
The primary goals of the experiments reported here are to distinguish between 
the various theories of reasoning discussed in Chapter 4: which of these frame- 
works is best placed to be applied to the study of mathematical reasoning? 
To this end, the experiments reported in this chapter consider mathematics 
students' responses to the Wason Selection Task. This task has historically 
been the most insightful instrument available to reasoning researchers, and so 
it seemed a natural choice to be used in the current context. 
Experiment 1 reports the outcome of a straightforward experiment which 
investigated the differences (if any) in response between mathematics students 
and the general well educated population. The finding that there is indeed a 
difference is then followed-up in Experiments 2 and 3. The results of these 
experiments are used to argue that only Evans's (1996) heuristic-analytic dual 
process theory can successfully account for the responses of successful mathe- 
matics students to the Wason Selection Task. 
6.1 Experiment 1: The pilot study. 
"All mathematicians can solve the four cards problem 
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if they put their minds to it. " (Devlin, 2001, p. 120) 
As noted in Chapter 4, the literature on the Wason Selection Task is vast. 
However, the key finding - that the general population struggle to select the 
normatively correct cards - has remained unchallenged. In view of the supposed 
importance of logic in mathematics discussed in Chapter 2, the question of 
how successful mathematicians perform on the Selection Task is of considerable 
interest. Is Devlin correct to claim that mathematicians can solve the task? 
And more importantly, do mathematicians solve it? 
Method. 
The aim of the pilot study was to speculatively administer the Selection Task 
to large mathematical and non-mathematical populations; and to compare the 
results. To this end, an internet based methodology was adopted. 
There were four categories of participants in the study, all from the Univer- 
sity of Warwick; mathematics undergraduates, mathematics (academic) staff, 
chemistry undergraduates and history undergraduates. History undergraduates 
were selected to represent the general population. Clearly such a highly educa- 
tion population isn't very general; but, for practical purposes, the control group 
needed to be contained within the university, and so would inherently be unrep- 
resentative of the population at large. This is a problem that affects virtually 
all psychological research; Wason (1968), for example, used psychology students 
as his population. History is a subject that contains little or no overt mathe- 
matical content, and so it seemed a good choice of department to act on behalf 
of the non-mathematical population. Chemistry undergraduates were selected 
as a 'half-way house'. It was assumed that they would have a relatively strong 
background in mathematics, but without the emphasis on proof and logic. ' The 
mathematics sample was particularly highly qualified. A typical offer from the 
Warwick Mathematics Institute is an A and B in two mathematics A-Levels. 
The department's international research reputation attracts some of the best 
students in the country. 
The undergraduate course at the University of Warwick contains a 30 hour 
first year module on theFoundations of Mathematics'. Approximately three/four 
hours of this module are devoted to introducing basic logical structures such as 
the formal definition of the conditional using truth tables. This is used to jus- 
tify using proof by contradiction. Barring these few lectures, there is no explicit 
logic taught to undergraduate students (and neither is there any explicit logic 
on GCSE or A Level mathematics syllabi). 
'Part of the first year chemistry core at Warwick is a 30 hour course in mathematical 
methods which covers material to A-level standard. A-level mathematics is not a prerequisite 
for studying Chemistry at Warwick. 
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Four cards are placed on a table in front of you. Each card has a 
letter on one side and a number on the other. 
You can see: 
LJ L! J L!. i LJ 
Here is a rule: "every card that has aD on one side has a3 on 
the other. " 
Your task is to select all those cards, but only those cards, which 
you would have to turn over in order to discover whether or not 
the rule has been violated. 
Figure 6.1: The task used in Experiment 1. 
The participants first received an email that explained the task and asked 
them to participate in the study. They were assured that the experiment would 
be entirely anonymous. If they agreed to participate, they would click on a link 
which directed them to the experimental website (Figure 6.1). Having submitted 
their answer, the participants were directed to a post-test thank-you page and 
were invited to request a digest of the results. Thirty-seven people asked to be 
notified of the results. 
The phrasing of the task was taken from Wason (1969), Griggs and Cox 
(1982) and Jackson and Griggs (1988). All of these studies found that their 
changes of wording from Wason's (1968) original had no significant effect on the 
results. 
Forty-eight hours after the original e-mails were sent the results were down- 
loaded and imported into a spreadsheet for analysis. Those who had seen the 
task before were deleted from the results - very few people fell into this cate- 
gory. In total 562 people participated in the study (compared to 62 in Wason's 
(1968) original study). The break-down of numbers by group is given in Table 
6.1. 
6.1.2 Web based experimenting. 
Using the internet in psychology experiments is a relatively new phenomena and 
it offers both opportunities and challenges. Clearly, it would have been imprac- 
tical to obtain the same level of response using a traditional survey method. 
This can easily be seen by the limited numbers that Wason (1968) and others 
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Maths u/g Maths Staff Chem. u/g Hist. u/g 
n 260 21 67 123 
% 34 24 27 23 
Table 6.1: The breakdown of response numbers, n gives the raw figure and % 
gives n as a percentage of those who were sent the e-mail. Here, u/g refers to 
undergraduate students. 
were able to recruit as participants - some studies reviewed in Chapter 4 had 
sample sizes of less than 20. However, having adopted a web based strategy, 
the amount of control that the experimenter has is more limited. For example, 
one cannot be sure that the participants didn't perform the task in consultation 
with others. 
Perhaps the most worrying problem that web based experiments face is that 
of multiple submission. There is no foolproof way of preventing participants 
submitting their answer more than once. Several options are available. It would 
be possible to write a website which places a 'cookie' on the user's computer 
when they first load the page. If they tried to resubmit their results then the 
website would detect the presence of the cookie and the result wouldn't be 
recorded. Of course, if the subject was determined to resubmit, they could 
delete the cookie and take the task again again. The use of cookies in website 
design causes concern amongst some users, as they are a potential security risk. 
Due to this, most browsers can be set to refuse them. 
Instead of using cookies, advice was taken from Reips (2000) who suggested 
logging the IP address of the subject. Again this isn't a foolproof method; often 
users have dynamic addresses - each time they go online they are assigned a 
different IP address. Reips also suggests that a combination of e-mail and IP 
addresses is a better solution, but this option was rejected in order to preserve 
the anonymity of replies. 
By logging the time and the IP address of participants, it was possible to 
catch those who resubmitted in quick succession. There seemed to be only 
one case of this - one mathematics undergraduate submitted 34 times within 
5 minutes. His or her answers were deleted. Of course, if someone with a 
dynamic IP address had gone to the trouble of logging out, logging back in and 
then resubmitting, there would have been no way of catching them. It is highly 
unlikely that this occurred enough to adversely affect the results. In the end the 
main defence against people resubmitting is simply that they have no incentive 
to do so. Unless incentives to take part are being offered, it provides them with 
no benefit. Indeed, the research that has been conducted in this area suggests 
that the number of internet resubmissions is very low indeed. One experiment 
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Maths u/g Maths Staff Chem. u/g Hist. u/g 
P, -Q 29 43 8 10 
Table 6.2: The percentage of each group selecting the correct answer in Exper- 
iment 1. 
(in the days where dynamic IP addresses were rare) put the resubmission figure 
at 0.5% of total submissions (Reips, 2000, p. 105). 
The question of how valid web based psychological research is has been stud- 
ied intensively. One study compared the results of twenty internet based surveys 
with their laboratory counterparts and found a remarkable degree of congruence 
between the two methodologies (Krantz & Dalal, 2000). It seems clear that the 
benefits of using the web for this pilot study substantially outweigh the disad- 
vantages. The literature suggests that problems such as lack of experimental 
control and multiple submissions do not affect the validity of web experiments 
findings; furthermore the opportunity to survey larger sample sizes is a great 
help in ensuring both validity and reliability. 
6.1.3 Results. 
The main results of the pilot study - the percentage of each group correctly 
selecting cards D and 7 (P and -, Q) - are shown in Table 6.2. In Table 6.2, and 
the tables that follow, only percentages are shown. 
The first thing to highlight is that the maths undergraduates did indeed find 
the normatively correct answer significantly more often than the history under- 
graduates, X2= 20.8, df = 1, p<0.00 1, who performed in a similar manner to 
the Chemistry students. However, the mathematics students' range of answers 
is far from consistently normýtive. Less than a third of students, and less than 
half of staff identified the normatively correct answer. Interestingly aX2 test 
reveals that the responses of the mathematics staff were not significantly dif- 
ferent to the students, x2=1.21, df = 1, NS, although perhaps this can be put 
down to the small sample of staff. Interestingly, there was no significant dif- 
ference between the responses of the chemistry and the history undergraduates 
(X2 = 9.22, df = 6, NS), suggesting that increased exposure to non-proof based 
mathematics is insufficient to cause the different range of responses detected 
between the mathematical and history samples. 
Looking at the detailed results (Table 6.3) reveals that not only are the 
mathematics undergraduates more successful at finding the normatively correct 
answer, but across the whole range of selections they perform differently, X2 
95.9, df = 8, p<0.001 . In particular, they seem 
to make different mistakes. 
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Maths u/g Maths Staff Chem. u/g Hist. u/g 
p 35 24 22 27 
P, -, P 0 0 0 0 
P, Q 6 5 33 30 
P, -Q* 29 43 8 10 
P, -P, Q 0 5 2 0 
P, -P, -Q 13 14 1 3 
P, Q, -Q 3 10 7 4 
all 8 0 19 13 
non-P 5 0 9 12 
n 260 21 67 123 
Table 6.3: The percentage of each group selecting each answer in Experiment 
1; *logically correct answer. 
Maths u/g Maths Staff Chem. u/g Hist. u/g 
p 50 42 24 30 
P, -, P 1 0 0 0 
P, Q 8 8 36 33 
P, -Q* 
P, -P, Q 0 8 2 0 P, -P, -Q 18 25 1 3 
P, Q, -Q 4 17 7 5 
all 11 0 20 15 
non-P 7 0 10 13 
Table 6.4: The frequency that each group selected each answer as a percentage 
of total mistakes; *logically correct answer. 
The modal non-normative answer from non-mathematicians was to select the 
D and the 3. A third of history undergraduates, and nearly as many chemistry 
undergraduates selected these two cards. Only 6% of maths students made this 
mistake, an extremely significant difference, X2 = 46.4, df = 1, p<0.001. 
The frequency of each mistake is highlighted when the figures from Table 6.3 
are quoted as percentages of the non-normative answers only. Using the maths 
students as an example; 35% selected D only, but this selection amounted to 
50% of all non-normative answers from the group. This is shown in Table 6.4. 
As well as looking at the frequency of each selection of cards, the results 
can be analysed in terms of the numbers selecting each card collapsed across 
selections. This is shown in Table 6.5. 
Despite the clearly higher success rate of mathematicians, it must be re- 
emphasised that one in five of the mathematics students in the sample affirmed 
the consequent (see Chapter 3). Rirthermore, the academic staff were just 
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Maths u/g Maths Staff Chem. u/g Hist. u/g 
D 95 100 91 88 
K 25 19 26 25 
3 20 19 62 52 
7 57 67 40 37 
Table 6.5: The percentage of each group selecting each card, collapsed across 
all combinations of selections. 
as prone to this as the undergraduates. Of the students, only 57% correctly 
applied the modus tollens argument, and the academic staff, at 67%, did not 
have a significantly higher figure. 
This then, is a very interesting and surprising result. It appears that mathe- 
maticians, both undergraduates and academic staff, apparently go about solving 
the Selection Task in a different way to the general population, but, despite this, 
their method doesn't lead to an overwhelmingly successful result. To summarise: 
Mathematicians are significantly more likely to find the normative answer 
to the Selection Task than non-mathematicians (both the history and the 
chemistry groups). 
Despite this, the mathematicians do not perform flawlessly. Less than a 
third of the mathematics students, and less than half of the mathematics 
staff made the normatively correct selection. 
Those mathematicians who fail to answer normatively seem to make dif- 
ferent mistakes than the non-mathematicians. In particular the 'standard 
mistake' - that of selecting the D and 3 cards - was very rarely made by 
mathematicians. 
9 Instead of the 'standard mistake' mathematicians seem to be more likely 
to select either the D card only, or the D, K and 7 cards. This latter 
response might be attributed to a misunderstanding of the question. 
It is important to re-emphasise that all the participants in Experiment 1 were 
very able mathematicians; and the staff involved are amongst the top thousand 
or so research mathematicians in the world. It is clearly untenable to suggest 
that the range of answers detected can be attributed to a lack of mathematical 
knowledge or ability. A more sophisticated explanation for these range of results 
is required. 
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6.2 Experiment 2: Mathematicians' performance 
on the Selection Task. 
The results of Experiment I are a serious challenge to all the existing theories 
of reasoning described in Chapter 4. Several obvious questions can be raised: 
Why should the mathematicians respond differently to the general population? 
Why don't they make the same mistakes as the general population? And can 
any existing theories of reasoning be adapted to answer these questions? Each 
theory needs to be evaluated as to how it can be adapted to explain these new 
results. 
The theories discussed in Chapter 4, then, need to be re-evaluated in light 
of the results of Experiment 1. However, before moving on to this discussion 
the results of additional research are first reported. Experiment 2 served two 
purposes. Firstly to attempt to repeat the surprising results for the mathemati- 
cians that were obtained in Experiment 1, and secondly to explore in further 
detail the background of the participants and how they went about solving the 
task. 
6.2.1 Method 
The methodology used in Experiment 2 was broadly the same as Experiment 1, 
except in this instance participants were directed to a preliminary page which 
collected data on their year group (as a measure of their mathematical expe- 
rience) and the final classification from their previous year (as a measure of 
their mathematical attainment). If there was a significant relationship between 
the responses to the Selection Task and experience or attainment, it should be 
expected they will be detected by these measures. 
The participants in the second experiment were mathematics undergraduates 
from two further top ranked UK universities. 2A total of 408 people took part. 
In the second experiment the time in seconds from when participants sub- 
mitted their preliminary information and progressed to the question to the point 
when they submitted their final answer was also recorded. Recording the time 
that each participant took to complete the task was designed to help throw 
further light upon which of the competing accounts of reasoning described in 
Chapter 4 can best account for the results. 
For practical reasons, in this design the recorded time included time spent 
reading the instructions. Clearly this introduces an inaccuracy into the timing. 
Slow readers might appear to take longer than fast readers, regardless of the 
2The two mathematics departments who took part in the second experiment both recruit 
undergraduates with A levels of AAB or higher. One depaxtment achieved an RAE grade 5*, 
the other a grade 5. 
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actual thinking time. However, as there is no reason to believe there is a cor- 
relation between reading speed and Selection Task performance, this factor will 
not affect the centre of the results, merely the spread. 
Whilst the timing could have been made more accurate by putting the in- 
structions on a separate page and only starting the timer when the page with 
the cards had been loaded, this would have changed the nature of the task from 
a pure reasoning question to a reasoning and memory question. Paradoxically, 
the more precisely the time taken to complete the Selection Task is measured, 
the less faithful a version of the task can be presented. And, as many studies 
have demonstrated, small changes in the task can lead to large changes in results 
and the meanings which should be attributed to them. 
Although other experimenters have used a version of the Selection Task 
where the instructions and cards are not visible simultaneously (e. g. Ball et 
al., 2003; Evans, 1996; Roberts, 1998b), they had comparatively small samples, 
and were more interested in the time spent inspecting each card rather than 
the overall time taken. Clearly small samples increase the seriousness of the 
inaccuracy introduced by this timing error. Given the large sample size expected 
from the internet method, it was felt that the introduction of this timing error 
was not as important as preserving the structure of the task. 
So, in addition to the answer, the following additional pieces of information 
were collected about each participant: 
9 The date and time they took the task. 
9 The IP address they used. 
" Their year group. 
" Their classification from their previous year's exams (if applicable). 
" The time they took to complete the task. 
" Whether or not they claimed to have seen the task before. 
Naturally those participants who had seen the task before were deleted from 
the analysis. 
6.2.2 Results. 
The overall results were distributed in a similax fashion to the mathematics 
undergraduates in Experiment 1,24% selected the normatively correct answer, 
and only 11% selected the modal response of the history undergraduates from 
Experiment 1 (see the last column of Table 6.6). However, some surprising 
findings emerged from a more detailed analysis. 
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3/4 All 
p 33 28 38 33 
P, -, P 1 1 1 1 
P, Q 13 9 11 11 
P, -Q* 28 23 21 24 
P, Q, -P 0 1 1 1 
P, -P, -Q 7 11 8 9 
P, Q, -Q 2 5 4 3 
P, Q, -P, -Q 8 14 6 9 
non-P 9 8 10 9 
n 151 115 142 408 
Table 6.6: The % of each undergraduate mathematics year group selecting each 
answer (for the rule P =: ý> Q). *logically correct answer. * 
Lack of an experience effect 
Table 6.6 shows the answers selected within each year group. Given the results 
of the Experiment 1, superficially one might expect that the more experience 
of mathematics one has, the more likely one is to respond correctly to the task 
- that is, there may be some expe7ýence effect. Perhaps surprisingly, this table 
indicates that there seems to be no such effect. That is to say, 28% of first year 
undergraduates solved the task correctly, compared with 23% of second years 
and 21% of third years. There is no significant relationship between solving the 
task correctly and the year of study, X2=1.97, df = 2, NS. 
Lack of an attainment effect 
Again, one might suppose that there is a attainment effect -a link between 
ability in mathematics and performance on the task. Table 6.7 shows the an- 
swers selected by participants against the classification they received in their 
last exams. It should be noted that of the 408 participants, 183 answered 'not 
applicable'. Clearly, the majority of these would have been first year under- 
graduates, though it may also include those who preferred not to answer this 
question. 
From the 225 participants who did answer the question, the data reveals 
that there appears to be no attainment effect. That is to say, there is no 
significant relationship between solving the task correctly and performance in 
examinations, X2=3.12, df = 4, NS. 
To re-emphasise, these measurements of mathematical experience and math- 
ematical attainment are crude. However., if a suitably significant correlation 
existed between either experience and attainment and ability to solve the Se- 
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First 2: 1 2: 2 Third 
p 33 30 40 31 
P, -, P 2 0 1 0 
P, Q 11 13 6 8 
P, -Q* 24 18 23 39 
P, Q, -P 0 1 0 0 
P, -P, -Q 15 12 6 0 
P, Q, -Q 5 5 1 15 
P, Q, -P, -Q 8 7 11 0 
non-P 3 12 11 8 
n 66 76 70 13 
Table 6.7: The % of each classification's answer (for the rule P ==> Q). Some 
participants, including all first years, did not provide their classification from 
last year. *logically correct answer. 
mean time (s) Std. Dev. n 
p 66.9 34.0 133 
P, Q 61.5 38.9 45 
P, -Q* 91.7 54.0 97 
All 77.9 45.5 402 
Table 6.8: The mean time taken by participants who selected the three most 
common answers. 6 outliers were ignored. *logically correct answer. 
lection Task correctly it would be expected that it would have been detected by 
this instrument. 
The implications of the lack of an experience or attainment effect are dis- 
cussed in greater detail in §6.6. 
The timing effect 
Table 6.8 gives the mean time taken by participants who selected the three 
most common answers. Six participants took over 305 seconds (more than 5 
standard deviations from the mean) to answer, and these cases were deleted from 
the analysis. It was assumed that their attention had been diverted elsewhere 
during the task. 
Recall that this is the time spent reading and thinking about the question. 
From the table it is clear to see that those who selected the correct answer 
(P, --, Q) spent longer than those who selected either P or P, 
These data were analysed using a one-way ANOVA between the various 
groups given in Table 6.8. There was a significant difference between these 
groups, F(3) = 8.983, p < 0.001). A Scheffe post-hoc comparison test indicated 
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that the time differences between P, -, Q and P; and P, -, Q and P, Q- despite 
the apparently high standard deviations - are highly significant (both at the 
p<0.01 level). There was, however, no significant difference between the time 
spent by those who selected P and P, 
So, participants who selected the correct answer took significantly longer 
than those who selected the next two most frequent answers, P and P, Q. But 
the time difference between these two selections was not significant. 
6.3 Discussion of Experiments 1 and 2. 
These results, on the face of it are surprising. To summarise: 
* The results from Experiment 2 replicated the mathematics undergradu- 
ates' results from Experiment 1. 
9 24% of mathematics undergraduates selected the normatively correct an- 
swer (P, -Q), 33% selected P. Very few (11%) selected P, Q- by far the 
most common mistake in the general population. 
* No relationship between year of study or classification and answer to the 
task was detected. 
9 Those who answered correctly took significantly longer than those who 
answered either P, Q or P. There was no time difference between these 
two selections. 
The question now is: how to interpret these results? Of the theoretical 
frameworks mentioned in section 4.4, which can best be applied to analysing 
the reasoning of the mathematicians? In the following sections each framework, 
and how they can be applied to these results, are considered in turn. 
6.3.1 Mental models theory. 
Recall that the mental models theory of reasoning (§4.4.1) suggests that humans 
reason by creating a mental model of the situation, but that often the model 
is incomplete as a result of the so-called 'principle of truth'; the idea that it is 
generally more efficient (in terms of cognitive effort and working memory load) 
to construct models only of things we know to be true. The correct answer is 
only reached if participants successfully 'flesh out' their model. Thus we need 
to consider three potential models: 
{P]Q 
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IP1 IQ] 
Q 
-IQ 
The first is a standard initial model, and if not fleshed out, results in the par- 
ticipant considering P and Q but picking only P. The second model is the 
result of the participant confusing the conditional with the biconditional and 
results in them considering P and Q and picking them. The third model is has 
been fleshed out from the first, and results in the participant picking the correct 
answer: P and -, Q. 
Adopting a mental models framework, then, the results from Experiments 
1 and 2 would seem to imply that the undergraduate and professional mathe- 
maticians are: 
1. Much less likely than the general population to construct a biconditional 
initial model, that is to say that mathematicians are less likely to interpret 
"if P then Q" as P <=> Q. 
2. More likely than the general population to flesh out their initial model, 
and thus find the correct answer. 
The first of these claims seems plausible. However, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
there is evidence from the mathematics education literature which suggests that 
some students have considerable difficulty distinguishing between 'P ==> Q' and 
'P <-* Q' (Hazzan & Leron, 1996; O'Brien, 1973). There are several points to 
note here. Firstly, Hazzan and Leron's participants were computer science ma- 
jors, not mathematics majors. We cannot claim that at that institution they 
had a lower mathematical ability based on this fact, 3 however it may be rea- 
sonable to argue that they are not as socialised into mathematical culture as 
the participants in Experiments 1 and 2. Certainly it seems reasonable to sug- 
gest that the two groups have different departmental affiliations with all that 
that entails (Bingolbali & Monaghan, 2004). Also, of course, the mistake that 
Hazzan and Leron report was only made by a minority of their sample. If the 
mental models explanation were adopted to explain this data, a small minority 
of participants would confuse the conditional with the biconditional. Unfortu- 
nately O'Brien does not report the departmental affiliation of his participants, 
so we cannot assume that they were mathematics majors: the same objection 
regarding departmental affiliation could apply. 
31ndeed Leron reports that computer science majors enter the course with higher mathe- 
matics marks than the mathematics majors (private communication). 
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Suppose, then, that we were to accept the first of these claims. What could 
explain this? Given that there is no relationship between either mathemati- 
cal experience or mathematical attainment, it would seem that the factor we 
are looking for must manifest itself before successful students reach university. 
Possible explanations are discussed in §6.6. 
The second implication of adopting a mental models framework is less easy 
to explain. Why should mathematicians be more likely to flesh out their ini- 
tial model than the general population? The mental models theory suggests 
that fleshing out an initial model takes time, effort and puts a load on working 
memory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird, 2001). The results of 
Experiments 1 and 2 would, therefore, seem to suggest that mathematics un- 
dergraduates are significantly more willing to spend time and effort fleshing out 
their initial mental model. The timing data provide strong support to this hy- 
potheses. Only those people who answered P, -, Q - those who explicitly fleshed 
out their initial model - took a significantly longer time. The two other main 
groups P and P, Q- those who did not flesh out their model - took significantly 
less time. This is perhaps not surprising. Mathematics undergraduates are, on 
the whole, people who enjoy logical problems, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that they would consider the Selection Task to be a logical problem, and that 
they would therefore be willing to devote more cognitive effort to solving it than 
a non-mathematician. 
So, with the assumption that mathematics undergraduates very rarely inter- 
pret conditionals as biconditionals, the mental models framework successfully 
provides a way of interpreting the results of Experiments 1 and 2. 
6.3.2 Mental logic theory. 
As with the mental models account, the mental logic theory (§4.4.2) of Rips 
(1994) explains the results of the Selection Task in three categories: 
9 Those who answer P are applying modus ponens, a standard part of ev- 
erybody's reasoning armoury. 
Those who answer P and Q are also applying modus ponens, but have 
interpreted the conditional rule as a biconditional. 
Those who answer correctly, P and --, Q, have successfully constructed 
the complicated modus tollens argument with a contradiction proof (as 
discussed in §4.4.2). 
The results of Experiments 1 and 2, then, would seem to suggest two fairly sim- 
ilar conclusions to the mental models account. Undergraduate and professional 
mathematicians are: 
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1. Much less likely than the general population to interpret the conditional 
statement in the rule ("if P then Q") as a biconditional (P ýý Q). 
2. More likely than the general population to be able to successfully construct 
a contradiction proof of the modus tollens deduction. 
The first of these claims is identical to that discussed in the mental models 
account. 
The second is subtly different, however. It is entirely plausible, and indeed 
probable, that successful mathematicians would be more fluent at constructing 
contradiction proofs than the general population. In fact, it is perhaps more 
of a surprise that this fluency appears to high enough in only around 25% of 
mathematics undergraduates. Given that proof, and proof by contradiction, 
are commonplace in advanced mathematics it would seem surprising that such 
limited numbers are successful in this fashion. 
Furthermore, it seems astonishing to claim that only 43% of professional 
mathematicians are able to successfully construct a straightforward modus tol- 
lens argument. It is also surprising that this ability does not seem to be related 
to either mathematical experience or mathematical ability. This issue can be 
seen as a weakness of the mental logic account of reasoning. It is clear that all 
professional mathematicians are capable of constructing a modus tollens con- 
tradiction type argument, if the mental logic theory explanation was adopted it 
would need to explain why they don't in this situation. 
Having said this, it is clear that Rips' account can be adapted to explain the 
results of Experiments 1 and 2, even if the explanation is somewhat counter- 
intuitive. 
6.3.3 Information value theory. 
Oaksford and Chater's (1994) information value theory is different to most other 
theories of Selection Task performance. It offers a justification of the most 
common response, rather than an explanation of how the response is reached. 
Using a mathematical model of the situation, Oaksford and Chater deduce that 
selecting P and Q is actually the most 'raýional' response to the task, since it 
is these two cards (with various sensible assumptions) that provide the highest 
information gain. 
The results from Experiments 1 and 2 showed mathematicians very rarely 
making this selection. Instead they overwhelmingly selected P on its own, or 
the correct answer P and -, Q. It seems very difficult to use information value 
theory to account for these results. 
Perhaps of more value is to see information value theory as a part of a dual 
process framework. That is to say, to use Oaksford and Chater's (1994) analysis 
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as a plausible explanation as to why System 1 biases participants in the way that 
it is; but to also accept that there is a System 2 analytical stage to reasoning as 
well. The dual process theory explanation for the results of Experiments I and 
2 is discussed in §6.3.5. A move in this direction was made by Oaksford and 
Chater (2003) who admitted that "an elite band of very high IQ participants" 
may have an analytical stage in their work on the Selection Task. However, 
they suggested, contrary to Evans (1996), that only this very small subsection 
of the population used analytic processes. 
6.3.4 Relevance theory. 
The relevance theoretic (Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995) explanation of the 
Selection Task (§4.4.6) attributes correct answers to two different sources. A 
minority of participants "know the difference between demonstrative and non- 
demonstrative truth evaluation" (p. 46) and therefore successfully solve the task. 
The majority, however, attempt to make the rule relevant through successively 
more complex interpretations. 
In order to make the relevance theoretic account fit the data from Experi- 
ments 1 and 2, we would need to accept the following: 
1. More of the mathematical group than the general group fall into Sperber, 
Cara, and Girotto's minority who successfully solve the task; however this 
group is still a small minority. 
2. Very few mathematicians interpret "if P then Q" as '3 x such that P(x) A 
Q(x)' (since this is the interpretation that leads to the P and Q cards 
being selected). 
The second of these claims is difficult to accept. The interpretation that 
leads to the P and Q selection is, according to Sperber, Cara, and Girotto 
(1995), a more complex interpretation than the interpretation that leads to the 
P selection. It seems peculiar to suggest that, on the one hand, a larger per- 
centage of mathematicians were sophisticated enough to remove relevance based 
calculations from their decision making process; but, on the other hand, that 
the rest of the mathematicians gave relevance to the rule by interpreting it in 
the least complex way. The relevance theoretic interpretation almost seems to 
be that a minority of the mathematical sample was substantially more sophisti- 
cated than the general population, but the rest of them were less sophisticated. 
This conclusion is surely not tenable. 
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6.3.5 Dual process theory. 
Recall that dual process theory (e. g. Evans, 1996; Stanovich, 2004), discussed in 
§4.4.7, suggests that the standard mistake originates from preconscious heuris- 
tics in System 1, and is a result of System 2 failing to adequately monitor and 
override its partner system. If a dual process framework is adopted, there would 
appear to be two alternative hypotheses that explain the increased frequency of 
the P selection, and decreased frequency of the P, Q selection, by mathemati- 
cians in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Hypothesis 1. Exposure to mathematics on a daily basis modifies System I 
heuristics so as to reduce the chances of the standard mistake - that 
of selecting P and Q- being made; but also to increase the chances of 
selecting the P card alone. 
Hypothesis 2. Mathematicians' System 1 heuristics tend to operate in the same 
way as in the general population. But exposure to mathematics on a daily 
basis results in an increased tendency to use System 2 for monitoring and 
possibly modifying the output of System 1. 
The psychology literature that discusses dual process theory would seem 
to indicate that hypothesis 2 is more likely, since the migration of rules and 
heuristics from System 2 to System 1 is not well understood (Evans, 2004a; 
Stanovich, 2004). 
Furthermore, there would appear to be some support for the second hy- 
pothesis from the mathematics education literature. Jacques Hadamard, in his 
celebrated essay on mathematical thinking, emphasised the role that checking 
for errors plays in mathematics: 
"Good mathematicians, when they make [errors], which is not infre- 
quent, soon perceive and correct them. As for me (and mine is the 
case of many mathematicians), I make many more of them than my 
students do; only I always correct them so no trace of them remains 
in the final result. " (Hadamard, 1945, p. 49) 
Could this expertise in error checking be a consequence of a continual mon- 
itoring process by System 2? 4 If hypothesis 2 were the case, however, it would 
raise the question: Why don't the mathematicians always get the answer right? 
Every successful mathematician is surely aware of the contrapositive of P =: > Q, 
if System 2 is being used by the majority of the sample, why doesn't the majority 
of the sample select the normatively correct answer? 
4Note that Hadamard (1945) is referring to all error checking, not just of conscious System 
2 checking of preconscious System 1 processes. 
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The answer to this question is also suggested by dual process theory. Recall 
that the theory proposes that attention is preconsciously directed to the match- 
ing cards by System 1. It is only these cards that System 2 attends to. Thus the 
reason why even highly proficient mathernaticians do not always notice that the 
-, Q card is needed may be because they do not even consider it, their attention 
has been preconsciously biased towards the matching cards. 
However, it is clear that many mathematics undergraduates do consider 
the -, Q card, as around one in four of them select the correct answer. In a 
dual process framework this explanation can be accounted for by an increased 
tendency amongst the mathematicians to use System 2 to slowly and analytically 
consider all the cards, not only the ones to which their attention has been 
filtered. 
This explanation would fit well with the timing data. Those who selected 
P or P, Q took roughly the same amount of time. According to a dual pro- 
cess framework, they were inspecting the cards that System 1 preconsciously 
directed System 2's attention towards, and either rationalising this selection (in 
the case of the P, Q selection) or correcting the mistake contained within it (in 
the case of the P selection). In contrast, however, those who selected P, -, Q 
took sigi ifficantly longer, which may indicate they were slowly and analytically 
analysing the entire situation. 
The second hypothesis associated with the dual process explanation, then, 
rests on three assumptions: 
1. Mathematicians have similar preconscious System 1 biases as the general 
population. 
2. Whilst rationalising their selection, mathematicians are much more likely 
to detect the Q error. 
3. A large subset of mathematicians spend time and energy analysing the 
entire task using System 2. 
The first of these assumptions fits with the psychological literature better than 
Hypothesis 1, but it is important to note that, as yet, there is no empirical 
data from this study to support it (but see Experiment 3). The second as- 
sumption seems very reasonable. As discussed earlier, it is entirely probable 
that mathematicians are less likely to confuse conditionals with biconditionals. 
This may well account for this effect. The third assumption is also reasonable. 
Once you have noticed that your System 1 biases are inaccurate, as most of the 
mathematicians do, it seems sensible to believe that you are much more likely 
to slowly analyse the entire situation using System 2. Perhaps, then, the fact 
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that the rationalisation process finds an error in the original bias, causes a sub- 
set of mathematicians to examine the whole problem again in a slow analytical 
fashion, and therefore select the --, Q card. This explanation for the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2 is summarised in Figure 6.2. 
---------------------------- ---------------------------- 
p 
rationalisation 
rejection 
p and full P_IQ 
analysis 
if-heuristic 
start PO 
rationalisation 
matching-heuristic 
PQ modification p r 
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and full 
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Heuristic System Analytic System 
---------------------------- ---------------------------- 
Figure 6.2: The dual process interpretation of Experiments I and 2. 
Note that the explanation shown in Figure 6.2 is not intended to be inter- 
preted as a universal account. Clearly, as with all psychological processes there 
will be a large degree of individual differences between participants. Rather, 
this explanation should be taken to be an account of the modal response, in an 
attempt to explain the trends in the data from Experiments 1 and 2. 
6.4 Summary of Experiments 1 and 2. 
Of all the theoretical frameworks that have been proposed to explain the Selec- 
tion Task results, section 6.3 argued that there are three that can be successfully 
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adapted to explain the results of Experiments 1 and 2: 
9 Mental models theory (§4.4.1, §6.3.1). 
9 Mental logic theory (§4.4.2, §6.3.2). 
9 Heuristic- analytic dual process theory (§4.4.7, §6.3.5). 
Before embarking on a detailed study on mathematical conditionals, it was 
decided to try to investigate further which of these three theoretical frameworks 
provide the best model for investigating how people reason with conditional 
statements. 
6.5 Experiment 3: The eye tracker study. 
6.5.1 Inspection time studies. 
The strongest empirical support for Evans's heuristic-analytic dual process the- 
ory account of the Selection Task has come from inspection time studies. These 
were briefly discussed in section 4.4.7, but will be elaborated upon in this sec- 
tion. 
Evans (1996) provided strong evidence for the dual process account of the 
Selection Task by measuring how long each participant spent inspecting each 
card. Participants were presented with Selection Tasks on a computer screen and 
were asked to hover their mouse pointer over the card that they were 'thinking 
about'. Participants selected each card by clicking on it with the mouse. As a 
consequence of this methodology, Evans argued that he had managed to measure 
how long each participant thought about each card. 
Evans (1996) suggested that if System 1 heuristics cued the cards that Sys- 
tem 2 considered slowly and analytically before selecting, there should be higher 
inspection times for the cards that ended up being selected. Thus, argued Evans, 
the dual process account of the Selection Task yields two predictions: 
P1 Cards associated with higher selection rates will also be associated with 
longer inspection times. 
P2 Within a given card, those subjects who choose it will have longer inspection 
times than those who do not. (Evans, 1996, p-226). 
Evans's (1996) data supported these two predictions. There were large dif- 
ferences in inspection time between selected and non-selected cards: typically, 
selected cards were inspected for in the region of 4 seconds and non-selected 
cards for under 2 seconds. Evans wrote: 
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"Our findings suggest that we may not think at all about options 
that we fail to choose. " (p. 236). 
"It appears that many [subjects] decide first and think afterwards" 
(p. 238). 
Roberts (1998b) later pointed out that these two hypotheses can be combined, 
and analysed with statistical techniques that have greater power than Evans' 
methods: 
P3 For each individual, the mean inspection time should be longer for selected 
than for nonselected cards (Roberts, 1998b). 
Roberts repeated Evans's (1996) experiment and found similar results. 
However, Roberts argued that the methodological technique used by Evans 
was unsound. He pointed out that Evans's version required participants to 
undertake two activities simultaneously: solving the Selection Task, and using 
the mouse to show what they are thinking about. There was a great danger, 
suggested Roberts, that there could be sensory leakage; that participants could 
consider and reject cards before they managed to hover the mouse over them. 
Furthermore, since participants were asked to click on cards they wanted 
to select, it might be the case that they would inevitably have to spend longer 
'inspecting' the cards they wished to select as an artificial consequence of the 
task set-up. Thus, Roberts (1998b) argued, the inspection time effect could be 
an artefact of the way in which Evans (1996) administered his version of the 
Selection Task. 
In order to investigate this possibility, Roberts (1998b) administered several 
variations of Evans's (1996) experiment: 
In the first modification, cards were only visible when the mouse hovered 
over them. This was an attempt to eliminate sensory leakage. Although 
the inspection time effect was still present, the size of the effect was con- 
siderably reduced on this version. 
9 In the second modification, participants had to either select "yes" or "no" 
for each card. This was an attempt to reduce the possibility that the 
inspection time effect was a consequence of spending time whilst physically 
selecting the cards. This modification again considerably reduced the 
inspection time effect. 
* The third modification was a combination of the first and the second 
modifications. It completely eliminated the inspection time effect. 
In the last modification, the task was changed so that. all the cards were 
initially selected and participants had to deselect cards appropriately (as 
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opposed to selecting them). In this version the inspection time effect was 
reversed. 
As a consequence of these experiments, Roberts (1998b) argued that it was 
highly probable that the inspection time effect found by Evans (1996) was arti- 
ficial. 
Evans (1998a) replied to these criticisms by partially accepting criticisms 
of his methodology, but rejecting the idea that Roberts (1998b) had falsified 
the entire heuristic-analytic account. Evans pointed out that all of Roberts' 
methodological variations had the effect of forcing participants to attend to 
cards that they would not normally attend to. For example, in Roberts' first 
modification,. cards were not visible unless the participant hovered their mouse 
over them. This clearly has the effect of forcing participants to attend to all cards 
in a fashion that they might not otherwise have done. Evans' objections were 
reanalysed by Roberts and Newton (2001) who conducted further experiments 
designed to remove any possibility of an artificial inspection time effect. Roberts 
and Newton used a rapid response methodology which insisted that participants 
responded to each card (presented individually) within two seconds of its display. 
It was argued that this would increase the frequency of responses attributed to 
preconscious biases. Strong supporting evidence was found for the dual process 
account. 
Although claiming that Roberts (1998b) had not damaged the theory, Evans 
(1998a) did accept that factors other than relevance assessments from System 
1 can affect what features of the task people attend to. He wrote: 
"For this reason, I would now wish to place less emphasis on inspec- 
tion times than on other forms of evidence that support my proposals 
about relevance effects in reasoning" (Evans, 1998a, p. 814). 
It is also clear that a mouse hovering technique is unlikely to be sensitive enough 
to give a highly accurate measure of attention. Roberts (1998a), in a response 
to Evans' reply, suggested that "gaze-tracking studies" would resolve the issue 
conclusively. 
Such a study was conducted by Ball et al. (2003). They used an eye-tracking 
device to record details of where the participants were looking during the time 
they tackled the task. Note that this experimental design assumes a strong 
positive correlation between eyeball fixation location and cognitive attention. 
This assumption is highly reasonable, and is discussed at length in §6.5.2. Ball et 
al. gave each participant four different Selection Tasks, with rotated negatives, 
in a random order. This approach, whilst commonplace, does run the risk of 
introducing learning effects into the data. 
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Ball et al. (2003) found convincing support for P1, P2 and the stronger P3. 
In view of the methodological criticisms of Roberts (1998b), two different ex- 
periments were conducted, with each version having the participants indicating 
their card selections in different ways: 
9 In the first experiment participants briefly pointed at the cards they 
wished to turn over using a 20cm metal pointer. 
In the second experiment participants pressed a button to indicate that 
they were ready to make their selection. Upon the button press, eye 
movement data ceased to be recorded. 
Both of these variations found strong support for P3. A similar finding was 
reported by Ball, Lucas, and Phillips (2005) who conducted an eye-movement 
experiment using deontic thematic versions of the Selection Task. 
Ball et al. (2003) argued that their two experiments rendered redundant any 
methodological concerns raised by Roberts (1998b). Despite the resolutions of 
these issues, there are several problems with the interpreting the inspection 
time paradigm as providing convincing evidence for the heuristic-analytic dual 
process account when compared to the mental models or mental logic account 
of Selection Task behaviour. 
Firstly, the mental models theory also makes a prediction about which cards 
participants will inspect. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991, p. 79) suggest that 
participants will "consider only those cards that are explicitly represented in 
their models of the rule". Thus, the mental models prediction, labelled P5 by 
Ball et al. (2003) is: 
P5 The cards represented in mental models associated with the rule should be 
inspected for longer than cards not represented in the models. (Ball et 
al., 2003). 
Recall that on the original "if P then Q" version of the task the initial mental 
model proposed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) is one of: 
IP1 Q 
[P) IQ] 
In both cases the theory predicts that participants should consider the P and 
Q cards. However, on task rules with rotated negatives the situation changes. 
For example, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) suggest that the rule "if P then 
-, Q" would have an initial mental model of: 
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[P] -iQ 
Q 
Thus for this version, the mental models theory predicts that the participant 
will consider the P, Q and -, Q cards, whereas the heuristic- analytic account 
suggests that the -, Q card will not be heuristically cued. 
As Ball et al. (2003) used a rotated negatives paradigm, they were able to 
test P5 and found strong support for it. They pointed out that this result was 
not hugely surprising as there is a "lack of orthogonality" between P3 and P5. 
Thus the inspection time paradigm, if restricted to comparing the time between 
selected and non-selected cards, appears not to be able to distinguish between 
the mental models account and the dual process theory account. Despite this, 
Ball et al. (2003) suggested that their work provided strong evidence for the 
dual process theory account, since the inspection time predictions were bold. 
That is to say, the theory made a novel prediction that could easily have been 
falsified. 
The second problem with the inspection time paradigm as it stands is that 
it could be argued that, contrary to the beliefs of Ball et al. (2003), P3 is not in 
fact a particularly novel prediction at all. Is it really a surprise that participants 
spend longer looking at cards that they select than those they do not select? A 
sceptic could argue that any of the theories of reasoning can account for this 
result, as long as it were assumed that participants spend a short amount of 
time checking or confirming their selections, regardless of how the selections 
were made. After all, the difference in inspection times between selected and 
non-selected cards detected by Ball et al. was not that great (typically the 
difference was around I second). 
As a result of these two concerns, it does not seem reasonable to believe 
that comparing the inspection times of selected and non-selected cards provides 
sufficient evidence to determine which of the theories of reasoning discussed is 
the most useful when considering conditional reasoning. 
However, the results from Experiments 1 and 2 provide an additional testable 
hypothesis. As discussed earlier, the dual process account of these results (hy- 
pothesis 2) relies upon several points: 
1. Mathematicians have similar preconscious System 1 biases as the general 
population. 
2. Whilst rationalising their selection, mathematicians are much more likely 
to detect the Q error. 
3. A large subset of mathematicians spend time and energy analysing the 
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entire task using System 2. 
From this analysis we can derive P6: 
P6 Mathematicians will spend longer inspecting non-selected matching cards 
than non-selected mismatching cards. This will not be the case for the 
general population. 
To begin with, in view of the concerns regarding the inspection time paradigm 
discussed above, only non-selected cards are being considered, thus the problem 
of artificial 'checking' time does not apply to this prediction. The claim being 
expressed by P6 is that mathematicians will reject matching cards in a different 
way to mismatching cards, and that the general population will not do this. 
If mathematicians are being cued towards matching cards in a similar manner 
to the general population they will, presumably, spend a considerably longer 
amount of time rejecting these cards than the ones that they have not been 
biased towards. However, most of the general population who are cued towards 
the matching cards end up selecting them after a rationalisation process. Those 
in the general population who do not select matching cards have, for the most 
part, not been biased towards them. 
In short, the unusual results from Experiments 1 and 2 suggest P6, a novel 
prediction with which to test the dual process theory account of the Selection 
Task. 
6.5.2 The eye-mind assumption. 
The validity of the eye tracking methodology used by Ball et al. (2003) and Ball 
et al. (2005) relies upon there being a strong correlation between eye movements 
and cognitive attention. This claim is reasonable, but to examine it we need 
to introduce some terminology. There are, roughly speaking, two sorts of eye 
activities: fixations and saccades. Fixations occur when the eye is resting on a 
particular point in the field of view, and saccades are the movements that eyes 
make between fixations. 
Typically people look at something when they wish to acquire information 
from it, and therefore it is natural to want to deduce cognitive attention and 
cognitive processing duration from eye movement data. This, the so-called eye- 
mind assumption, was suggested by Just and Carpenter (1980) in the context 
of reading: 
"the eye remains fixated on a word as long as the word is being 
processed. So the time it takes to process a newly fixated word is 
directly indicated by the gaze direction" (p. 330). 
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However, in a recent review of the situation Irwin (2004) pointed out four prob- 
lems with assuming a 1-1 correspondence between attention and fixation loca, 
tion: 
9 The view that is afforded by a single fixation is quite large. It is unreason- 
able to assume that only the fixation location is being processed during a 
fixation. 
9 The locus of cognitive processing moves from the current fixation location 
to the next one before the eyes themselves shift. 
Sometimes the eyes are captured in an involuntary fashion by unexpected 
stimuli. Thus the position of the eyes is not always under cognitive control. 
9 Some cognitive processing takes place during saccades. 
Despite these concerns, Irwin argued that fixation duration and fixation 
location measures can be very useful indices of cognitive processing, but that 
the 100% correlation suggested by Just and Carpenter (1980) was not justified. 
In another review of the field, Rayner (1998) agreed with this: 
"Although we can easily decouple the locus of attention and eye 
location in simple discrimination tasks, [ ... 
] in complex informa- 
tion processing tasks such as reading, the link between the two is 
probably quite tight" (p. 375). 
Most researchers seem to agree that it is generally more efficient to move the 
eyes than it is to move attention alone (e. g. He & Kowler, 1992; Liversedge, 
Paterson, & Pickering, 1998; Sclingensiepen, Campbell, Legge, & Walker, 1986). 
The assumption underlying the work of Ball et al. (2003), Ball et al. (2005) 
and Experiment 3- that fixation durations and fixation locations correlate suf- 
ficiently with cognitive processing to provide a useful measure of Selection Task 
card inspection times - seems reasonable, and is supported by the currently 
available eye-movement research. Furthermore, fixation locations have been 
used to measure attention during problem solving across a wide variety of do- 
mains in addition to the Selection Task (e. g. Charness, Reingold, Pomplun, & 
Stampe, 2001; Knoblich, OhIsson, & Raney, 2001; Pan et al., 2004; Rayner, 
1998). 
6.5.3 Design and method. 
In order to investigate P6 it was decided to adopt an eye-tracker methodology 
along the lines used by Ball et al. (2003). 
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Participants. 
The mathematics sample consisted of 30 undergraduate and postgraduate vol- 
unteers from the Mathematics and Statistics Departments at the University of 
Warwick. The control sample consisted of 28 undergraduate or postgraduate 
volunteers from the Arts Faculty at the same institution. None of the partic- 
ipants had seen the task before or received any tuition on the psychology of 
reasoning. All participants were paid volunteers, and were recruited on the 
basis that they did not wear eye-glasses. 
Apparatus. 
Stimuli were presented on a 19" (445mm. [33.05'1 visible diagonal) Sony SVGA 
monitor at a resolution of 800 x 600 pixels (120 Hz refresh rate) which was 
driven by a1 GHz Pentium based PC. Eye position was determined using an 
SR Research EyeLink I system. This is a head mounted infrared-based system 
that automatically compensates for head movements and achieves an average 
gaze accuracy of approximately 0.5 - 1.0'. Eye position was recorded from the 
right eye at a rate of 250 Hz. The eye tracker was calibrated for each partic- 
ipant using a 9-point display directly before the presentation of the task. No 
mechanical means were used to restrict head movements and viewing distance 
was approximately 75cm. Participants were tested individually in a dimly illu- 
minated sound attenuated room. 
Materials. 
A standard Selection Task was used, displayed in two parts. As discussed above, 
splitting the instructions and the cards onto two different screens is unfortunate, 
but unavoidable when the inspection time for each card is the variable being 
measured. If, for example, the instructions and cards were on the same screen it 
would be difficult to know how to interpret time spent looking at the P and Q 
in the rule. Should this time be counted as part of P and Q's inspection times 
or not? There is no satisfactory resolution to this question, other than splitting 
the instructions and cards onto different screens. 
The task instructions used are shown in Figure 6.3, and the layout of the 
cards used is shown in Figure 6.4. Contrary to Evans (1996), Roberts (1998b) 
and Ball et al. (2003), only one version of the task (a standard "if P then 
Q" version) was given to each participant. This was designed to eliminate 
any learning effect that might adversely affect the results. There were 4! = 24 
different configurations for the cards, and they were fully counterbalanced across 
participants. 
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On the next screen you will see four cards. Each 
of the cards has a letter on one side and a number 
on the other. You will only be able to see one 
side. Here is a conjectured rule about the cards: 
if a card has aD on one side, then 
it has a3 on the other 
Your task is to select all those cards, but only 
those cards, which you would need to turn over in 
order to find out whether the rule is true or false. 
When you are sure you understand these 
instructions press the button. 
Figure 6.3: The instructions seen by participants in Experiment 3. 
You can see: 
pK 
37 
when you are happy with your answer, press the button 
Figure 6.4: One version of the cards seen by participants in Experiment 3. 
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Procedure. 
Participants were tested individually. Once they had been fitted with the eye- 
tracker and given a response box to hold, a series of calibration and drift correc- 
tion tasks were undertaken. After successful calibration, a screen of instructions 
was displayed (see Figure 6.3). 
When participants had pressed a response button they were asked to confirm 
that they understood the instructions. Upon confirmation of this the experi- 
menter spoke aloud: 
Thank you. You will now see the next part of the task. When you 
are ready to answer the question, please press one of the buttons 
and say your answer out loud. Take as long as you want. 
They then fixated (for drift correction purposes) on a dot at the centre of the 
screen, afterwards the cards were displayed. 
Once the participants has pressed the button the screen blanked, the eye- 
tracker stopped recording and they were asked to state their selection aloud 
which was recorded by the experimenter. This method of stopping eye-tracker 
reasoning experiments was identical to that used by Ball et al. (2003, Experi- 
ment 2) and Charness et al. (2001). Once the experiment had been completed 
the data was imported into the EyeLink Data Viewer software for analysis. 
Analysis. 
To analyse the eye tracking data the on-screen display was divided into areas 
of interest. Two different analyses were conducted, one where fixations outside 
the cards were ignored, and one where fixations inside a region that included 
each card and an area surrounding it (giving a total area of 39245 pixels) were 
included. The dwell times for the two types of region were highly correlated 
(rs > 0.98). In all the analyses reported below the larger areas have been used. 
It is possible that the amount of time required for a participant to press a 
response button after deciding on their answer (which blanked the display and 
halted the eye movement recording) could artificially inflate the inspection time 
of the last card to be fixated. In order to prevent this possibility we analysed 
and report the data with the last two fixations deleted (although ail additional 
analysis in which all data were included produced an essentially identical pattern 
of data and levels of significance). 
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6.5.4 Results and discussion. 
Inspection times, P3 and P6. 
The distributions of selections made by each group is shown in Table 6.9. Despite 
the comparatively small sample size, the difference between the two groups' 
range of responses was significant, Fisher-Reeman-Halton Exact Test, p<0.05, 
with the direction of the key differences between the groups as in Experiment 
Ia. In addition, the mathematical group, as in Experiment Ia, made more 7 
selections than the arts group (43% vs. 14%) and fewer 3 selections (36% vs. 
43%), although this latter difference was of a lower magnitude than that found 
in Experiment Ia. 
Maths u/g Arts u/g 
raw % raw % 
D 12 40 10 36 
D3 3 10 10 36 
D7* 4 13 0 0 
DK37 4 13 0 0 
other 7 23 8 29 
N 30 28 
Table 6.9: The percentage of each group selecting each answer in Experiment 3. 
No single selection in the 'other' category was made by more than 2 participants. 
*logically correct answer. 
Recall that Roberts (1998b) translated Evans' (1996) predictions P1 and P2 
into P3: 
P3 For each individual, the mean inspection time should be longer for selected 
than for nonselected cards (Roberts, 1998b). 
In order to test P3, the mean dwell time for each card that each participant 
selected was calculated, along with the mean dwell time for each card that they 
did not select. These data are shown in Table 6.10. Evidence for P3 was found in 
both groups. The overall mean inspection time, across both groups, for selected 
cards was 3.9s, compared to a figure of 2.6s for non-selected cards. 
A between-groups within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) provided 
strong support for P3, F(1,52) = 9.66, p<0.01. However there was no sig- 
nificant interaction between group and card-type (selected/non-selected) dwell- 
time, F(1,52) = 0.99, NS. 
However, the primary purpose of this experiment was to investigate a stronger 
prediction that P3, namely P6: 
P6 Mathematicians will spend longer inspecting non-selected matching cards 
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than non-selected mismatching cards. This will not be the case for the 
general population. 
In order to test P6, mean dwell times were calculated for participants' non- 
selected matching cards and non-selected mismatching cards. 5 These data are 
given in Table 6.11, and have been graphed in Figure 6.5. Both groups had 
similar inspection time means for non-selected mismatching cards (2.2s for the 
mathematical group and 2.3s for the arts group). However there was a difference 
between the groups on the non-selected matching card mean inspection times. 
The mathematical group's figure was 4.4s, substantially higher than the arts 
group's figure of 1.7s. 
Average dwell times (ms) 
for non-selected cards 
--D-maths --o-general 
6000 
4000 
2000 
0 
non-selected matching non-selected 
mismatching 
Figure 6.5: The mean dwell times (ms) for non-selected matching, and non- 
selected mismatching cards. Error bars represent +/ -I standard error around 
the mean. 
A univariate ANOVA was conducted to compare dwell-times on non-selected 
matching and non-selected mismatching cards. The groupxcard-type interac- 
tion effect was significant, F(l, 86) = 4.51, p<0.05, with the mathematical 
group spending significantly longer inspecting the non-selected matching cards 
than the arts group, F(1,39) = 4.53, p<0.05. 
5Note that the four participants who selected all the cards have been deleted from this 
analysis. 
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Card type Group N Mean Std Error 
Selected Maths 26 4716.2 1009.4 Arts 28 3091.1 377.8 
cards Total 47 3873.6 530.6 
Non-selected Maths 26 3069.7 636.6 Arts 28 2243.1 505.8 
cards Total 47 2641.1 381.3 
Table 6.10: The mean dwell times (ms) for selected and non-selected cards. 
Card type Group N Mean Std Error 
Non-selected Maths 23 4363.2 1066.3 
matching cards Arts 18 1709.0 342.7 
Non-selected Maths 23 2165.2 379.1 
mismatching cards Arts 26 2331.7 487.8 
Table 6.11: The mean dwell times (ms) for non-selected matching, and non- 
selected mismatching cards. 
Card type Group N Mean Std Error 
Maths 19 4237.8 1246.0 Non-selected 3s Arts 16 1558.5 329.9 
Maths 17 1668.7 405.4 Non-selected 7s Arts 24 2226.3 572.1 
Maths 22 2030.0 363.9 Non-selected Ks Arts 24 2341.8 542.5 
Table 6.12: The mean dwell times (ms) for non-selected cards. 
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Mean dwell times (ms) of non-selected cards 
6000 
4000 
maths 
M arts 
2000 
0 
37K 
Figure 6.6: The mean dwell times (ms) for the non-selected 3,7 and K cards. 
Error bars represent +/ -I standard error around the mean. 
In addition, an analysis on individual nonselected card's mean dwell times 
was conducted, excluding the D card on account of the high proportion of par- 
ticipauts who selected this card. These data are shown in Table 6.12, and 
graphed in Figure 6.6. Both groups had similar inspection times for rejected K 
and rejected 7 cards (ranging from 1.7s to 2.3s), but the mathematics group's 
mean inspection time for the rejected 3 card was 4.2s compared to 1.6s for the 
arts group. A univariate ANOVA was conducted to compare mean dwell times 
on these non-selected cards, the groupxcard interaction effect wa's significant, 
F(2,116) = 3.46,1p < 0.05. 
These data suggest that the mathematical group rejected matching cards 
in a significantly different manner to the arts group; and furthermore that the 
mathematical sample rejected matching cards in a significantly different manner 
to how they rejected non-matching cards. 
These strongly support the second hypothesis associated with the heuristic- 
analytic dual process theory account. The data replicates Ball et al. 's (2003) 
work with regards to P3; it was found that both groups spent longer inspecting 
cards they selected than those they did not select. However, the confidence Ball 
et al. have in this prediction to reject certain theories of Selection Task perfor- 
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mance is not justified. If participants spend a small amount of time checking 
their answers before stating them aloud then this would explain P3, but it does 
not distinguish between the differing accounts of how participants reach their 
answers. 
The results from Experiment 3, regarding P6, however, were clear. The 
mathematicians rejected matching cards in a different manner to that of the 
arts group. These data allow the first hypothesis associated with the heuristic- 
analytic dual process theory to be rejected. If the key difference between the 
two groups was their System I biases, one would expect little difference in their 
inspection times between the non-selected matching and non-selected mismatch- 
ing cards. In fact a significant group x card-type interaction was found. 
Note that these data also shed light on the issue of individual differences 
discussed in §6.3.5. The relatively large standard error associated with the 
mathematicians' mean non-selected matching inspection time is an indication 
that not all mathematicians are preconsciously biased towards both the P and 
Q cards: this is merely the modal case. A large number, as predicted by the 
heuristic-analytic theory, will be more effected by the if-heuristic and be biased 
towards the P card alone. This factor accounts for the difference in standard 
errors shown in Figure 6.5. 
Mean fixation duration measures. 
The Eyelink system records a substantial amount of data which can be ex- 
plored. Alongside the predictions P3 and P6 some of the other data recorded 
by the equipment in Experiment 3 was also investigated. In particular, some 
researchers have suggested a correlation between the mean fixation duration on 
an area and the cognitive processing difficulty associated with that area (for a 
full discussion see Irwin, 2004; Rayner, 1998). Although it should be noted that 
this correlation is not well understood, and may well only be justified when con- 
sidering visual cognitive processing difficulties. Nevertheless, several researchers 
have used mean fixation durations as direct measure of task difficulty and in- 
formation complexity (e. g. Ikehara & Crosby, 2005; Pan et al., 2004). 
The Eyelink equipment records fixation durations in ms for each fixation. 
The mean fixation duration for each card, fX, was baselined according to the 
formula 
fx = 
100 - dx 
fs - nx 
where dX is the dwell time for card X, fS is the mean fixation duration for 
the entire screen and nX is the number of fixations on card X. Thus for each 
card the 1-nean fixation duration as a percentage of the mean fixation duration 
for the entire screen was calculated. This baselining was designed to control for 
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_Card 
type Group N Mean Std Error 
Maths 29 1.051 0.0382 Matching Arts 28 1.075 0.0227 
cards Total 57 1.062 0.0270 
Maths 28 0.962 0.0557 Mismatching Arts 27 0.989 0.0252 
cards Total 55 0.975 0.0307 
Table 6.13: The mean baselined fixation durations for matching and mismatch- 
ing cards. 
any general speed variations between participants. 
The mean fixation durations for various types of cards were then calculated. 
Table 6.13 shows the mean fixation duration times for matching versus mis- 
matching cards. 
A univariate ANOVA showed that the mean baselined fixation durations 
for matching cards were significantly higher than those for mismatching cards, 
F(1,108) = 5.29, p<0.05, but that there was no significant group x card-type 
interaction, F(I, 108) = 0.002, NS. 
So, the participants' mean fixation times were significantly longer for match- 
ing cards than they were for mismatching cards. The mean fixation duration 
analyses provide some support to the heuristic-analytic dual process account of 
Selection Task performance. Participants had significantly longer mean fixation 
durations on matching cards than they did on mismatching cards. Mean fix- 
ation durations have been used by some as a measure of cognitive processing 
difficulty. Evidence from a study by Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, and Rao (1997) 
suggests that whereas short fixations are primarily concerned with encoding, or 
reencoding, information into working memory, long fixations are associated with 
deeper processing. As a consequence of such work several researchers have used 
mean fixation durations to give an indication of task difficulty and information 
complexity (e. g. Knoblich et al., 2001; Pan et al., 2004). Given this, these 
data could be interpreted as indicating that the manner in which participants 
processed matching cards is different to how they processed mismatching cards. 
This might suggest that the purpose of fixations on mismatching cards was to 
reencode the identity of the card into memory, whereas some of the fixations 
on matching cards were correlated with more advanced processing. Such an 
account fits with the heuristic-analytic dual process theory. 
Ordering data. 
In order to investigate the role of heuristic biases in this task further, an analysis 
of the orders in which participants looked at different cards was conducted. Each 
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participant's trial was split into fiftieths, and each fiftieth-segment was coded 
based on which card was fixated on for the longest amount during this fiftieth. 
If the participant was not fixating on any card during the segment it was coded 
as "missing". Unfortunately this process needed to be done by hand using 
printouts and acetate, as the EyeLink Data Viewer does not have the facilities 
to conduct such an analysis. 
After each participant's trial had been coded, each fiftieth was given a score 
based on whether the card was matching (1) or mismatching (-1). Thus a 
string of fifty values was associated with each participant. These values were 
averaged for the two groups and a five point moving average taken. The graph 
of this data is shown in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7: The order in which participants looked at matching and mismatching 
cards. 
It can be seen that both the mathematical and the control group were, 
initially, biased towards looking at the matching cards. The control group's line 
moves in a generally negative direction, indicating a slow reassignment towards 
looking at the mismatching cards as well as the matching cards. However, the 
mathematical group's line initially starts this process before steeply returning 
to the matching cards, and entering into another cycle. 
Extreme care needs to be taken with these data, as the standard errors 
involved are large. However, the data is consistent with the heuristic-analytic 
account outlined above. The mathematical group's sudden lurch up the graph 
about half way through the time period could be interpreted as being the point 
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Matching v Mismatching 
MA moving average - GP moving average 
when they notice that the 3 card is not necessary and begin a slow analysis of the 
matching cards. However, it is important to emphasise that this interpretation 
of these data is speculative. Notwithstanding this caveat, it is fair to say that 
the ordering data provides weak support to the heuristic-analytic account of 
Selection Task performance. 
6.5.5 General discussion. 
The main aim of Experiment 3 was to attempt to distinguish between the various 
theoretical accounts of Selection Task performance from Experiments 1 and 2. 
Using eye-movement data the behaviour of mathematics students and arts 
students whilst solving the task was compared. Although the main purpose of 
this experiment was to investigate the results from Experiments 1 and 2 further, 
as a byproduct, Ball et al. 's (2003) findings were successfully replicated: It 
was found that participants' inspection times associated with selected cards are 
longer than those for non-selected cards. 
However this result cannot, as Ball et al. (2003) suggested, be used to 
successfully distinguish between the various accounts of Selection Task perfor- 
mance. Instead P6 was derived and tested, a prediction based on the heuristic- 
analytic dual process theory. P6 suggested that the mathematical group would 
have higher inspection times for non-selected matching cards than for non- 
selected mismatching cards, and that this would not be the case for the general 
population. Strong support was found for this prediction. 
The results of Experiment 3 raise doubts about both the mental logic and 
mental models accounts of the Selection Task. Both these theories can explain 
the differences in the range of responses from mathematicians and the general 
population in the same way: by suggesting that fewer mathematics undergradu- 
ates interpret conditional (P =* Q) as a biconditional (P -ý-* Q) than the general 
population. This is a plausible explanation for the different range of responses, 
but not the difference in inspection times. 
Mental logic theories would suggest that because fewer mathematicians mis- 
interpret the rule in this fashion they make the P selection more frequently than 
the non-mathematicians. However, the theory cannot account for why the in- 
spection times for mathematicians and non-mathematicians should be different 
for the non-selected matching cards. 
The mental models account implies a difference between the two group's 
distribution of initial models. That is to say that there would be proportion- 
ately fewer mathematics undergraduates who represent the problem with the 
biconditional model: 
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IP1 IQ] 
and proportionately more who represent the problem with the conditional model: 
[P] Q 
Crucially, according to the mental models theory, the proportions of each group 
who have each initial model has no bearing on how each individual participant 
reasons from this model. The theory argues that participants who select the P 
card start with this model and reason from here, so no difference in behaviour 
would be expected between the mathematicians who start with this model and 
the non-mathematicians who start with this model. That is to say that all those 
non-mathematicians who represent the problem with a conditional model should 
inspect exactly the same cards (P and Q), and for similar amounts of time, as 
the mathematicians who represent the problem with a conditional model. But 
a significant interaction between group and card-type was found, showing that 
the mathematicians spent considerably longer inspecting non-selected matching 
cards than they spent inspecting non-selected mismatching cards. This result 
runs contrary to the predictions of the mental models theory. As the theory 
currently stands, it cannot successfully account for these data. 
As well as calling into question the mental models and mental logic theories, 
these data cast doubt upon Oaksford and Chater's (1994) information value 
model as an explanation of the Selection Task as a whole. Whereas the results 
do not impact on Oaksford and Chater's (1994) mathematical model, they do 
provide strong evidence for an analytical stage of reasoning, as suggested by 
Evans (1996). It is preferable to see Oaksford and Chater's (1994) analysis 
as an explanation for why the matching- and if-heuristics have survived the 
evolutionary process, despite, from a logical standpoint, being suboptimal (see 
§4.4.4). 
These data from Experiment 3 do not comfortably fit any of the mental 
models, mental logic or information value accounts of Selection Task perfor- 
mance. But Evans's (1996) heuristic-analytic dual process theory can account 
for them. The mathematics undergraduates in the sample appeared to be af- 
fected by the same preconscious biases as the general population, but during 
the analytical stage of reasoning they seemed to behave differently. This lead 
them to being considerably more successful at detecting that the Q card (in 
the rule P =* Q) is unnecessary. As discussed above, the findings of Stanovich 
and West (1998) do not seem to explain this difference. It is clearly untenable 
to suggest that mathematics students have, de facto, higher cognitive abilities 
than arts students. 
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Although Stanovich and West's (1998) work cannot explain the difference in 
the System 2 behaviour of the mathematical and non-mathematical samples, it 
is less clear what can. The range of responses detected from the mathematics 
sample appears to be different to that found in any other homogeneous group- 
ing, including research scientists (Griggs & Randell, 1986; Kern et al., 1983). 
Notwithstanding several largely introspective reports of mathematicians on the 
psychological aspect of their work (e. g. Hadamard, 1945; Poincar6,1905; Tall, 
1980), there has been little empirical research on the nature of higher-level math- 
ematical cognition with reference to conditional statements. Further research 
on this subject is reported in Chapter 8. 
Evans's (1996) heuristic-analytic dual process theory account of choices on 
the abstract Selection Task suggests that preconscious System 1 heuristics di- 
rect attention to apparently relevant parts of the task. For most participants, 
conscious System 2 processes only serve to rationalise these biases. This chapter 
has argued that, the reason for behavioural differences between mathematicians 
and the general population on the task is that a large proportion of mathematics 
undergraduates do more than just rationalise these biases. They actively anal- 
yse and override them. This adaptation of the heuristic-analytic dual process 
theory can account for the surprising difference in the range of responses to the 
task given by mathematicians and the general population. 
The e, vidence here suggests, in line with the heuristic-analytic dual process 
theory account, that there are two stages to reasoning on the Selection Task. 
Evans's (1996) theory, however, makes no strong claims about how these stages 
operate. So while the theory suggests that there is an analytical stage to rea- 
soning where System I biases are either modified or rationalised, there is no 
clear framework with which to describe and explain how this analytical phase 
operates. It may well be that, modulo System 1 heuristics, mental logic theories 
or the mental models theory could form the basis of such a theory. Furthermore, 
it could well be that the information value theory can account for the existence 
and evolutionary survival of the matching- and if-heuristics that operate within 
System 1. 
6.6 Aside: The effect of an undergraduate edu- 
cation on reasoning skills. 
Although the main purpose of this chapter has been to distinguish between the 
various theories of conditional reasoning that could be used to analyse math- 
ematical reasoning behaviour, the results from Experiment 2 also reveal some 
surprising findings with regard to the effect of an undergraduate education on 
ill 
reasoning. Recall that the data from Experiment 2 showed no correlation be- 
tween finding the normatively correct answer to the Selection Task and either 
year of study (experience) or degree classification (attainment). These data are 
shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 (p. 82). 
In the literature on conditional reasoning there have been few studies that 
speak directly to the issue of what effect an undergraduate education has on 
reasoning skills. Lehman and Nisbett (1990) conducted a longitudinal study 
that looked at this question. They constructed a battery of tests and tasks 
to produce an instrument that scored participants on 'statistical and method- 
ological', 'conditional' and 'verbal' reasoning abilities. Participants were tested 
twice: once at the beginning of their undergraduate course, and once in their 
fourth year of study. Students from four different disciplines took part: natural 
science, humanities, social science and psychology. Of particular note for the 
current purposes is that Lehman and Nisbett's 'conditional reasoning' instru- 
ment included a version of the abstract Selection Task, alongside three other 
tasks. 
Lehman and Nisbett (1990) found that, over the course of their degree, 
students from natural science and humanities backgrounds improved their con- 
ditional reasoning scores by substantial percentages (> 55%), whereas students 
from social science and psychology backgrounds made no significant improve- 
ments. The data also revealed a significant correlation between the number 
of mathematics courses taken by the students and their conditional reasoning 
score improvement, r=0.31, p < . 0.002. Restricting this analysis to only the 
natural science students (who took most of the mathematics courses) increased 
the correlation to r=0.66, p < 0.001. 
At first glance the results of Experiment 2 appear to contradict the con- 
clusions of Lehman and Nisbett's (1990) study. The data from Experiment 2 
showed no correlation between experience of an undergraduate mathematics 
education and responses to the abstract Selection Task. However, some care is 
needed in interpreting these results in this fashion. Lehman and Nisbett used 
four tasks to compile their participants' 'conditional reasoning' scores. Their 
paper has no details on how each component of their instrument contributed to 
this score, or what the non-Selection Task questions were. Unfortunately the 
raw data regarding participants' responses to the Selection Task component of 
the instrument are no longer available, so no reanalysis is possible (Lehman and 
Nisbett, private communication). Given this, it is impossible to tell whether 
the improvements detected by Lehman and Nisbett on their overall conditional 
reasoning instrument are representative of an increased tendency to respond 
to the Selection Task normatively. However, there are further reasons to be 
cautious of direct comparisons between the studies. Lehman and Nisbett found 
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improvements in natural science and humanities students. No mathematics un- 
dergraduates took part in the experiment. Perhaps the first year students in 
Experiment 2 had already been exposed to as much mathematics as the fourth 
year natural science students in Lehman and Nisbett's work. Without access to 
the original materials and raw data it is hard to speculate further. 
Putting Lehman and Nisbett's (1990) work to one side, it is still perhaps 
surprising that there appears to be no correlation between increased mathemat- 
ical experience or attainment and responding normatively to the Selection Task. 
However, once the results of Experiment 3 have also been digested, the lack of 
correlations are not so unexpected. The heuristic-analytic dual process account 
of the data from Experiments 1 and 2 posits that in fact the vast majority of 
mathematical participants in Experiment 2 responded normatively, modulo their 
preconscious biases. The parts of the problem that the mathematics students 
considered were analysed normatively by almost all participants. 
The following is a plausible account of where each of the answers detected 
by Experiments 1 and 2 come fTom: 6 
9 P, Q- Very small numbers of mathematics students made this selection. 
9P- This answer could result from those mathematics students who were 
biased towards the P and Q cards, and normatively analysed this part 
of the problem and correctly detected that the Q card was unnecessary. 
It is probable that an awareness of the distinction between 'P Q' and 
'P ý-ý Q' could be responsible for this. 
0 P, -, Q - This answer could result from those mathematics students who 
were biased towards P and Q (or P alone), but were sufficiently engaged 
with the task to begin a slow analysis of the entire problem. That is to 
say that they ignored their preconscious biases and conducted a protracted 
analysis of the -, P and --, Q cards in addition to those that they were biased 
towards. It seems unlikely that any knowledge or skills gained during a 
mathematics degree could predispose anybody to become more inclined to 
conduct this analysis; instead it could be hypothesised that an enthusiasm 
for logic puzzles might account for the increased engagement with the task 
7 that would be a prerequisite for such an analysis. 
'Once again these descriptions are intended to describe trends and tendencies only, as with 
all psychological research large individual differences between participants are to be expected. 
7Some evidence for the idea that the mathematics students were more familiar and com- 
fortable with dealing with questions such as the Selection Task comes from the behaviour of 
paxticipants in Experiment 3. The mathematics group's inspection times for the instruction 
page were lower than the control group's. For the third (most complicated, see Figure 6.3) 
paxagraph the mean inspection time for the control and mathematics groups was 12.9s and 
8.8s respectively; this difference is significant, t(30.5) = 2.49, p = 0.018. For the first para, 
graph the mean inspection time for the control and mathematics groups was 13.5s and 10.2s 
respectively; this difference is approaching significance, t(49) = 1.97, p = 0.054. 
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It is reasonable to assume that an increased mathematical ability or increased 
mathematical experience might reduce the chances of confusing 'P =: >. Q' and 
'P <-* Q', but it seems unlikely that it would increase the chances of engag- 
ing enthusiastically with logic puzzles such as the Selection Task. Perhaps an 
enthusiasm for such matters is simply a matter of personal taste; and perhaps 
more people with such tastes are filtered into mathematics degrees. 
This account, then, suggests why no correlation between mathematical ex- 
perience or attainment was detected. The tendency to respond with the nor- 
matively correct answer is not related to either of these factors. Instead it is, 
perhaps, related to an enthusiasm with logic puzzles which is not developed 
during the course of a mathematics degree. The one factor that is developed 
by an increased exposure to mathematics is that which ensured that almost all 
the mathematics students in Experiments 1 and 2 analysed the parts of the 
problem that they considered normatively - namely the reduced tendency to 
conflate 'P =* Q' and 'P 4-=> Q'. 
6.7 Conclusions and summary of Chapter 6. 
The main goals of this chapter were twofold: 
To distinguish which of the theories of reasoning discussed in Chapter 4 
provide the best framework to investigate mathematicians' use and under- 
standing of conditional statements. 
To explore how successful mathematics students respond to the Wason 
Selection Task. 
The results from Experiments 1,2 and 3 satisfy both these aims. Indeed, Exper- 
iment 3 has gone further, suggesting that the mental models, information value 
and mental logic theories of deduction struggle to satisfactorily account for the 
reasoning behaviour of mathematicians. Only the heuristic-analytic dual pro- 
cess theory put forward by Evans (1996) can account for the data reported here, 
and this is the framework that is taken forward into the remainder of this thesis. 
In the next chapter dual process theories are reviewed from a wider perspec- 
tive, and compared to existing dualities in the mathematics education literature. 
The framework is then put to use in Chapter 8 to analyse how successful mathe- 
matics research students use and understand conditional statements in realistic 
mathematical contexts. 
In summary, the main findings of this chapter were: 
* Mathematics students respond differently to the general population on the 
Wason Selection Task. 
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9 Mathematics students are preconsciously biased to the same parts of the 
problem as the general population, but are notably better at noticing and 
overriding the mistakes contained within these biases. 
It is hard to see how the mental logic, information value, or mental models 
theories can successfully account for these data. Conversely, strong sup- 
port was found for Evans's (1996) heuristic-analytic dual process theory. 
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Chapter 7 
Dual Processes Revisited 
Following the empirical work contained in Chapter 6, it seems clear that the 
heuristic-analytic dual process theory of reasoning is best placed to account for 
the behaviour of successful mathematicians on the Wason Selection Task. In 
view of this finding, it is this theory which will be taken forward to the qual- 
itative interview study reported in Chapter 8. However, before describing this 
study, the current chapter seeks to review dual process theories in greater detail. 
Some of the literature that has used versions of dual process theories in domains 
other than deductive reasoning is reviewed, and the theory's connections with 
frameworks that are well known in the mathematics education literature are 
discussed. 
7.1 Dual process theories. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, dual process theories posit the existence of two 
quite different systems (or sets of systems) in the brain that affect reasoning 
behaviour. System 1 is fast, automatic and preconscious. It is seen as being 
an innate system (although actually comprised of a set of systems), common 
to both humans and animals, that includes innate instinctive behaviours and 
(perhaps) domain-specific knowledge and skills. 
System 2, on the other hand, is slow, conscious and analytical. It per- 
mits hypothetical thinking and is believed to be constrained by the limits of 
working memory capacity. It has been suggested that System 2 is unique to 
humans, although this is disputed by some animal behaviourists who see sim- 
ilarities between dual process theory and the theoretical distinction between 
stimulus-response (S-R) and cognitive processing that has been observed in 
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many animals' (e. g. Toates, 1998). 
As mentioned above, although System 1 is seen as innate, some researchers 
argue that it can be developed over time through experience. For example, it 
has long been recognised that chess grandmasters, as well as having superior 
analytical skills, have a different way of 'seeing' the chess board to amateur 
players (Charness et al., 2001). Their experience of chess playing has altered 
their System 1 heuristics as well as developed their System 2 analytical skills. 
Stanovich (2004, p. 40) explains that 
"conceptual systems and rules may enter [System 1] with practice. 
This is one way that humans structure their own cognition - by 
explicitly practising higher-level skills so that they become an au- 
tomatized [System 1] process". 
It could, however, be argued that the chess players are merely applying existing 
innate System 1 heuristics to new knowledge gained through their chess experi- 
ence. Thus the change may be in how innate heuristics are applied rather than 
a change in the heuristics themselves. It is not at all clear how to distinguish 
between these two possibilities, or indeed whether a distinction of this sort is 
meaningful. Exactly how development of System 1 skills happens, and what 
limits there are on modifying it, remains an open question. 
It is important to re-emphasise that many of the previous theories of reason- 
ing discussed in Chapter 4 can comfortably fit within a System 1/2 frainework. 
For example, mental models, mental logic, information value theory and rele- 
vance theory could all be seen as attempts to explain the mechanisms behind 
how either System 1 or System 2 operate. (It is less easy to situate either 
pragmatic reasoning schemas or social contract theory within a dual process 
framework, as both appear to dramatically underestimate the role of System 2)_ 
In this sense dual process theory can be seen as less of a theoretical framework, 
and more a framework for theoretical frameworks. 
In addition to the empirical data that has been gathered from reasoning 
research, there is also neuropsychological evidence that supports the dual pro- 
cess account of reasoning. Goel and Dolan (2003) used fMRI brain scans whilst 
participants took standard reasoning tasks. They found that responses tradi- 
tionally associated with System 1 were related to activity in the ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex, whereas the logically correct System 2 responses originated 
in the right inferior prefrontal cortex, an entirely different part of the brain (see 
also Parsons & Osherson, 2001). 
'Indeed, in some ways, the theoretical models associated with this animal behaviourist 
work are more advanced than the dual process theories of human reasoning discussed here; 
particularly regarding the question of how experiences can affect the operation of the two 
Systems. 
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Stanovich (2004) went further than some dual process theorists by attribut- 
ing different purposes and origins to the different systems. He argued that 
System I and System 2 have fundamentally different goal structures. That is 
to say that an individual's System 1 is shaped by evolution to maximise the 
likelihood of reproducing their genes. It is a "short leash" control mechanism of 
behaviour that is pre-programmed by your genes, 2 and has the aim of preserving 
and reproducing those same genes. System 2, in contrast, is formed by cultural 
memes 3 and is focussed on an individual's personal goals. It "instantiates a 
flexible goal hierarchy that is oriented toward maximising goal satisfaction at, 
the level of the whole organism" rather than at the genetic level (Stanovich, 
2004, p. 64). 
In short, it is possible for System 2 to override the System 1 response, and 
thus gain advantage for the individual rather than the genes. Stanovich referred 
to this as "the robot's rebellion". Using contraception during sex is a clear case 
of this. It is in the interests of your genes to always have unprotected sex, as it 
maximises the chances of genetic reproduction, however the analytical System 
2 part of your brain realises that it may not be in your best interests to obey 
this heuristically cued response. System 2 allows you to take the benefits of 
sexual pleasure without the long term costs that could be associated with it. 
It is straightforward to list many such examples of where an individual's goals 
are best served by the overriding the genetic heuristics. However, as we have 
seen, it is not always the analytical System 2 that prevails when there is conflict 
between it and System 1. 
In terms of the notion of dual rationality discussed in §4.5, Stanovich (2004) 
was proposing a further type of rationality. Whereas Evans and Over (1996a) 
suggested that rationality, is about enhancing your goals, and rationalitY2 is 
about behaving in accordance to some normative standard, Stanovich suggested 
we also need to consider evolutionary rationality, which is about acting in the 
interests of your genes. 
There are critics of dual process theory. Some, for example, claim that two 
distinct systems are not necessary to explain the various experimental results. 
Osman (2004) argued that a single cognitive system which distinguishes between 
cognition in a three dimensional 'dynamic graded continuum' better accounts 
for the experimental data than a two system model. In this model System 1 
and 2 sit at different sides of the continuum (see also Cleeremans & Jim6nez, 
2002). 
211ere genes should be understood in the sense of The Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 1976). 
3Again, in the sense of Dawkins (1976). 
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No police dogs are vicious. 
Some highly trained dogs are vicious. 
Therefore, some highly trained dogs are not police dogs. 
No nutritional things are inexpensive. 
Some vitamin tablets are inexpensive. 
Therefore, some vitamin tablets are not nutritional. 
Both these deductions are valid, but whereas the first is 
rated as sound by 86% of the population, the second is so 
rated by only around 62% (Evans et al., 1983). 
For logically invalid deductions the percentages accepting 
believable and unbelievable content were 66% and 13% re- 
spectively. 
Figure 7.1: Belief bias, a System 1 heuristic. 
7.1.1 Other System 1 biases in reasoning. 
Alongside the matching- and if-heuristics discussed in Chapter 4, there are nu- 
merous other examples of apparently irrational System I heuristics. For ex- 
ample, it has been found that, in syllogistic reasoning tasks, valid deductions 
with unbelievable conclusions are deemed valid far less often than those with 
believable deductions (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). This phenomena has 
become known as belief bias (see Figure 7.1). Evans et al. (1983) explained it by 
suggesting that there is a heuristic within System 1 that leads people to be more 
willing to accept believable conclusions without any logical analysis. 4 Clearly 
this sort of heuristic makes evolutionary sense: why waste time evaluating an 
argument whose conclusion you know to be true? There are, however, alterna- 
tive accounts. Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, and Garnham (1989) adopted a mental 
model framework and suggested that a believable conclusion would reduce the 
chances of the individual fleshing out alternative models. 
Support for the dual process interpretation of these findings came from 
Evans and Curtis-Holmes's (2005) study. They asked participants to deter- 
mine whether various syllogisms were valid or not under two conditions: one 
group had unlimited time, and the other had to respond within 10 seconds. 
They found that the belief bias effect increased with time restrictions. The dual 
process account would predict this, as, when under severe time restrictions, it is 
harder to use slow System 2 processes to accurately analyse and override mis- 
4AIthough, of course, their work predates the System 1- System 2 terminology introduced 
by Stanovich and West (2000). 
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leading System 1 biases. Further support for the dual process interpretation of 
this bias was found by Inglis (2006) who demonstrated that successful math- 
ematics students are less influenced by the believability of a conclusion when 
judging whether it follows from a conditional than the general population. 
Another System 1 bias investigated in the reasoning literature is known as 
negative conclusion bias. Evans (1977) found that participants on conditional 
inference tasks (e. g. Figure 4.2, p. 42) are more likely to endorse negative conclu- 
sions than positive conclusions. That is to say that participants are more likely 
to make a modus tollens deduction for a rule of the form 'P =* Q' than they 
are for a rule of the form '-, P =* Q': the conclusion for the former is negative 
(-, P), but for the latter the correct conclusion is positive (P). 
Evans et al. (1995) noted that, along with dual process theories, both the 
mental models and the mental logic theories of reasoning can account for con- 
clusion bias through a 'double negation process' (see also Schroyens, Schaeken, 
Fias, & d'Ydewalle, 2000). 
7.1.2 Heuristics and biases in decision making. 
Dual process theories of reasoning have, historically, emerged from two quite 
distinct research programmes. The traditional psychology of reasoning litera- 
ture (reviewed above, and in Chapter 4) and the decision making literature. 
The latter work, whilst not directly relevant for the purposes of this thesis is 
important enough to merit a brief discussion and review. 
Since the Sixties there has been mounting evidence that participants when 
making decisions under uncertainty do not always respond in a normative man- 
ner. This research programme was primarily conducted in the United States by 
Kahneman, Tversky and colleagues, and it was for this work that Kahneman 
was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2002 (Kahneman, 2003). It is 
interesting to note that until relatively recently there has been little cross-over 
between this programme of research and the pure reasoning work conducted by 
Wason, Evans, Johnson-Laird and colleagues (for a discussion of the historical 
development of the dual process theories see Evans, 2004b). 
Perhaps the most famous instrument from this research tradition, known 
as the heuristics and biases programme, is the 'Linda' problem (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983). In this task participants were told: 
"Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She ma- 
jored in philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with 
issues of discrimination and social justice and also participated in 
antinuclear demonstrations. " 
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Participants were then given eight possible descriptions of her present employ- 
ment and activities, and were asked to rank them in order of probability. In- 
triguingly, 85% ranked "Linda is a bank clerk and active in the feminist move- 
ment" as more probable than "Linda is a bank clerk". Clearly, such a ranking 
is impossible. Tversky and Kahneman named this the conjunction fallacy, and 
explained it by noting that Linda resembles the prototypical feminist bank clerk 
more than she resembles the prototypical bank clerk. 
Tversky and Kahneman, however, argued that it would be unreasonable 
to claim that their (highly educated) participants had conscious conceptions 
of probability that were largely based on resemblance to prototypical examples. 
Instead, the dual process account argues that the Linda tasks standard response 
comes from System 1. It is intuitive, automatic and more concerned with social 
data than formal models of probability. System 2 cues the opposite response, 
that which notes that P(A) cannot possibly be less than P(A n B). Individuals 
who respond with the conjunction fallacy, then, fail to successfully use System 
2 to monitor and correct their intuitive System 1 output. 
The heuristics and biases programme has uncovered many other system- 
atic System 1 heuristics that can detract from normative decision making. For 
example, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) spoke of the 'availability heuristic': 
"A person is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he 
estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances 
or associations could be brought to mind" (p. 164). 
A good example of this effect came by asking experimental participants to 
quickly estimate one of the following products: 
olx2x3x4x5x6x7x8 
*8x7x6x5x4x3x2xl 
Participants in the first group (who estimated the first product) replied with an 
average estimate of 512, but the figure for those in the second group was 2250. 
The correct answer is 40230. Tversky and Kahneman argued that because of the 
order of the digits, in the second version the larger numbers are more available 
than the smaller numbers, and vice-versa for the first version. 
A similar effect was observed by Ross and Sicoly (1979), who asked a group 
of husbands and wives to independently estimate what proportion of various 
household tasks they performed. Both husbands and wives estimated that they 
undertook well over half of the odd-jobs. Clearly they cannot be both correct. 
The availability heuristic explanation of this finding notes that the examples 
of chores that come easily to mind are those that you yourself have performed, 
so you are likely to attach more significance to your own actions that those of 
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anybody, else. This finding has implications in very many domains: there are, 
for example, clearly lessons for researchers who need to determine the order of 
authorship on academic papers. 
The heuristics and biases programme has come under sustained and fierce 
criticism from defenders of human rationality (e. g. Gigerenzer, 1991,1996; for a 
reply see Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; c. f. §4.5). However, these criticisms and 
counter-criticisms are not directly relevant for the purposes of this thesis. The 
key thing, for our purposes, is to note that the dual process theories of reasoning 
and decision making have been applied across many different domains with much 
explanatory success. 
7.2 Dual processes in mathematics education. 
7.2.1 The intuitive/analytical distinction. 
The role of intuition in mathematics has been noted by many great mathemati- 
cians (e. g. Hadamard, 1945; Hahn, 1933/1960; Poincar6,1905) and philosophers 
of mathematics (e. g. Feferman, 2000), but the first major study of intuitions in 
mathematics education was conducted by Fischbein (1987). Fischbein defined 
an intuition as a cognition characterised by several properties: 
"An intuition is, then, an idea which possesses the two fundamental 
properties of a concrete, objectively-given reality; immediacy - that 
is to say intrinsic evidence - and certitude (not formal conventional 
certitude, but practically meaningful, immanent certitude)" (p. 21) 
Fischbein saw intuition as, in some sense, the opposite of deductive reasoning, 
arguing that "no productive mathematical reasoning is possible by resorting 
only to formal means" (p. 16). Instead, he argued well developed mathematical 
intuitions are necessary for the creative aspects of mathematics, and that the 
development of such intuitions should be a major goal of instruction. Fischbein's 
definition of intuition is similar to that given by other researchers: 
"Intuition is that faculty of the mind for which comprehension is 
spontaneous and immediate as opposed to rational and linear, and 
very often, though not always, sudden" (Schmalz, 1988, p. 34) 
Again, in this characterisation, intuition is seen as being in some sense the 
opposite of rational thought. 
Whereas Fischbein (1987) saw intuition as something important to be de- 
veloped, not all mathematicians and philosophers take the same view. Hahn 
(1933/1960), for example, argued that mathematical intuition was unreliable 
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and untrustworthy. He cited several example of apparently paradoxical curves 
in support of this assertion (see the discussion on p. 172). Other mathemati- 
cians have disagreed with Hahn's stance, by suggesting that intuition is an 
important part of mathematical cognition (e. g. Feferman, 2000; Hadamard, 
1945; Poincar6,1905). 
Hersh (1998) wrote that intuition was "an essential part of mathematics" 
(p. 61) but, nevertheless recognised that, like Hahn, some mathematicians do 
not agree: 
"One author takes pride in avoiding the 'merely' intuitive An- 
other takes pride in emphasising the intuitive" (pp. 61-62). 
Burton (2004) conducted a study where she asked professional research math- 
ematicians to introspect on the nature of their working habits. She found that 
most of her sample recognised that intuition played an important role in their 
reasoning; although this was not the case for all. However, there was a feeling 
amongst many of her sample that "intuition" was not the most appropriate 
word to use, instead preferring "insight", "instinct" or "gut feeling". 
When Burton (2004) asked her interviewees what exactly intuition was for 
them, she got mixed responses: 
"One mathematician explained: 'seeing the best way forward - that's 
intuition. ' [ ... 
] Making connections was important: 'Insight is see- 
ing a connection'; 'If the light switches on when I look at a problem, 
I have had an insight' [ ... 
] 'An enhanced understanding that comes 
to you suddenly'; 'Pattern matching is the best way of describing 
it"' (Burton, 2004, pp. 76-77). 
These responses all appear to share similarities with Fischbein's (1987) charac- 
terisation of intuition. 5 
Fischbein's (1987) notion of 'intuition' seems to be partially related to the 
dual process concept of System 1 cognition. However, there are important dif- 
ferences. Intuition and System I preconscious heuristics should not be identified 
as being identical. For example, Fischbein asserts that "an intuition is a theory, 
511owever, some care may be needed when listening to mathematicians speak about intu- 
itiveness. Kemeny (1964) reported the following anecdote: 
"The mathematician's favourite word is 'trivial, ' which is a shorthand way of 
saying 'intuitively obvious. ' There are endless stories about the word 'trivial. ' 
My favourite is the one about the mathematician who, in a lecture, asserted that 
a result is trivial. One of his colleagues challenged him, and they got into a long 
argument which was still going on at the end of the class. The class tiptoed out, 
and the two mathematicians were seen arguing vehemently for over two hours. 
When they finally showed up outside, students eagerly queried the challenger 
about the outcome. He replied: 'Oh, he was right. It is trivial'. " (p. 41). 
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never a mere skill or perception" (p. 201), but dual process theorists would wish 
to include non-theories into System I cognition. Reflex actions, for example, 
are categorised as System 1 responses by Stanovich (2004), clearly these are not 
'theories'. 
Perhaps the most important distinction between Fischbein's (1987) work and 
dual process theories is the role of attention. Evans (1996) suggests that the 
primary purpose of System 1 is the allocation of attentional resources. System 
1 'decides' what is relevant (what is worth spending conscious attention on) 
and System 2 then attends to these aspects of the environment. Fischbein at- 
tributes a different role to 'intuition' than the allocation of conscious attentional 
resources. For Fischbein, intuitive errors are the consequence of "incomplete or 
inappropriate" intuitions, not the consequence of failure of an analytical over- 
riding process. Indeed analytical reasoning may not be present at all. 
As a consequence of these differences, the two frameworks attribute quite 
different purposes for the education system. For dual process theorists such as 
Stanovich (2003), the role of teaching should be to develop System 2 analytical 
skills in an attempt to promote the successful analysis and evaluation of System 1 
heuristic responses. Fischbein (1987), however, suggested that the responsibility 
of education should be to develop intuitive responses "by assimilating adequate 
formal structures" (p. 209). Whereas Stanovich believed that System 1 responses 
need to be overridden using System 2, Fischbein believed that intuition itself 
needs to be modified. 
Further differences in both scope and sophistication can be seen between 
Fischbein's (1987) work and dual process theories by looking at his analysis 
of the Selection Task, and contrasting it with the heuristic-analytic account 
described in Chapters 4 and 6. Fischbein (1987) wrote of the task: 
"Generally, the full correct solution is not found even by people who 
know the truth table of implication. Our hypothetical explanation 
is that these people have not assimilated intuitively the complete 
structure of implication. To assimilate intuitively means, accord- 
ing to our conception, to get the respective concept turned into an 
intrinsically obvious and behaviourally meaningful, efficient cogni- 
tion. " (pp. 78-79) 
When compared to any of the frameworks described in Chapter 4, this analysis 
seems to offer little more than a redescription of one part of the data (the 
low number of normatively correct responses). The notion of lack of intuitive 
assimilation can offer no explanation for the matching bias effect, the thematic 
effect or the training/education non-effect. Whereas it is possible to see Evans's 
(1996) heuristic-analytic account as a more sophisticated version of Fischbein's 
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(1987) work, it, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, does not attribute either 'success' 
or 'failure' on the task to not having the "complete structure of implication" 
internalised to System 1, instead it suggests that the key factor is how System 
1 and System 2 interact. 
7.2.2 Intuitive rules. 
The successor to Fischbein's (1987) work on intuition is the 'Intuitive Rules' 
programme of research by Stavy and Tirosh (e. g. Stavy & Tirosh, 1996; Tirosh 
& Stavy, 1999). They propose that some aspects of students' reasoning can be 
understood as, and predicted by, the application of simple 'intuitive rules'. So, 
according to Stavy and Tirosh (1996), many incorrect answers to mathematical 
problems can be explained by the intuitive rule 'more A-more 13'. That is to 
say that if an object has more of property A than another object, intuitively it 
is expected to have more of property B. 
Zazkis (1999) asserted that this intuitive rule can be used to explain results 
from a study that looked at students' responses to a number theory task. She 
asked students to decide whether the following statement was true or false: 
If a natural number a is bigger than a natural number b, then the 
number of factors of a is bigger than the number of factors of b. 
According to the more A-more B intuitive rule, students might intuitively be- 
lieve that this statement is true, whereas in fact it is clearly false. Zazkis found 
that 4 out of 58 participants did in fact believe it was true. Strangely, however, 
this extremely low figure (7%) was not enough for Zazkis to question the role 
of the intuitive rule in this context, instead she wrote: 
... The more of A, the more of B' appeared to be robust and not 
readily given up by some students even when they were confronted 
with new evidence. " (p. 207) 
Similar applications of the intuitive rules theory were published by Tsamir 
(2003) in the context of a task that asked about the lengths of journeys around 
polygons. 
Another intuitive rule that apparently effects students' reasoning patterns 
is the 'same A-same B' rule. That is, if an object has the same amount of 
property A as another object, it is intuitively likely that it has the same amount 
of property B. For example, Tirosh and Stavy (1999) cite the case of a hexagon 
and a pentagon (see Figure 7.2). In this task the students were told that the 
sides of the pentagon were equal to the sides of the hexagon, and asked the 
students to judge whether angle 1 was greater than, equal to, or less than angle 
2. 
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Figure 7.2: The two polygons from Tirosh and Stavy's (1999) paper. 
The results from this study showed that large numbers of students incorrectly 
answered that the angles are equal (, zý 50% in grades 4,6 and 8). Interestingly, 
this figure was considerably lower in higher year groups (16% in grade 12). 
Tirosh and Stavy (1999) attribute the high number of incorrect responses from 
the lower grades to an application of the 'same A-same B' intuitive rule. 
However, there are some potential flaws in Tirosh and Stavy's (1999) analy- 
sis. The hexagon in Tirosh and Stavy's task has more sides than the pentagon, 
so perhaps, according to the 'more A-more B' rule, the participants should have 
judged angle 1 to be greater than angle 2? Van Dooren, de Bock, Weyers, and 
Verschaffel (2004) published an extensive critique of the intuitive rules theory 
based on arguments along these lines. They argued that the supposed "predic- 
tive power" of the theory does not in fact exist. For example, they produced 
the following task: 
Is -ý19- larger than / equal to / or smaller than vr6-? 
According to the 'same A-same B' rule, students should respond with "equal 
to" as the ratios ýý and ? are equal. But, argued Van Dooren et al., according to 96 
the 'more A-more B' rule, students should respond with "larger than" as 9>6 
and/or 3>2. Across several tasks Van Dooren et al. found little or no evidence 
of systematic use of intuitive rules in students' responses. The key issue on these 
tasks appears to be where participants allocate their attentional resources, but 
Van Dooren et al. 's data suggest that Tirosh and Stavy's intuitive rules do not 
always accurately predict this. 
It is important to note that even if one discards the methodological and con- 
ceptual concerns raised by Van Dooren et al. (2004) regarding the intuitive rule 
theory, its content and breadth are quite different to the dual process theories 
of Evans (1996), Sloman (1996) and Stanovich and West (2000). 
Stavy and Tirosh's (1996) work is only concerned with the 'intuitive rules' 
of (very young) schoolchildren. Indeed, their data shows that the proportion 
of answers that are consonant with the 'more A-more B' and 'same A-same 
B' intuitive rules decline with age. Thus, the status of these intuitive rules, if 
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one brushes aside concerns over their conceptual coherence, would appear to 
be of a quite different form to the System 1 heuristics discussed earlier. The 
if- and matching-heuristics do not decline in importance with age, the evidence 
suggests that they are innate and manifest themselves in extremely high-ability 
students of all ages (see Chapter 6). 
A second important difference between the theories is the level of detail 
that they provide. For example, not only do dual process theories set out to 
describe preconscious System 1 heuristics, they can suggest why they are there. 
An evolutionary analysis, supported by Oaksford and Chater's (1994) Bayesian 
model, provides ample evidence for the ecological benefit of the if- and matching- 
heuristics. No such analysis is present with Stavy and Tirosh's (1996) intuitive 
rules. 
Further differences between the intuitive/analytical distinction of Fischbein 
(1987) and followers, and the dual process theories discussed earlier were pointed 
out by Leron and Hazzan (2006). They noted that, in mathematics education 
circles, there has often been a distinction between the use of the term 'cognition' 
and 'metacognition' (e. g. Schoenfeld, 1992). Leron and Hazzan pointed out 
that, within a dual process theory framework, metacognition is clearly a System 
2 analytical process. They write 
"The added value of using dual-process theory in mathematics edu- 
cation research is not the distinction between intuitive and analytical 
thinking; the distinction itself is of course ancient and well-known 
and much has been written about it. Rather, we see the added value 
in tightening, refining and operationalising this distinction. " (Leron 
& Hazzan, 2006, p. 23) 
Leron and Hazzan were right to note that the operationalisation of dual process 
theory is on substantially stronger theoretical and empirical grounds than the 
intuitive rules research programme in the mathematics education literature. One 
obvious benefit of this operationalisation was demonstrated in Chapter 6: by 
using chronometric analyses such as eye-tracker devices it is possible to directly 
scrutinise the differing roles of heuristic and analytical processes. 
7.2.3 Skemp's A, and A2- 
There have been a number of other dualities discussed in the mathematics ed- 
ucation literature. For example, Marton and Saljo (1976) suggested that there 
are two distinct approaches to learning, which they termed the deep and sur- 
face approaches. Along a similar line, Duffin and Simpson (1993) argued that 
learning experiences could be categorised as being eith 'natural' or 'alien'. Al- 
though it may be tempting to see such dualities as being similar to the System 
127 
1-System 2 distinction proposed by dual process theorists, these theories are 
quite different in both scope, aim and scale. 6 There is, however, one further 
duality from the mathematics education literature that merits further scrutiny 
to see whether its superficial similarities with dual process theories stand up to 
examination. 
Skemp (1979) proposed that learning can be analysed in terms of two dis- 
tinct 'director systems' which he labelled delta-one (A, ) and deltaAWO (A2)- 
A director system, for Skemp, is a cognitive system which directs the ways in 
which effort is applied in order to help meet goals of the organism. Skemp sug- 
gested that A, is a first order director system which operates on features of the 
physical environment. A2, in contrast, operates on A,. Its role is to manipulate 
the operation of A, until it functions optimally. 
There are some clear similarities between Skemp's (1979) notions of dual 
director systems and the System I and System 2 of dual process theories. For 
example, in Evans's (2006) heuristic-analytic theory, it is emphasised that Sys- 
tem 2 acts on System 1 output, in much the same way as A2 acts on A,. 
However, when the two theories are scrutinised in greater detail it becomes 
clear that there are also some important differences. 
Firstly, Skemp, (1979) emphasised that A, is teachable. Indeed, he saw the 
primary role Of IA2 as being the 'teacher' of A,. In contrast, dual process 
theorists are (at best) ambivalent about whether it is possible to teach System 
1. As discussed above, the role education is seen as, primarily, being about the 
improvement of System 2 operation (e. g. Stanovich, 2004). 
Secondly, some clear distinctions between the work of Skemp (1979) and the 
dual process theorists can be found by examining specific examples of operation. 
For example, Skemp suggests that translating an unseen prose passage from 
French to English as being an "intellectual task at the A, level" (Skemp, 1979, 
p. 82). This is a A, task in Skemp's terms as it involves operating on objects 
from the physical environment, namely the passage of text. For dual process 
theorists, however, this task clearly involves a combination of System 1 and 
System 2 processing. As has been emphasised throughout this chapter, System 
1 first directs attention towards relevant parts of the environment and then 
System 2 analyses these apparently relevant features. 
Thirdly, Skemp (1979) makes no bold claims about the operational charac- 
teristics of his two director systems. Whereas the list of features of System 1 
and System 2 are quite explicit (see Table 4.2). System 1 operates in a quick 
and automatic fashion, the same is not true of A,. 
6Strangely not everybody agrees with this analysis. Bizarrely, one anonymous reviewer 
suggested to me that dual process theories are merely a redescription of Duffin and Simpson's 
(1993) natural/alien distinction, but offered no justification for this view. 
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1. A student wrote in an exam: 
"Z3 is a subgroup Of Z6" - 
In your opinion is this statement true, partially true, or 
false? Please explain your answer. 
2. A student wrote in an exam: 
"S4 is a subgroup of S5". 
In your opinion is this statement true, partially true, or 
false? Please explain your answer. 
Figure 7.3: The Lagrange's Theorem task. 
In summary, whilst the Al/A2 developed by Skemp (1979) shares some 
similar features to dual process theories of reasoning, there is no direct one-to- 
one mapping between the theories either in terms of the conceptual relationships 
they specify, or the empirical observations they seek to account for. 
7.2.4 Uses of dual process theory in maths education. 
Leron and Hazzan (2006) analysed the so-called Lagrange's Theorem Task (Fig- 
ure 7.3) using dual process theory. They suggested that research that found a 
large minority of students are prone to confusing Lagrange's Theorem 7 with its 
converse (Hazzan & Leron, 1996) can be accounted for by a re-analysis using a 
dual process framework. In effect, using the language discussed in §4.4.7, Leron 
and Hazzan claimed that the Lagrange's Theorem Task satisfies Criterion T. 
Hazzan and Leron (1996) found that 27% of students invoked Lagrange's 
Theorem to answer the first part of the task (shown in Figure 7.3). That is to 
say that they constructed an argument of the form: 
Z3 is a subgroup Of Z6 because 3 divides 6. 
Hazzan and Leron found that, in the second example, 29% of students answered 
'false' and justified this response with an argument of the form: 
S4 is not a subgroup of S5 because 4 does not divide 5. 
7Lagrange's Theorem states that if H is a subgroup of a finite group G, then IHI divides 
IGI. 
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Write an equation for the following statement: "There are 
six times as many students as professors at this university". 
Use S for the number of students and P for the number of 
professors. 
Figure 7.4: The Students and Professors problem. 
Both these arguments are incorrect, but both are similar in the sense that 
they are using surface features of the problem in an attempted application of 
Lagrange's Theorem. Leron and Hazzan's (2006) new interpretation of these 
results is that the participants' attention was drawn to apparently relevant parts 
of the problem by System 1 heuristics, and that the lack of System 2 monitoring 
and criticism was responsible for the incorrect answer. In essence, Leron and 
Hazzan (2006) argued that the process that produced the incorrect responses to 
the Lagrange's Theorem task is structurally identical to the heuristic-analytic 
account of the Selection Task. It would be worthwhile to test this hypothesis 
further. For example, if this analysis is correct one might expect a rapid-response 
methodology, of the type used by Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005), to increase 
the percentage of these specific incorrect answers. 
Leron and Hazzan (2006) also noted that a dual process interpretation can 
be applied to the 'Students and Professors' problem (Clement, Lockhead, & 
Monk, 1981). In this task (Figure 7.4) it was found that 37% of university 
students answered incorrectly, and that two-thirds of these mistakes were of the 
form '6S = P'. 
As with the. Lagrange's Theorem task, Leron and Hazzan (2006) argued that 
these responses could be seen as a consequence of linguistic surface relevance 
features of the problem. Again, it would be interesting to adopt a rapid-response 
methodology to this task to test specific predictions of the dual process account, 
as there are other competing explanations (e. g. Crowley, Thomas, & Tall, 1994). 
There are many other tasks that are well known to the mathematics educa- 
tion community which can be seen from a dual process perspective. One such 
example, the 'waiter's profit' task, is given in Figure 7.5. In this task partic- 
ipants are confused by surface relevance features of the problem that there is 
a 'spare' pound. It is only after a careful, slow and analytical analysis of the 
situation that the explanation can be revealed. 
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The waiter's profit? 
Three people are in a restaurant. The bill comes to 130 and 
each person puts in LIO. The manager of the restaurant 
tells the waiter "they are good customers, give them E5 
back". 
The waiter, being a little dishonest, gives them each back 
Z1 and pockets Z2. This means that each has paid Z9 
for their meal, whilst the waiter has pocketed Z2. Now, 
3x X9 is Z27. The clever waiter has f2. Where is the 
other pound? 
(Johnson-Wilder, private communication) 
Figure 7.5: The 'waiter's profit' task. 
7.3 Summary of Chapter 7. 
Dual process theories of reasoning are a growing field. This chapter has sought 
to expand upon the range of literature reviewed in Chapter 4, and to establish 
links between dual process theories and distinctions which have been noted by 
earlier mathematics education researchers: 
Along with the matching- and if-heuristics discussed in Chapter 6 with 
reference to the Selection Task, other System 1 heuristics have been iden- 
tified from the reasoning and decision making literatures. 
It is possible to see dual process theories as more sophisticated and devel- 
oped versions of the intuitive/analytical divide that has been discussed in 
the mathematics education literature, although there are still important 
differences between the theories. 
9 Several established results from the mathematics education literature can 
be seen and analysed in terms of dual process theory. 
The application of dual process theorists in mathematics education is a new 
and growing field, which could have applications in many areas (Ejersbo, Inglis, 
& Leron, 2006). In the next chapter, the framework is put to use in a study which 
seeks, amongst other aims, to explore whether the if- and matching-heuristics 
play a role in advanced mathematical thinking in a realistic environment. 
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Chapter 8 
Experiment 4: Applying 
the Framework 
Chapter 6 argued, using empirical data from three experiments, that the dual 
process theory of reasoning provides the best framework within which to analyse 
how mathematicians reason with conditional statements. The purpose of this 
chapter, then, is to conduct such an analysis within the context of a realistic 
mathematical setting. 
There were several specific goals: 
To investigate the role of preconscious System 1 heuristics in mathematical 
reasoning with conditionals. Do the matching- and if-heuristics impact on 
strategies in realistic mathematical contexts in the same way that they do 
in the Selection Task? 
* To investigate the types of processes mathematicians go through when 
evaluating the validity of conditional statements. 
The general discussion in Chapter 5 highlighted the benefits and drawbacks 
of qualitative and quantitative methods. In view of the main aims of this ex- 
periment it was felt that a qualitative method was more appropriate as it would 
be hard to claim that any standardised test would truly be a "realistic math- 
ematical context". It was also felt that the level of richness of data required 
to satisfactorily meet the specified goals would be impossible to obtain from a 
quantitative study. 
Naturally a qualitative study takes more space and time to report than the 
quantitative work of Chapter 6, and so an entire chapter is devoted to describing 
the task, and reporting the outcome. 
This chapter begins by introducing the task, how it was developed, and 
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describing the methods and participants in the Experiment, it concludes with 
three lengthy sections: 
The first section (§8.5) analyses the role that preconscious heuristics played 
in participants' responses to the task. It is argued that, as in the Selection 
Task, the if- and matching-heuristics play an important role in shaping 
conscious thought in this mathematical situation. 
The second section (§8.6) begins to develop a theory that models the eval- 
uation of mathematical conditionals. The groundwork for this theoreti- 
cal attempt is laid in this chapter through the introduction of Toulmin's 
(1958) argumentation scheme. It is argued that the manner in which the 
scheme has been applied to mathematics by earlier researchers is inade- 
quate for dealing with all types of mathematical reasoning. 
9 In the final section (§8.7) the data reported in the earlier two sections 
is drawn together with Evans and Over's (2004) theory of suppositional 
conditionals to develop a model of how successful mathematicians evaluate 
mathematical conditionals. 
8.1 The task. 
The task used for this experiment ("the Abundant Number Task") is given here. 
Participants were first given the following information, on a A5 card: 
All the numbers below should be assumed to be positive in- 
tegers. 
Definition. An abundant number is an integer n whose divisors 
add up to more than 2n. 
Definition. A perfect number is an integer n whose divisors add up 
to exactly 2n. 
Definition. A deficient number is an integer n whose divisors add 
up to less than 2n. 
Example. 12 is an abundant number, because 1+2+3+4+6+12 
28 and 28 >2x 12. However, 14 is a deficient number, because 
1+2+7+ 14 = 24, and 24 <2x 14. 
Your task is to consider the following conjectures and determine, 
with proofs, whether they are true or false. 
When participants indicated that they were ready to proceed they were given 
the first of the conjectures shown in Figure 8.1, again on A5 card. Participants 
had unlimited amounts of paper on which to work. Only after participants had 
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dealt with the first conjecture to their satisfaction were they given the card 
containing the second conjecture, however they retained access to the previous 
cards that they had been given. Only one participant managed to complete ev- 
ery conjecture in the allotted hour, and discretion was used by the interviewer 
in determining whether or not to miss out certain conjectures in order to max- 
imise the use of time. The conjectures, were, however, always presented in this 
order they are shown in Figure 8.1.1 Enthusiastic readers may wish to study 
the conjectures themselves before proceeding to the next section. 
Conjecture (1). A number is abundant if and only if it is a multiple of 
6. 
Conjecture (2). If n is perfect, then kn is abundant for any kEN. 
Conjecture (3). If pi and P2 are primes, then PlP2 is abundant. 
Conjecture (4). If n is deficient, then every divisor of n is deficient. 
Conjecture (5). If n and m are abundant, then n+m is abundant. 
Conjecture (6). If n and m are abundant, then nm is abundant. 
Conjecture (7). If n is abundant, then n is not of the form pm for 
some natural m and prime p. 
Figure 8.1: The Abundant Number Task. 
If the participant began to check some examples, or asked whether any 
examples were available, they were given a further card: 
Examples. 
The first few abundant numbers are: 12,18,20,24,30,36,40,... 
The first few perfect numbers are: 6,28,496,8128.... 
8.2 Designing the task. 
When designing the Abundant Number Task there were several priorities. In 
view of the aims and objectives of the study it was important to ensure that 
the conjectures were as realistic as possible. That is to say that they needed 
to appear to the participants as being natural successors to one another. As a 
consequence of this objective Conjectures 2-7 were generated during the course 
of an investigation into the properties of abundant numbers. 
'i. e. Conjecture n was presented after Conjecture m if m<n. 
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Conjecture 1 was based on previous empirical research into mathematical 
reasoning. In an extremely interesting, yet unpublished, piece of research from 
the early eighties Markowitz and Tweney (1981a, 1981b) reported a study that 
looked at the confirmatory and disconfirmatory reasoning strategies of mathe- 
maticians. In earlier work Mynatt, Doherty, and Tweney (1978) had investi- 
gated how research scientists test conjectures in a simulated research environ- 
ment. Markowitz and Tweney's work was an attempt to extend this research 
to mathematicians; thus allowing the comparison of confirmation and disconfir- 
mation strategies between the disciplines. 
To do this they presented twelve research mathematicians (primarily research 
students) with Conjecture 1, and asked them to first evaluate the conjecture, 
and then proceed in any manner they chose, bearing in mind their primary goal: 
to "determine the divisibility properties necessary and sufficient for a number 
to be abundant". After two hours of solitary work, during which time the 
experimenter took notes on the participants' behaviour, the participants were 
asked to organise and summarise their work. 
Markowitz and Tweney's (1981a) method was a hybrid of their own con- 
struction. They used participants' protocols, the experimenter's notes and a 
post-experimental interview to construct an account of the participants' reason- 
ing process. From a more recent perspective, their analysis procedure was highly 
unorthodox. Ten "interesting" conjectures were determined from amongst the 
participants' replies, and a pseudo-quantitative analysis conducted on the par- 
ticipants' reasoning patterns. For example, participants were awarded 'points' 
for proposing 'interesting' conjectures, and further points for proving them. 
In view of the differing aims of the current study and their's, and the 
methodological discussion in Chapter 5, it was felt that a clinical interview 
would be more appropriate than Markowitz and Tweney's (1981a) approach, 
both methodologically and practically. The richness and non-triviality of the 
mathematical context that Markowitz and Tweney's (1981a) opening conjecture 
provided, however, was deeply impressive. It was resolved to use this abundant 
number environment to explore the current research question: How do math- 
ematicians evaluate conditional statements, and what is the role of System 1 
heuristics? 
In view of the concerns with making the ordering of conjectures as realistic 
as possible, Markowitz and Tweney's experimental instructions were retrospec- 
tively followed by myself. What follows is a rough introspective account of this 
attempt, together with some discussion of how the conjectures ended up in their 
final form on the interview schedule. 
Conjecture (1). A number is abundant if and only if it is a multiple of 6. 
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False. 
There are easy counterexamples to this conjecture in both directions. However, 
further investigations reveal that all proper multiples of 6 are abundant. The 
proof of this fact is non-trivial, and relies upon picking an appropriate subset 
of divisors of 6k, so that when you add up all the divisors in this subset you get 
a total of more than 12k. 
Proof of Conjecture 1. =*: 20 is a counterexample, it is abundant, but not a 
multiple of 6 (1 +2+4+5+ 10 + 20 = 42 >2x 20). 6 is a counterexample, 
it is a multiple of 6 and is perfect, not abundant. However, all multiples of 6 
apart from 6 are abundant. Take n= 6k for some k :? ý 1. Then 1, k, 2k, 3k, 6k 
are divisors of n. This gives: 1+k+ 2k + 3k + 6k = 12k +1>2x 6k = 2n. 0 
Conjecture (2). If n is perfect, then kn is abundant for any kEN. False. 
Conjecture 2 is a generalisation of Conjecture 1. Whilst investigating the first 
conjecture it was found that all proper multiples of (the perfect number) 6 are 
abundant, so it seemed natural to wonder whether this is true for all perfect 
numbers. It is (and can be proved in a similar fashion to the argument in 
Conjecture 1), although the conjecture as written is false since for k=1 it is 
clear that kn is perfect, not abundant. 
Proof of Conjecture 2. The statement is true provided k : ýk 1. Suppose n is 
perfect with divisors di, d21 .... d, (i. e. 2n = di + ... + d, 
). Then kn has 
amongst its divisors l, kdl, kd2, .... kdr, and these sum to 2kn +1> 2kn. So 
kn is abundant. El 
Conjecture (3). If pi and P2 are primes, then PlP2 is abundant. False. 
The key issue in proving Conjectures 1 and 2 was finding the correct divisors 
to add up. Considering the properties of divisors of natural numbers naturally 
leads you to consider primality, and what relation primality has to abundantness 
(c. f. Weber's (2001) notion of 'strategic knowledge'). It was easy to see that 
all prime numbers are deficient, so the properties of numbers that are multiples 
of two primes were investigated. It is fairly straightforward to show that these 
numbers cannot be abundant. 
Proof of Conjecture 3. pi = 2, P2 =3 is a counterexample. In fact it is true 
to say that if P1 7 P2 are prime then PlP2 
is not abundant. For this we need 
to show, assuming pi :ý P2 , that 
1+ P1 + P2 + PlP2 2plP2. This reduces to 
1+ P1 + P2 !5 PIP2. This is equivalent to (p, - 1) (P2 1) ý! 2 which is clearly 
true for all P1 i P2 other than p, = P2 = 
2.0 
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At this stage the investigation moved on to consider the properties of sums of 
abundant numbers (Conjecture 5). But for the research instrument it was also 
important to evaluate the role of System 1 heuristics in mathematical reasoning. 
One of the heuristics that turned out to play a vital role in the Selection Task 
was the so-called if-heuristic. This heuristic plays the role of directing attention 
towards the antecedent of a conditional statement, i. e. the P in P =ý Q. The 
next conjecture was designed to investigate whether this is true in genuinely 
mathematical contexts. 
Conjecture (4). If n is deficient, then every divisor of n is deficient. True. 
This conjecture is (almost) the contrapositive of Conjecture 2. In fact the proof 
of Conjecture 2 proves a stronger statement: that kn is abundant (or perfect) 
for any perfect or abundant n. Conjecture 4 is the contrapositive of this stronger 
statement, and therefore should be a straightforward corollary of Conjecture 2. 
However, the if-heuristic predicts that things will not be so simple: attention will 
be directed towards the statement's antecedent - the case when n is deficient. In 
fact, to prove this statement using the contrapositive it is necessary to consider 
the case when n' (a divisor of n) is abundant or perfect. The prediction, then, 
is that this conjecture sets up a Criterion T situation (see §4.4.7). 
Proof of Conjecture 4. Consider the contrapositive: if n is not deficient, then 
kn is not deficient. Suppose n has divisors dl, ..., 
dr and that d, +. .. + 
dr > 2n. 
Then the set of divisors of kn contains 1, kdl, W2, .... 
Mr. And we know that 
1+ kdl +... + kdr > 2kn + 1. Therefore kn is not deficient. This is the same 
statement as Conjecture 2 (with a small modification). 0 
Conjecture (5). If n and m are abundant, then n+m is abundant. False. 
This conjecture asserts that abundantness is preserved under addition, but find- 
ing a counterexample is trivial. 
Proof of Conjecture 5.20 and 12 are abundant, but 32 is deficient (I +2+4+ 
8+ 16 + 32 = 63 <2X 32). 0 
In an attempt to extend Conjecture 5, the next conjecture to be investigated 
asserted that abundantness is preserved under multiplication. 
Conjecture (6). If n and m are abundant, then nm is abundant. True. 
This statement turned out to be surprisingly difficult to prove, despite, on re- 
flection, being a straightforward consequence of Conjecture 2. However, the 
if-heuristic predicts that this statement will indeed be difficult to prove, as it 
sets up a Criterion T situation. To recap, the if-heuristic directs conscious at- 
tention towards the antecedent of the statement - in this case the situation 
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where n and m are both abundant - thus disguising the fact that Conjecture 
2 is relevant. If attention were not biased towards the antecedent of the state- 
ment, it would perhaps be straightforward to see that it is a trivial special case 
of Conjecture 2. Interestingly, Hadamard (1945) described a similar, yet more 
extreme, situation: 
"I have several times happened to overlook results which ought to 
have struck me blind, as being immediate consequences of other ones 
which I had obtained. Most of these failures proceed from 
attention too narrowly directed" (p. 50) 
Hadamard went on to give some clear cut examples from his own mathematical 
career, and the careers of others (pp. 49-52). In the abundant number context 
it seems that the if-heuristic directs attention too narrowly - at the antecedent 
as written - and thus inhibits progression towards the trivial conclusion that 
2 this conjecture is a straightforward consequence of Conjecture 2. 
Proof of Conjecture 6. This is a specialisation of the claim that all multiples of 
abundant numbers are abundant, so it is true. 0 
Conjecture (7). If n is abundant, then n is not of the form p' for some natural 
m and prime p. 7V-ue. 
The final conjecture was, in some sense, an extension of Conjecture 3. But the 
final formulation that appeared on the interview schedule was designed to inves- 
tigate the role of the matching-heuristic. The statement is straightforward to 
prove indirectly by considering its contrapositive; the matching-heuristic should 
aid this process as, according to the dual process account, it directs attention 
2My own initial approaches at proving Conjecture 4 revolved around assuming n and m 
are abundant, cross multiplying the set of divisors of n with the set of divisors of m, and 
adding up the resultant divisors. Unfortunately far too many repeat divisors are created in 
this cross multiplication, and so when the addition process takes place at the end, the sum is 
artificially large. I also attempted the decomposition of n and M into products of primes and 
attempting to count up the primes in nm. So, for example, I considered 
n= P"' ... P" and m =,, 
Pl PP. Ir 
where the ai and fli may be zero, and it is assumed (without loss of generality) that r>s. 
Multiplying these two products together gives 
nm = pc" ... Pat ý 
+16. 
1s... pp, 
Using this technique I hoped that the divisors of nm would reveal themselves. Unfortunately 
they didn't: this strategy proved both complicated and fruitless. Having unsuccessfully at- 
tempted to prove the statement, I sought assistance from a colleague who was also familiar 
with the task context and the first few conjectures. Together we ran through similar argu- 
ments to the ones discussed above, but were also unsuccessful at producing a correct proof. 
Disheartened, I gave up. But, strangely, a couple of days later, whilst driving home from 
work, the solution floated into my consciousness! Conjecture 6 is a trivial consequence of 
Conjecture 2! If kn is abundant for any k>1 and abundant n, then certainly it is is the case 
that nm is abundant for any two abundants m and n. 
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towards the linguistic surface features of the rule, in this case the case where 
n= pm. 
Proof of Conjecture 7. Consider the contrapositive: if n is of the form p' then 
n is not abundant. The divisors of p' are l, p, p2,..., P M, so we Deed to show 
that 1+p+... + pm 5 2pm. Do this by induction on m. Clearly true for 
m=1. Assumetrue form= k, giving 1+p+... +pk <2 pk . 
This implies that 
1+p+. - -+P 
k +P k+1 <- 2 pk+pk+l, which gives 1+p+.. . +pk+pk+l < ppk +P 
k+I 
since 2<p. Therefore 1+p+... +pk+l <2 pk+1 which completes the induction 
step. 0 
Before the main study the interview schedule was piloted with a colleague, 
and minor adjustments were made to the design. The most notable change was 
the inclusion of the sheet of examples in order to minimise the amount of time 
that participants spent looking for abundant and/or deficient numbers. 
8.3 Participants, method and analysis. 
8.3.1 Participants. 
Eight postgraduate volunteers were interviewed as part of this study, each par- 
ticipant was paid L10 for taking part. The participants were recruited through 
an appeal for volunteers sent to all postgraduate students researching mathe- 
matics or undergraduate mathematics education at the University of Warwick. 
All those who responded were interviewed. The backgrounds of the students 
are summarised in Table 8.1. 
Code Name Research Area 
A Andrew Functional analysis and partial 
differential equations 
B Ben Quantum chemistry 
C Chris Conformal field theory 
D David Algebraic topology 
E Edward Computational algebra in Lie 
theory 
F Fred Philosophy of mathematics 
G Gary Undergraduate maths education 
H Harry Undergraduate maths education 
Table 8.1: The participants in Experiment 4. 
All the students had successfully completed undergraduate mathematics de- 
grees and were now researching some area of mathematics or mathematics edu- 
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cation. All participants other than Fred were, at the time of interview, studying 
at the University of Warwick. ned was at the University of London. 3 Partici- 
pants A to F intended to follow an academic career in mathematics, and were 
at various stages in their Ph. D. research. Gary and Harry intended to follow 
careers as mathematics education researchers. All the participants had been 
highly successful undergraduate mathematics students, and participants A to F 
were amongst the most talented mathematics students in the country. It is on 
these cases that the following analyses will concentrate. 4 
8.3.2 Method. 
Data collection. 
Participants were interviewed alone in a seminar room or private office. The 
interviews were recorded with an electronic audio-dictaphone, and later tran- 
scribed for analysis. The possibility of video-taping the interviews was consid- 
ered, but it was felt that such a method would be more intrusive than an audio 
recording and that the benefits of the extra data provided by a video recording 
would be minimal. In the early interviews the interviewer made notes during 
the course of the interview, but participants tended to find this distracting so 
the practice was stopped. Instead the interviewer wrote down reflective com- 
ments immediately on completion of the interview. Participants' rough notes 
made during the work were retained for analysis. 
The interview began with the participants being presented the first card of 
instructions and being asked to read it aloud. When they were happy to move 
on the interviewer gave them the card containing Conjecture 1. Participants 
were asked to "think aloud" during the interview, and to verbalise anything 
that they wrote down on the rough paper provided. 
The interviews followed a 'semi-structured' format (L. Cohen et al., 2001; 
Robson, 1993). Although the conjectures were never presented in a differing 
order, sometimes (in order to maximise the use of time) conjectures were missed 
out. For example, after participants had correctly solved Conjecture 3, most 
were asked about the modified conjecture "if p, and P2 are primes, then PlP2 is 
not abundant. " However, for example, Ben had spent disproportionately long 
investigating Conjectures I and 2, so the modified version of Conjecture 3 was 
omitted from the interview schedule in his case. 
When necessary within each conjecture, the interviewer asked for clarifica, 
3F'red had previously studied at Waxwick- 
'A further two participants were interviewed during the design of the task, all were re- 
seaxching undergraduate mathematics education. Although these data are not reported here, 
the case-law outlined in the following sections is consistent with incidents seen in these pilot 
interviews. 
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tion and explanation, and probed the participants in a fashion associated with 
the clinical interview method (Ginsburg, 1981; Swanson et al., 1981). When the 
interviewer felt that too long had been spent on a certain conjecture (typically 
over 15 minutes on a single conjecture), and that as a consequence no useful 
data was being collected, two strategies were adopted. Firstly the interviewer 
attempted to 'push' the participant towards a correct solution by the use of 
hints and leading questions. If that failed the participant was asked to stop 
and the interviewer demonstrated the solution, before moving on to the next 
conjecture. Happily, the first technique needed to be used sparingly, and the 
second only once. Notwithstanding this, none of the participants seemed to feel 
that the task was trivial, and only one, David, completed the whole of the task 
in the allotted hour. Several participants, however, asked to carry on until they 
had completed the conjecture they were working on to their satisfaction. As an 
example of a typical interview structure, the entire transcript of the interview 
with David is given in Appendix A. 
Data analysis. 
The analysis was conducted as a series of case studies using the quasi-judicial 
method, with the aim of developing a set of coherent case-law (for a full dis- 
cussion of the quasi-judicial method of qualitative data analysis see §5.3, or 
Bromley, 1986). In practice this meant: 
1. An interview was selected. 
2. The interview was transcribed and imported into qualitative research soft- 
ware for analysis. 
3. The interview was coded. Codes were based on the dual process framework 
(this was, to use Bromley's (1986) terminology, a prima facie explanation). 
The full set of codes used in the analysis are given in Appendix B. 
4. Separate arguments within the interview were analysed using Toulmin's 
(1958) scheme, and warrants coded using Harel and Sowder's (1998) proof 
scheme framework (another prima facie explanation). 
5. This process was undertaken for each interview in turn, before common 
themes were drawn together to form a set of coherent case-law. The report 
which follows describes this case-law. 
In the following sections interview transcripts are reported together with the 
participant's code a number that represents which conjecture they were working 
on at the time. So, for example, 'Al' indicates that the transcript is from the 
portion of Andrew's interview where he was working on Conjecture 1. 
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8.4 Aside: a note about notation. 
In the extracts that follow the standard notation regarding the divisors of a 
natural number is used. Given nEN, the sum of the divisors of n will be 
denoted by a(n). It is interesting to note that no participant in the study was 
familiar with this notation, and as a consequence, they were forced to invent 
their own. There were a wide variety of different notations invented by the 
various participants. 
Some participants used adaptations of set-theoretic notation (e. g. David), 
some used sentences of text (e. g. Ben), and others used hybrid notations of 
their own construction (e. g. Fred). Examples of various notations are shown in 
Figure 8.2. 
Some participants' notations impacted on their ability to complete the task 
successfully. For example, Fred's notation naturally led him to the lemma 
o, (nk) ý! u(n) -k (see Figure 8.2). However, participants who had adopted 
notation which did not reveal this relationship as naturally tended to struggle. 
For example, Harry used a strange notation where each divisor of n was repre- 
sented by a dot. This notation, shown in Figure 8.2, seemed to hinder Harry's 
progress towards a solution he was happy with. The impact that the quality 
of notation has on success in mathematical research appears to be an area ripe 
for future research. Perhaps a methodology similar to that adopted here for 
different research questions could be used to study this question empirically. 
However, the goal of this thesis is not to study the role of notation, rather to 
characterise how successful mathematicians reason with conditional statements. 
This process begins by considering the role of preconscious heuristics in Exper- 
iment 4. 
8.5 Evidence of preconscious heuristics at work. 
The heuristic-analytic dual process theory suggests two stages to reasoning. The 
first preconscious stage has the role of directing attention to appropriate parts 
of the environment. As seen in Chapters 6 and 7, two main heuristics have been 
proposed that are important when paxticipants consider conditional statements 
as part of the Selection Task: the if- and matching-heuristics. In this section 
the role of these heuristics in shaping participants responses to the Abundant 
number task is considered. 
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David's notation for u(n) < 2n 
ý x. J, %ÄV j- n -Z= Zk 
Ben's notation for kxa (n) = 2nk. 
IM 
l( 2ý- 
) ýc= 2-, -, 
Fred's notation for u(n) = 2n. 
Fred's notation for the lemma u(nk) >a (n) k. 
Lt j( If 
--- ------- 
Harry's notation for the divisors of n and 2n. 
Figure 8.2: Various notations adopted by the participants in Experiment 4. 
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8.5.1 The if-heuristic. 
Recall that Evans and Over (2004) postulated that the if-heuristic directs at- 
tention towards the antecedent part of a conditional statement (the P in the 
rule 'if P then Q'). 
Evidence from the abundant number study suggested that participants did 
indeed tend to initially concentrate on determining the meaning of the an- 
tecedent before moving on to try and prove the statement. For example, consider 
Andrew's reaction to Conjecture 2: 
ANDREW: [Reads question] OK, so if n is perfect, then kn is abundant, for 
any k. OK, so what does it, yeah it looks, so what does it mean? 
Yeah so if n is perfect, and I take any pi which divides this n, then 
afterwards the sum of these pi's is 2n. This is the definition. 
(A2) 
Andrew's focus is immediately on the semantic meaning of the antecedent, it is 
only then that he moves on to consider the consequent, and a possible proof. 
This behaviour was widespread throughout the study. Ben's reaction to the 
same conjecture was similar: 
BEN: [Reads question] OK, so n being perfect means that you've got the 
sum of the divisors is exactly n. (B2) 
However the more interesting examples of the if-heuristic at work came from 
Conjectures 4 and 6. Recall that these two conjectures were related to Conjec- 
ture 2: 
Conjecture (2). If n is perfect, then kn is abundant for any kcN. 
Conjecture (4). If n is deficient, then every divisor of n is deficient. 
Conjecture (6). If n and m are abundant, then nm is abundant. 
Conjecture 4 is (almost') the contrapositive of Conjecture 2, and Conjecture 
6 is a trivial consequence of Conjecture. 2. However, the if-heuristic predicts that 
participants' attention would be directed away from these relevant factors. 
Evidence of the if-heuristic from Conjecture 4. 
Having successfully proved Conjectures 1,2 and 3, David began tackling Con- 
jecture 4 in the following manner: 
5As discussed earlier, although the two statements axe not exact contrapositives, the stan- 
dard proof of Conjecture 2 also proves the exact contrapositive of Conjecture 4. 
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DAVID: If n is deficient then every divisor of n is deficient, so the sum of 
the divisors is, right, err, sum of m in divisors of n, [David had invented 
the notation div(n) to describe the set of divisors of n, so here he actually wrote 
EmEdiv(n)rn] right, let's just write this down as less than or equal to 
2n. And if you've got, err, so if you consider, hmm. Umm, if you 
consider a divisor of n, itself then you've got, erm... [long pause] 
INTERVIEWER: What are you thinking? 
DAVID: What am I thinking?! I'm not, I'm not sure. I'm trying to take 
away a term from that, but you can't just take away one term be- 
cause you might end up with too many. OK, so let's, a good way to 
do this is sort of fundamental theorem of arithmetic... (D4) 
David then proceeded to attempt a proof by decomposing n into its prime 
factors. After spending a while attempting to find a sufficiently large lower 
bound on the sum of the divisors of n, David abandoned his initial attempt at 
a proof and started again, this time trying to formulate an induction argument 
based on the fact that the product of primes is deficient: 
D"ID: Yeah, so if n is deficient then every, ok, so let's think primes again, 
primes are very deficient, what was that previous one? if P, and P2 
are primes then PlP2 is erm, not abundant. So, it's either err, so we 
write our n as a product of primes, p, to p, and each of these are, 
each of these are [very long pause] err, A hang on, that [Conjecture 3] 
only says PlP2 doesn't it? That doesn't help, it won't give us an 
induction. 
INTERVIEWER: Oh, I see, does that extend to 3 then? If you put a P3 in 
there? 
D"ID: Well, it wouldn't necessarily extend, I mean look at 2x2x3, it's 
12 which is abundant. (D4) 
David's attention here is clearly drawn towards the antecedent of the statement. 
He first writes down what "n is deficient" means, and then attempts two differ- 
ent methods of direct proof. Despite having proved a logically (near) identical 
statement ten minutes or so previously, all David's attempts are based on con- 
structing a new direct proof. This is exactly the kind of behaviour that the 
theory behind the if-heuristic would predict. 
After his second failure at a direct proof David re-evaluates, and considers 
an indirect approach: 
D"ID: I'm just trying to think about going the other way, rather than 
starting with n start with some divisor of n, and then see if we 
can say, OK, so I guess what I'm trying to do is the contrapositive. 
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So I'm saying, umm, suppose every divisor of n is not deficient, so 
suppose this is not deficient and then add a prime and see if you 
get something that's still not deficient? Is that right? Is that what 
I'm trying to say? If every divisor of n is not deficient then n is not 
deficient. Umm. 
INTERVIEWER: So what's the contrapositive? 
DAVID: Yeah. That's what I've just said. If every divisor of n is not 
deficient then n is not deficient. So, this is umm, p, to, why is this 
taking me so long? (D4) 
Even having formulated the contrapositive of Conjecture 4 it's structural simi- 
larity to Conjecture 2 remains hidden to David. The surface linguistic features 
of the two statements appear to direct attention to two different locations: Con- 
jecture 2 is about abundantness and Conjecture 4 is about deficientness (even 
when reformulated into a conjecture about non-deficientness - see the discussion 
of the role of the matching-heuristic below). 
After David had successfully proved the statement indirectly (he had used 
a slightly different method to his proof of Conjecture 2), the interviewer asked 
him about the connections between Conjectures 2 and 4: 
INTERVIEWER: So what's the relationship between that one, number 4, 
and the one you proved a minute ago [points at number 21? If at all? 
DAVID: Umm, if n is perfect then kn is abundant. Errm, A yeah, so 
it's the same thing isn't it? [laughs] Gosh! It's the contrapositive, 
well, hang on, it's not quite the contrapositive is it? Because if n 
is perfect, it doesn't mean, erm, so here we're not assuming perfect, 
we're assuming not deficient, so it's not quite the same, and we're 
not quite proving the same thing, because we're proving that kn is 
not deficient. 
INTERVIEWER: Right, so it's nearly the contrapositive? 
DAVID: So, it's sort of, it's similar to the contrapositive, but it's not quite. 
INTERVIEWER: Yeah, because you've come up with two entirely different 
proofs which is quite interesting. 
DAVID: Yeah gosh, I have, haven't I? [laughs] (D4) 
When asked directly about the connections between the two conjectures David 
immediately sees that they are closely related, and is amused that he hadn't 
noticed. It is when the interviewer forced David to attend to the two conjec- 
tures that he sees the similarities. Previously his attention had been directed 
elsewhere because of the influence of the if-heuristic and the surface linguistic 
relevance features of the statements. 
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It is interesting to note David's amusement when he notices the connection. 
His reaction is somehow similar to how some people react when encountering 
optical illusions: many people can be amused by what they see as the irrational- 
ity of their behaviour. (It is important to emphasise the "what they see as" 
so as to avoid any unwelcome distractions from the debates surrounding ratio- 
nality discussed in §4.5). David's amusement at this situation was not at all 
atypical, and other examples can be found throughout the extracts reported in 
this chapter. 
David's behaviour when investigating Conjecture 4 was typical. To give 
another example, here is how Andrew reacted: 
ANDREW: If n is deficient then every divisor of n is deficient. Err... [long 
pause] 
INTERVIEWER: What are you thinking? 
ANDREW: Actually I'm thinking if it's OK or not. But actually I can't, I 
don't know at the moment, so let's make some investigations. Err, 
if n is deficient [long pause] OK, so OK, let these [writes pi ... Pk] 
be 
the divisors of n. (A4) 
Notice how Andrew's initial reaction is to attempt to decide whether he thinks 
the statement is "OK or not", this behaviour is discussed in greater depth in 
section §8.6. After attempting, and failing, to find a direct proof by considering 
the set of divisors of a typical divisor of n, Andrew asked to see the examples. 
Having convinced himself of the statement's truth by evaluating a few examples 
he returned to attempting to prove the statement directly. Eventually, after 
several further unsuccessful attempts, Andrew looked back through the conjec- 
tures he had already worked on and noticed that Conjecture 2 was relevant. As 
with David, he was highly amused by this finding: 
ANDREW: Wow! A number is abundant if and only if it is a multiple of 6. 
But I think that this wasn't true. If n is perfect then kn is abundant. 
Oh! Oh! [collapses laughing] 
INTERVIEWER: What are you whooping at?! What does this mean?! 
ANDREW: So actually it is done. Right. (A4) 
TW06 participants fairly quickly realised that they needed to try an indirect 
proof, but still did not notice the connection with Conjecture 2. Fred's initial 
reaction was similar to David's: to try to consider n as a product of primes. 
6Note that although the number of participants in the study who answered in each fashion 
are included here for interest purposes, no claim of statistical significance is being made. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the quasi-judicial method of qualitative data analysis seeks validity 
and reliability through the cogency of the theoretical reasoning conducted by the analyst, not 
through the representativeness of the cases. 
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However, he quickly realised that this wouldn't work, and instead turned his 
attention to the contrapositive. 
FRED: If n is deficient then every divisor of n is deficient. Hmmm. Now 
I'm going to be a little bit wily, because I think, because going by the 
last question, it would probably help me to look at the product of two 
primes. [long pause] Umm, no that's not going to help me, because 
there might be other deficient numbers that aren't the product of two 
primes... Let me think... I would go towards this... UMM... I think 
the way to do it is to find... hmm... is the term contrapositive? Is 
it the contrapositive I'm looking for?... going the other way... there 
exists a non deficient divisor of n implies n not deficient. Now is 
that the contrapositive? 
INTERVIEWER: What are you trying to do here? 
FRED: Err, going through that, I mean, my initial thought is that, I did 
have it in my mind, but I'm trying to think again now... if n is... [long 
pause] 
INTERVIEWER: What are you thinking? 
FRED: I did have quite a clear picture of where I was going to go, I'm just 
trying to get that back... I really do think you've got to go from the 
opposite direction... 
INTERVIEWER: Why? 
FRED: Because, because, given a number n, it's tricky to find the divisors, 
but given a divisor its a lot easier to find n. Like, it's, yeah, it seems 
a lot less tricky to work up rather than to work down. (F4) 
There are several things worth noting from this transcript. Firstly, it is strik- 
ing that Red is not at all confident with the term "contrapositive"; although 
he is perfectly able to formulate the contrapositive correctly, he seems more 
comfortable referring to it as "going the other way". This type of behaviour 
was not at all unusual. Ben, for example, consistently and incorrectly used the 
term "converse" to mean "contrapositive". Andrew preferred to talk only about 
"contradiction arguments", and Edward used "the opposite of what this is say- 
ing" to refer to the contrapositive. It seems reasonable to conclude that the 
contrapositive, at least in the formal sense that it is taught in logic courses, was 
not a prominent part of these (highly talented and successful) research students' 
concept images of implication. 
Secondly, although Fred believes that the contrapositive may be of help to 
him, it is not because he realises that he has already proved it. Instead he 
notes that it is easier to find multiples of numbers than it is to find divisors of 
numbers. He uses his strategic knowledge of number theory to help formulate 
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his proof attempt (Weber, 2001). But he does not immediately recognise that 
the proof he has already completed will work. 
Thirdly, this excerpt indicates that the if-heuristic may not be all-pervasive. 
FYed's attention, whilst initially directed at the antecedent, soon is redirected 
into trying an indirect proof. Perhaps ned was not overly influenced by the 
if-heuristic, or perhaps his System 2 processes soon overrode any influence that 
it did have. In either case it seems, contrary to the experiences of David and 
Andrew discussed above, Conjecture 4 was not a Criterion T problem for Fred. 
Of the all the interviewees, only two - Fred and Edward - considered the con- 
trapositive of the statement early on in their attempted proofs, and neither ap- 
parently decided to do this on account of having already proved a near-identical 
statement. 
After Red successfully completed his proof of Conjecture 4 the interviewer 
asked him about connections between Conjectures 2 and 4. 
INTERVIEWER: What's the difference between number 2 and number 4? 
Did you just re-prove number 2? 
FRED: Hmmm. [long pause] No I haven't, because Conjecture 2... talks 
specifically about n being perfect, it's going to be a bit confusing 
to describe this because you're using n to describe the sort of big 
multiple number in Conjecture 4, but in the first one you're saying 
the big multiple number... erm, is based on a perfect number, but 
in Conjecture 4 you're saying the big multiple number is built on, 
err... well the contrapositive statement which I proved is saying that 
the big number is based on a perfect number or an abundant number. 
INTERVIEWER: So if we changed that to be, in number 2, to be either a 
perfect or an abundant number it would be exactly the same? 
FRED: Umm, let's have a look at my notes... would the prove I have 
worked? [Reads through his proof of Conjecture 2] Yeah, the proof I have 
would work. [ ... 
J I'm not sure why it is the same. Umm, I have 
to say I can't see much similarity between the statements, it's not 
jumping out at me that the statements are very similar. (F4) 
Even after Fred agrees that the two proofs he has produced are essentially 
identical, he still feels that the statements do not "seem" that similar. Of 
course, the reason why may be that the surface linguistic features of the problem 
bias aed's attention towards deficiency in Conjecture 4 and abundantness in 
Conjecture 2. 
In summary, evidence was found that Conjecture 4 was a Criterion T situa- 
tion for most of the participants. The if-heuristic appeared to direct attention 
towards the antecedent of the rule, which, because of linguistic surface relevance 
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features of the statement, biased participants away from noticing that they had 
already proved a near-identical statement. In fact even the two participants 
who did quickly adopt an indirect strategy did not notice the connections with 
Conjecture 2. This, whilst not a consequence of the if-heuristic, could still be 
seen as being a consequence of preconscious System 1 relevance heuristics: be- 
cause of the linguistic structure of the two statements, Conjectures 2 and 4 were 
seen as being "about" different things. One was concerned with abundantness 
and one with deficiency. 
Evidence of the if-heuristic from Conjecture 6. 
Recall that Conjecture 6 asked participants to prove that the product of two 
abundant numbers was also abundant. This is a trivial consequence of the fact 
that kn is abundant for abundant n and natural k. However, it was predicted 
that the if-heuristic would complicate matters by directing attention towards 
the antecedent of the statement, that is to say the situation where both M and 
n are abundant. There was clear evidence of this from the interviews. Here, for 
example, is Chris' reaction to being given the statement: 
CHRIS: Right, so if n and m are abundant then nm is abundant. That 
looks more plausible [than Conjecture 5], cos they're going to share 
factors. Anything that divides n... in fact, I mean it might be a 
quite straightforward proof because the set of factors of n, these 
same ai's I've been using [Chris was using the notation ai to denote divisors 
of n], so we know the sum of the ai's are strictly greater than 2n, if 
I let the bi's be the divisors of m. So certainly the a, the ai's and 
the bi's are also factors of nm, so the sum of all the factors of nm is 
going to be greater than or equal to, the sum of the ai's the sum of 
the bi's. (C6) 
Chris went on to try to prove the statement by considering the 'cross product' 
of jai} with f bi}, but realised that this method would fail on account of having 
repeated divisors in the final sum. The interview ran out of time before Chris 
completed his solution. 
Edward also failed to find a solution during the course of the interview, 
but asked the interviewer what the correct solution was. When the interviewer 
pointed out the connection between Conjectures 2 and 4 Edward was highly 
amused: 
EDWARD: Oh yeah [laughs]. [ ... 
I Oh yeah, of course. That is funny 
[laughs]. That's so blatantly obviously the same as that! [laughs]. 
(E6) 
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David adopted a similar strategy to proving Conjecture 6 as Chris and Ed- 
ward: 
DAVID: Oh, so n and m are... oh, hang on, so you've got sums here as 
well, so I've got my two assumptions down there, [David used the same 
assumptions that he'd written down for Conjecture 5] and then umm, I want 
to say the divisors of nm, so what I do know is the sum k, maybe I 
should use a different k here, multiplied by k', so k is in the divisors 
of m, umm, k is in divisors of n, so this is actually greater than 
4mn. (D6) 
David continued down the same path as Chris before realising that he too will 
end up with too many repeated divisors in his sum: 
DAVID: Actually, that might not be right [scribbles everything out), because 
you might get terms more than once here, if you multiply these two 
sums together, errm, umm, you see, [longpause]. (D6) 
David attempted to rescue the situation by arguing that the divisors will only 
ever be repeated twice, but eventually rejected this approach as not feasible. 
Having seen both his approaches so far fail, David reviewed the previous con- 
jectures and notices the connection with Conjecture 2, again he was amused by 
his failure not to notice this earlier: 
DAVID: Umm, I think, let's have a look at what we had before. So we 
had, these two corollaries 4 and 2 wasn't it, let's see if we can use 
any of those. If n and m are abundant, so if n's abundant then kn's 
got to be abundant, I mean if n's perfect then kn is abundant, so 
mn's got to be abundant, I mean, yeah [laughs] I've realised it's kind 
of a triv-ial consequence of this [Conjecture 21,1 mean you can do the 
same proof as in here can't you? I mean, if you, except you start 
off with greater than or equal to, > 2n and then you prove that, so 
you prove. something different, something weaker than this, well, not 
logically weaker but, I mean it's got to be, if n is perfect then kn is 
abundant, well if n's abundant already then... 
INTERVIEWER: So if you're making it more abundant? 
DAVID: Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so, I mean, you'd need a new proof, you'd 
need to start off with an inequality there and you'd still have in- 
equalities. (D6) 
Red's interview proceeded in a similar fashion. Having attempted to cross 
multiply the two sets of divisors he got stuck. Whilst stuck he suddenly noticed 
the connection with Conjectures 2 and 4: 
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FRED: UMM, [long pause] just because... [long pause] oh actually, I think 
I've got it. Oh, simple, it's much simple, simpler than that! Can I 
start again? [17ýed seemed to be half annoyed with himself and half amused] 
INTERVIEWER: Yeah, why do you say that? 
FRED: The reason is, because from I think, conjecture 4,1 proved there, 
that if a number is abundant you can multiply it by any num- 
ber... and you get an abundant number. So we're just being a bit 
more specific about which numbers we can multiply by... [long pause] 
INTERVIEWER: Right. 
FRED: That's it. 
INTERVIEWER: Is that it? Is that the end of it? 
FRED: Yeah, that's it. That's the end of it. You're multiplying an abun- 
dant number by a number. And then as we showed in part 4... 
(H) 
As with Conjecture 4, however, not every participant found Conjecture 6 
to be a Criterion T situation. Two participants - Andrew and Gary - realised 
immediately that the conjecture was a trivial consequence of their earlier work: 
ANDREW: [Reads Conjecture 6] Abundant, oh, this is already proven. This 
is Conjecture 1. 
INTERVIEWER: So that's the end of that then? You look surprised. You 
are entirely happy that that's true? 
ANDREW: Yeah [laughs] 
INTERVIEWER: Why are you laughing?! 
ANDREW: No, no, because it seemed that the conjectures are getting 
tougher and tougher. I was getting incredibly scared! [laughs] 
(M) 
However, Andrew's quick dismissal of Conjecture 6 could perhaps be because 
of an earlier experience of a similar conjecture. During his work on Conjecture 
4, Andrew had attempted to prove that the product of two perfect numbers 
couldn't be deficient, despite already having established that any proper multi- 
ple of a perfect number was abundant: 
ANDREW: So the question is, if we've got one perfect number, a second 
perfect number and we multiply them, can we get a deficient num- 
ber? So this is the only thing. OK. OK, so let's dig into these 
summations, so if I sum this, err... (M) 
Andrew went on trying to prove that the product of two perfects cannot be 
deficient for some time before noticing that he had already proven a stronger 
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statement. So Andrew had already encountered a Criterion T situation of simi- 
lar form to Conjecture 6 during his solution to Conjecture 4, which he had spent 
some considerable time solving. 
Gary also quickly noticed that he had already proved Conjecture 6: 
GARY: If n and m are abundant then n times m is abundant. That sounds 
right. 
INTERVIEWER: Why? 
GARY: Because multiplication of abundants tend to get even more abun- 
dant. I think we have already proved that. I claimed that any 
multiple of abundant is abundant, so it would be true. Now let's 
just go back to that little piece to see if it's true, it should be true. 
(G6) 
Interestingly, Gary was the only person in the entire sample who appeared to 
be unaffected by the if-heuristic on Conjecture 6, or, in the case of Andrew, a 
similar conjecture earlier. 
It is worth pointing out that, because of time constraintS7 , 
Gary was not 
asked to tackle Conjecture 5 (n, m abundant =: ý- nm abundant), the conjecture 
that immediately proceeded Conjecture 6 for the other participants. Gary, in 
contrast, had been tackling a structurally very similar statement to Conjecture 
6 (Conjecture 4) immediately before. Although, it should be noted that this 
cannot explain Gary's behaviour in its entirety, as Andrew had also been looking 
at a similar statement prior to the excerpt from Conjecture 4 quoted above. If 
meeting Conjecture 5 was a prerequisite for the Criterion T status of Conjecture 
6 then one would not have expected Andrew's behaviour in Conjecture 4. 
The if-heuristic: A summary of the evidence. 
The evidence from Conjectures 4 and 6 supports the notion that the if-heuristic 
has an important role to play in mathematical reasoning. It was predicted 
that the two conjectures would satisfy Criterion T, and for the majority of 
participants this did indeed appear to be the case. That is to say, the structure 
of the statements biased participants' attention towards unhelpful parts of the 
problems. This attentional bias was so strong that even though participants 
had already proved a logically near-identical statement (Conjecture 2), both 
Conjectures 4 and 6 proved difficult to solve for most participants. 
It is also of interest to consider the situations in which participants overcame 
this bias (if they did). Participants tended to 'get past' the bias after having 
tried several attempts and got stuck. As paxt of a 're-evaluation' of the situation, 
7Gary had taken approximately 45 minutes on Conjectures 1-4. 
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which often involved explicitly looking back at previous conjectures, the solution 
would reveal itself. Here, for example, is David solving Conjecture 6: 
D"ID: Umm, I think, let's have a look at what we had before. So we 
had, these two corollaries 4 and 2 wasn't it, let's see if we can use 
any of those. If n and m are abundant, so if n's abundant then kn's 
got to be abundant, I mean if n's perfect then kn is abundant, so 
mn's got to be abundant, I mean, I've realised it's kind of a trivial 
consequence of this, I mean you can do the same proof as in here 
can't you? (D6) 
This pattern, of getting stuck, re-evaluating the global picture, and then noticing 
the links to previous conjectures was widespread across the different interviews. 
Paradoxically, then, mathematicians of higher abilities - those who are less 
likely to get stuck - may be more likely to have the structure of their final 
proofs influenced by their preconscious heuristics. 
It was also striking at how often participants were amused at their inability to 
immediately see the relations between the conjectures. Here Andrew recognised 
the relevance of his proof of Conjecture 1 to a sub-conjecture he made during 
his solution to Conjecture 4: 
ANDREW: OK, so how to prove it. [long pause, taps on table] OK, so we've 
got some number x, and it's deficient. [long pause] Well, I mean, it's 
really very simple [laughs] it's really very simple [laughs]. Because, 
yeah, because of this conjecture. (A4) 
In summary, evidence was found that is consistent with the hypothesis that 
the if-heuristic plays a role in mathematical reasoning. In the next section the 
role of the matching-heuristic is considered. 
8.5.2 The matching-heuristic. 
Some indication of the influence of the matching-heuristic has already been 
presented in the discussions above. For example, recall that when Fred was 
asked about the connections between Conjectures 2 and 4 he remaxked that, even 
though he realised the two proofs he had produced were essentially identical, 
the statements didn't seem to be that similar (see the dialogue on page 149). 
Recall that the matching-heuristic directs attention towards the semantic 
content of the antecedent and consequent, regardless of the presence of negatives 
in the rule. Red's remark that the connections between the statements didn't 
"jump out" at him could be interpreted as a consequence of the matching- 
heuristic. For Conjecture 2 this heuristic directs attention towards abundancy 
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and perfectness; for Conjecture 4 attention is directed towards deficiency. In 
attentional terms, the two statements are "about" different things, even though 
logically they are almost identical. 
However, more evidence was found for the role of the matching-heuristic 
with regards to what proof strategies participants adopted for the differing con- 
jectures. The last six conjectures were of the form "if P, then Q", but the 
immediate strategies adopted by participants varied considerably depending on 
the presence of a negation in the consequent (i. e. whether Q was written "not 
R" for some R). Consider Andrew's response to Conjecture 7 ("if n is abundant, 
then n is not of the form p' for some natural m and prime p"): 
ANDREW: OK, so if n is abundant then n is not of the form p, hmm, 
hmm. Yeah, well this shouldn't be probably too hard. Because if we 
take p' then what are the divisors? Yeah, the divisors are basically 
1+P+P 2+ blah blah blah +p. And actually this is just a geometric 
series right? And the sum of this is, I don't know, something like 
this... (A7) 
Andrew immediately starts to consider the negation of the consequent of Con- 
jecture 7, He thinks about the case when n is of the form p', and starts to 
deduce consequences from it. Eventually he successfully proves that n cannot 
be abundant. In this case Andrew's instantaneous reaction was to start a con- 
trapositive proof (although, as we have seen, he did not use this language). 
Compare his reaction to Conjecture 7 to Conjecture 4 discussed earlier. Al- 
though, like Conjecture 7, he ended up using an indirect argument to establish 
the result, it took him substantial amounts of time to adopt this approach. In 
Conjecture 7 this was an instantaneous response. David behaved similarly to 
Andrew: 
D"ID: OK, so if n is abundant then n is not of the form, err, so in other 
words, it's the contrapositive again, if n is of the form p' then it's, 
then n is not abundant, so we know this, err, right, so what's the 
sum of k in p'? k, err, whatever... (D7) 
Again, as with Andrew, David went on to prove that n couldn't be abundant. 
The contrast between this behaviour and David's approach to Conjecture 4 is 
striking. 
Ben offered an explanation as to why he immediately thought of an indirect 
proof with Conjecture 7. 
BEN: [reads question] OK, so, my original idea would be to try and prove the 
converse, [Ben persistently used the term 'converse' to mean 'contrapositive] 
because it's "not" which is just nasty. So assume n is p'. Then you 
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want to know about the sum of the divisors of n. Umm, the sum of 
the divisors of n is just [long pause] is just the sum of 1+p+ p2 Up to 
p'. Which there's a formula for if I could remember it... (B7) 
Ben is absolutely correct to identity the key factor here is the "not" in the 
statement. Whereas in Conjecture 4 the antecedent was perceived to be about 
deficiency, in Conjecture 7 the antecedent is, despite the presence of the negative, 
perceived to be about the form p'. Consequently the matching heuristic directs 
attention towards numbers of this form, which in turn leads to an indirect proof 
based on a contrapositive argument. It should be noted that in this instance 
the matching heuristic is helpful - by considering this part of the statement 
a correct proof is more likely to be found. This conjecture does not satisfy 
Criterion T, indeed the exact opposite: perhaps such a situation could be said 
to satisfy Criterion U? 
In short, the data from Experiment 4 appears to support the idea that the 
matching-heuristic plays an important role in mathematical reasoning. 
8.5.3 Summary of §8.5. 
The aim of the quasi-judicial method of multiple case study analysis is to impose 
pre-existing theory onto qualitative data. The theory used in this section was 
the heuristic-analytical dual process account of reasoning described, examined 
and tested in §4.4.7 and Chapters 6 and 7. The empirical evidence collected in 
Experiment 4 provides strong support for the idea that preconscious heuristics 
play an important role in directing attention during mathematical reasoning. 
Two particular heuristics were examined: 
9 The if-heuristic directs attention towards the situation where the an- 
tecedent of an "if P then Q" statement is true. It was found that many 
empirical observations from across the study fitted with predictions de- 
rived from the postulated role of the if-heuristic. 
The matching-heuristic directs attention towards the surface linguistic 
content of the antecedent and consequent parts of an "if P then Q" state- 
ment, regardless of the presence of negatives in that statement. Support 
was found for the idea that this heuristic plays an important role in math- 
ematical reasoning. 
In short then, the evidence suggests that preconscious heuristics have an im- 
portant job in normal mathematical reasoning: they direct attention towards 
apparently relevant parts of mathematical statements. Normally these heuris- 
tics are useful, they prevent wasteful expenditure of System 2 resources by 
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biasing attention towards helpful parts of the problem (such situations satisfy 
Criterion U). However, on some occasions these heuristics are not so helpful; by 
biasing attention away from pertinent parts of the problem they may detract 
from an individual's overall ability to solve the task to their own satisfaction 
(such situations satisfy Criterion T)- 
In the next section further analyses from Experiment 4 are reported. But 
whereas this section concentrated on the role of preconscious System I heuristics 
in reasoning, the next considers the processes that underlie conscious System 
2 reasoning and argumentation about conditionals: Once attention has been 
directed towards certain parts of the these statements, how do participants go 
about evaluating and whether the statements are true or false, and how do they 
go about proving it? 
8.6 Evaluating conditionals. 
Recall that the second part of the research question which Experiment 4 was 
designed to investigate was: what kind of System 2 processes do mathematicians 
use when working with, and judging the validity, conditional statements? This 
section attempts to explore this question by representing the arguments that 
were offered by participants during the interviews. As suggested by Bromley 
(1986), heavy use will be made of Toulmin's (1958) argumentation scheme. 
Toulmin's notion of informal logic was briefly discussed in Chapter 3, and is 
fully reviewed here. 
8.6.1 Toulmin's informal logic. 
Toulmin (1958) advocated an approach to analysing arguments that radically 
departed from both traditional and modern approaches to formal logic. Toul- 
min was less concerned with the logical validity of an argument, and more 
worried about the semantic content and structure in which it fits. This manner 
of analysing argumentation has become known as 'informal logic' in order to 
emphasise its differences from formal logic. 
Toulmin's (1958) scheme has six basic types of statement, each of which 
plays a different role (sometimes a role that is not explicitly verbalised) in an 
argument: 
Conclusion (C) The statement which the arguer wishes to convince their au- 
dience of. 
Data (D) The foundations on which the argument is based, the relevant evi- 
dence for the claim. 
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Warrant (W) Justifies the connection between data (D) and conclusion (C) 
by, for example, appealing to a rule, a definition or by making an analogy. 
Backing (B) Supports the warrant (W) by appealing to further evidence. 
Modal Qualifier (Q) Qualifies the conclusion (C) by expressing degrees of 
confidence. 
Rebuttal (R) Rebuts the conclusion (C) by stating the conditions under which 
it would not hold. 
Toulmin's (1958) use of the word 'warrant' is not identical to how the term has 
been used by some researchers in the mathematics education literature. Rodd 
(2000), following Plantinga (1993), defined a warrant as being "that which se- 
cures knowledge" (p. 222). Rodd saw a warrant as guaranteeing the removal 
of uncertainty, whereas Toulmin was more flexible, he accepted that a war- 
rant can be qualified with a modal qualifier, thereby potentially only reducing 
uncertainty. 
These six components of an argument are linked together in the structure 
shown in Figure 8.3. Toulmin's structure can be naturally extended to accom- 
modate longer and more complicated arguments, as shown in Figure 8.4. 
Figure 8.3: Toulmin's model of a general argument. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Toulmin's (1958) scheme has been used infrequently 
for analysing advanced mathematical thought. A notable exception is the 
philosopher Aberdein who has used to the scheme to analyse the proofs of the 
Intermediate Value Theorem (Aberdein, 2005) and the Four Colour Theorem 
(Aberdein, 2006). Aberdein's use of Toulmin's work is interesting, as he only 
uses it to describe formal mathematical arguments. In his original work Toulmin 
believed that formal mathematics was one of the few domains of explanation 
where formal logic - the system he was reacting against - adequately described 
argumentation structures. However, in a later work Toulmin et al. (1984) gave 
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Figure 8.4: A long argument represented in Toulmin's scheme. 
an example of a formal mathematical argument expressed in the argumentation 
structure. Alcolea Banegas (1998) gave further examples of applying Toulmin's 
structure to mathematics: he looked at a meta-mathematical argument which 
justified the adoption of the Axiom of Choice. It is on these examples that 
Aberdein's work builds. 
From a psychological perspective, it seems unclear what the purpose of de- 
scribing formal mathematics using informal logic is. In this specific context 
many parts of Toulmin's (1958) scheme appear to be trivial or redundant. For 
example, when Aberdein (2005) analysed the proof of the theorem that asserts 
there are only five platonic solids the backing he -used was "given the axioms, 
postulates, and definitions of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry"; the modal 
qualifiers he used was "with strict geometric necessity", "classically" and "con- 
structively"; and the rebuttal he used was "no rebuttals or exceptions". It is 
clear that these will be effectively identical for all formal mathematical proofs. 
Several researchers have attempted to solve this problem by simply omitting 
the Backing, Modal Qualifier and Rebuttal from Toulmin's (1958) model when 
applying it to mathematics. Krummheuer (1995), for example, adopted such an 
approach when using informal logic to describe classroom based mathematical 
arguments. Many other researchers have followed this approach, and it appears 
to have become the default position in mathematics education research that has 
used Toulmin's work. For example, such a position has been taken by researchers 
studying basic number skills (Evens & Houssaxt, 2004), logical deduction (Hauk, 
2005; Hoyles & Kiichemann, 2002; Weber & Alcock, 2005), geometry (Knipping, 
2003; Pedemonte, 2003), and proof (Yackel, 2001). Indeed, this position appears 
to have become so entrenched that, in her recent review of research on proof in 
mathematics education, Mariotti (2006) described Toulmin's scheme as being a 
"ternary model". 
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Note that all these mathematics education researchers were not, as Toulmin 
et al. (1984) and Aberdein (2005) were, attempting to describe formal math- 
ematical reasoning. In contrast they were attempting to describe the informal 
reasoning patterns of students in mathematical situations. One of the major 
arguments made in this section of the thesis is that both these mathematics 
educators and Aberdein (2005) have not extracted full benefit from Toulmin's 
(1958) scheme: Using informal logic to describe formal mathematics is psycho- 
logically unrevealing; but equally, using only a subsection of Toulmin's scheme 
to describe informal logic is unsound - there are many aspects of informal math- 
ematical reasoning that cannot be adequately modelled without the use of all 
six components of Toulmin's scheme. 
When modelling arguments using Toulmin's (1958) scheme it is often the 
case that certain parts of the argument (most commonly backings and rebut- 
tals) are not explicitly verbalised by the arguer. In line with earlier researchers 
who have used the scheme, we dealt with this issue by inferring the backings and 
rebuttals of participants' arguments where they were not explicitly verbalised. 
Consequently the diagrams reported in the remainder of this chapter represent 
plausible models which account for participants' behaviour and utterances; they 
are not direct one-to-one mappings from utterance to argument. However, it 
should be noted that, in the examples given here, very few sections of the di- 
agrams are not directly related to the participant's actual spoken words. The 
methodological issues involved in using Toulmin's scheme for modelling empir- 
ical data are discussed in depth by, for example, Bromley (1986) and Simosi 
(2003). 
8.6.2 Modal qualifiers in mathematical reasoning. 
Previous work that has applied Toulmin's (1958) argumentation scheme to 
mathematical reasoning has, as discussed above, downplayed the role of the 
modal qualifier and rebuttal parts of arguments. This section seeks to argue 
that appreciating the role of the modal qualifier is crucial to fully understand- 
ing how mathematicians deal with conditional statements. 
After Chris had correctly identified that Conjecture 3 was false the inter- 
viewer asked him whether he thought the conjecture would be true if it was 
modified to read "if P1 i P2 are prime, then PlP2 is not abundant". He tried two 
examples (2 and 3,5 and 97) to investigate the situation and then said: 
CHRIS: Since the smallest numbers I could find to put in this equation 
showed it was perfect and in the larger limit it showed, PlP2 Was 
deficient. So it's possible it holds for all P1, P2- 
INTERVIEWER: Do you think it does? 
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CHRIS: I think it probably does. But I'm not sure why [laughs]. Yeah, the 
faci that this is, in some ways, sort of monotonic. In other words, 
I know that this statement is true for large P1, P2; I know it's true 
for small P1 , P2; so I 
feel therefore that it should be true for P1 I P2 
in the middle. Umm, but I might have to do some work to show 
that. (C3) 
This piece of argumentation is shown graphically in Figure 8.5. Chris says that 
unless there is 
a counterexample 
PI i P2 are prime 
1 4. PI so, probably " PlP2 is not abundant 
PlP2 is not abundant for small PI i P2 
(2 and 3), and is not abundant for large PIP2 
(5 and 97), "so I feel therefore that it 
should be true for P1 i P2 in the middle" 
number theory tends 
to be "monotonic" 
Figure 8.5: Part of Chris's response to Conjecture 3. 
he thinks it is "probable" that the statement is true, on account of an argument 
to do with monotonicity and two examples. He accepts that he has not shown 
the result formally, but informally, he has persuaded himself that the statement 
is probably true, and does not feel obliged to carry on and produce a formal 
proof. In terms of Toulmin's (1958) scheme, his argument revolves around a 
modal qualifier that does not carry certainty. 
In this example Chris appears to be fairly confident that the conclusion 
can be made, but there are examples of less certain modal qualifiers. Here, 
for example, David is asked the same question, about the modified version of 
Conjecture 3: 
INTERVIEWER: If I changed it [Conjecture 31 then, to be not abundant, what 
would you say? 
DAVID: That would seem more reasonable. Because primes look very de- 
ficient. 
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INTERVIEWER: Do they? 
DAVID: Well, they only have 1 and themselves as divisors, so they're about 
as deficient as you can get right? (D3) 
David went on to produce a direct proof of the statement. 
unless there is 
a counterexample 
P1 i P2 are prime 
so, it seems reasonable PIP2 is not 
to believe that abundant 
primes are very 
deficient 
primes only have themselves 
and 1 as divisors 
Figure 8.6: Part of David's response to Conjecture 3. 
This argument is modelled in Figure 8.6. Compare the different modal quali- 
fiers used by Chris and David. David seems less convinced by his argument than 
Chris did, and went on to convert this informal piece of reasoning into a formal 
proof. Chris, on the other hand, was sufficiently convinced of his argument that 
he didn't feel the need to continue, despite accepting that "some work" would 
be needed to "show" the result. 
The key point here is that Chris and David used different types of warrants 
in their respective arguments. These different warrants were accompanied by 
different modal qualifiers, which fixed their degree of belief in the conclusion of 
the argument. In the next few sections examples of differing types of warrants 
will be discussed, roughly categorised according to warrant-types. To be clear, 
a warrant is a part of a particular argument, however a warrant-type is a device 
with which to categorise individual warrants based on their similarities. Thus, 
each argument's warrant belongs to a warrant-type. The warrant-types observed 
fit broadly with Harel and Sowder's (1998) 'proof-schemes' framework (a prima 
facie explanation; see Chapter 2), therefore similar adjectives have been used 
to describe the warrant-types discussed here. 
There is, however, an important difference between the notion of a warrant- 
type and that of a proof scheme. Harel and Sowder (1998) defines a person's 
proof scheme as that which helps to "remove her or his own doubts about the 
truth of an assertion". A proof scheme, then, is about removing uncertainty. 
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Warrants from certain warrant-types, in contrast, may only reduce uncertainty. 
The theoretical relationship between the constructs 'warrant-type' and 'proof 
scheme' is discussed in full in §8.6.7. 
8.6.3 The inductive warrant-type. 
Harel and Sowder (1998, p. 252) define inductive proof schemes as "when stu- 
dents ascertain for themselves and persuade others about the truth of a conjec- 
ture by quantitatively evaluating their conjecture in one or more specific cases". 
Many examples of inductive warrants were used by participants in the abundant 
number study. One example has already been discussed. Figure 8.5 shows an 
argument offered by Chris during his work on Conjecture 3. Clearly the warrant 
Chris uses is inductive, he has quantitatively evaluated the conjecture for both 
small and large numbers, and thus feels that it should be true for all numbers. 
In his response to Conjecture 4, having failed in his initial proof attempt, 
Andrew offered the following argument: 
ANDREW: Let's make some experiments [laughs]. OK, so the deficient num- 
bers are, for example, 9.9 is deficient. That's too big because, OK, 
10 let's say. We've got 2,5. Primes are apparently deficient. 
INTERVIEWER: Primes are deficient? 
ANDREW: Primes are always deficient, yeah, because the sum is equal to 
the number plus 1. Well, always [laughs], no, or is it? no, even 2 is 
deficient, so it doesn't fail. Yeah, so apparently it works here. Yeah 
ok, so apparently, it seems to me that it's true. 
INTERVIEWER: Why do you say that then? Because it works for 10? 
ANDREW: Because [pause] because, hmm. [longpause] (M) 
At this point, after a long pause, Andrew began another proof attempt that 
eventually resulted in a correct proof. Andrew's argument in the extract above is 
modelled in Figure 8.7. Based on one empirical evaluation, Andrew is sufficiently 
convinced of the conclusion's truth to start a proof attempt. In the language of 
Balacheff (1988), Andrew conducted a 'crucial experiment' to convince himself 
of the statement's probable truth. 
In a similar example, David constructed a two stage argument to evaluate 
Conjecture 2. In the first stage he successfully showed that kn was either abun- 
dant or perfect if n is perfect (using the same argument deployed during his 
work on Conjecture 1), and during the second stage he tried to remove the 
possibility that kn is abundant: 
D"ID: Why would it [the equation o, (kn) ý! 2kn] be a greater than? Umm, 
I don't know, why couldn't it be perfect? I mean you've got some 
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unless there is 
a counterexample 
n is deficient so, it seems that all 
the divisors of 
n are deficient 
10 is deficient, and 
so are 2 and 5. 
cceven 2 is deficient"ý 
Figure 8.7: Part of Andrew's response to Conjecture 4. 
possible counterexamples here, I mean, we might look for one of 
them, so does 6 divide into that? [looks at the list of examples of perfect 
numbers] I don't know, no it doesn't does it? So does 6 divide into 
the next thing? So, I can't see any counterexamples there, and for 
example... So I guess, umm, what was we, what would I, umm, we 
need to find some divisors that aren't of the form 2m for ma divisor 
of n, don't we? (D2) 
David's search for counterexamples is a failure, so he concludes that it is plausi- 
ble that the statement is true, and attempts a proof. It is notable that before he 
looked for possible counterexamples, David seemed unsure of whether it was true 
or not. It is also worth noting that the list of examples David used contained 
only 28,496 and 8128. After noting that 6 did not divide any of these three 
perfect numbers, David was sufficiently satisfied that the conjecture was true 
that he began a proof attempt. His (two stage) argument is modelled in Figure 
8.8. Note that David happily used two different sorts of warrant-qualifier pairs 
in the argument. The first stage uses a modal qualifier that carries certainty, 
whereas the second only carries plausibility. 
Another example of an inductive warrant was Chris's behaviour when work- 
ing on Conjecture 6. 
INTERVIEWER: So you think it's true? 
CHRIS: Umm, I'm not sure, I mean I haven't actually tried an example, 
because I'm too afraid to work out the prime factorisation of some- 
thing that big, I suppose, well, ok, 12 X 18, Right [laughs] so [muttering] 
umm, so the factorisation is going to be 3x4x3x2X3 so 196 
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Figure 8.8: Part of David's response to Conjecture 2. 
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factors to 23x 33 in fact. [begins to add up divisors] 
INTERVIEWER: Well, actually, that's going to be abundant. 
CHRIS: Right, ok, good. Umm, ok, I mean it certainly looks plausible. 
(C6) 
When the interviewer intervened with the information that 12 x 18 was in fact 
abundant, Chris became convinced that the statement was "plausible", and 
began an attempt to prove it. The interview ran out of time before he was suc- 
cessful. Again, here, Chris conducts an empirical investigation into the situation 
to evaluate how confident he is in the conclusion of the argument. 
Edward also used an inductive warrant to fix his level of belief in a conclusion 
of an argument. When studying Conjecture 4, he began by thinking it was 
probably untrue, but became convinced through the use of examples and a lack 
of counterexamples: 
INTERVIEWER: So you think that is unlikely to be true? 
EDWARD: No, I'm not sure now. If n is deficient then every divisor of n 
is deficient. 14 is a deficient number. And certainly all the divisors 
of 14 are deficient. [long pause] Oh, OK, so you've given me a list of 
the first few abundant, this is the complete list? There aren't any 
missing? 
INTERVIEWER: No, no. 
EDWARD: OK, so umm, these are abundant, these are perfect, so obviously 
all the deficient ones are the ones that aren't in these lists, so, I don't 
want to go for, I want to go for some interesting numbers. I also 
want to go for some fairly large numbers because I'm pretty, like 14 
is 2x7 and I think that, well it's blatantly obvious, well just one 
prime number times another prime number, you're not going to get 
anywhere at all, they're clearly deficient. So, umm, but of course, 
this is why I'm thinking that this probably is true now, because 
all of the interesting cases are already grabbed. Err, [long pause] so 
there's no obvious counterexamples that I can see from that list, like 
numbers that are missing from that list. [long pause]. (E4) 
This argument is modelled in Figure 8.9. 
It is clear that, on many occasions, degrees of belief in conclusions were fixed 
by the participants with the use of examples. Two distinct strategies emerged: 
9 The use of examples (e. g. Figures 8.5,8.7, and Chris's argument in Con- 
jecture 6). 
9 The use of counterexamples (e. g. Figures 8.8,8.9). 
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possibility of 
a counterexample 
n is deficient so, it is probable that all divisors of n are deficient 
There are no obvious 
counterexamples 
I 
All the "interesting" cases on the list 
of examples are abundant or perfect 
Figure 8.9: Part of Edward's response to Conjecture 4. 
The first strategy involves the use of an example as a 'crucial experiment' (Bal- 
acheff, 1988) to test whether the Conjecture held in that case or not. If it did, 
a 'plausible' modal qualifier was used to join the conclusion with the data. The 
second strategy was somewhat different, in this case participants looked through 
a series of examples to see if they could find a counterexample. If they couldn't 
find any counterexamples, again a 'plausible' modal qualifier was used. The 
second strategy, then, is more like Balacheff's 'naive empiriciSM,. 8 
In both cases, once participants had fixed their degree of belief in the con- 
clusion, they attempted to prove it formally. No participant used an inductive 
warrant to deduce with ceTtainty that the conclusion followed from the data, 
and this would not have been expected, since they were all highly talented 
mathematicians. However, inductive warrants were used widely to establish 
participant's belief in the conclusion, through moderation by appropriate modal 
qualifiers. 
8.6.4 The structural-intuitive warrant-type. 
This section introduces the term 'structural-intuitive' to refer to a participant 
using observations about, or experiments with, some kind of mental structure, 
be it visual or otherwise, that persuades a them of a conclusion. Often, but not 
8jt should also be said that there were also several cases of participants using 'generic 
examples' (Balacheff, 1988). These tended to be useful after the degree of belief in the con- 
clusion had been fixed. Generic examples seemed to be most helpful in generating knowledge 
about the situation in order to produce a formal proof, they tended not to be used to evaluate 
the conclusion. 
167 
necessarily always, this sort of reasoning appears to be of an intuitive type (in 
the sense of Fischbein, 1987, see §7.2.1). 
The notion of the structural-intuitive warrant-type is related to two differing 
proof schemes in Harel and Sowder's (1998) taxonomy: 
Perceptual: "Perceptual observations are made by means of rudimentary 
mental images - images that consist of perceptions and a coordination of 
perceptions" (p. 255). 
4, Transformational: "Transformational observations involves operations on 
objects and anticipations of the operations' results" (p. 258). 
It is not at all clear how these two schemes are related, or how it is possible to 
distinguish between them by observing mathematicians' behaviour. To compli- 
cate matters further, Harel and Sowder's (1998) notion of the transformational 
proof scheme has itself been reconceptualised by Harel (2001, in press). With 
reference to the current Experiment, based as it is on empirical data, it seems to 
make more sense to abandon Harel and Sowder's two categories, and categorise 
warrants using terminology more easily identifiable with actual behaviour. 
Chris's reasoning about Conjecture 4 exemplifies this kind of warrant: 
CHRIS: So if n is deficient then we get for free that umm, none of it's 
divisors are perfect, so every divisor must be deficient or abundant. 
Umm, it would seem odd if they were allowed to be deficient and 
abundant but not perfect. Because perfect is kind of the middle 
case, so it looks true. (C4) 
This argument is modelled in Figure 8.10. Chris's warrant here is based on some 
intuitive understanding about how the properties of deficiency and abundant- 
ness should behave, and a realisation that if the conjecture was false, it would 
mean that these properties would have been broken. 
Sometimes participants were unable to back their structural-intuitive war- 
rants that they used. Whilst working on Conjecture 4, for example, Ben admit- 
ted that he thought it was true: 
BEN: So, I think, my initial thought is that it's true, that every divisor of 
it is deficient. 
INTERVIEWER: Why? 
BEN: Just 'cos it seems sensible [laughs] Umm. -- 
INTERVIEWER: So that's just a gut feeling you've got? 
BEN: No, no real mathematics involved at all! 
[laughs] (B4) 
Whereas Chris could tangibly justify his structural-intuitive warrant, Ben seemed 
either unable or unwilling to. Nevertheless, this warrant led him to start a proof 
search which eventually proved successful. 
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possibility of 
a counterexample 
All the divisors 
of n are either 
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so, it is all divisors of 
plausible that Hn are deficient 
It would "be odd" if divisors could be 
abundant or deficient but not perfect 
perfect numbers are the "middle case", 
and abundancy seems to be m( 
I 
Figure 8.10: Part of Chris's response to Conjecture 4. 
Structural-intuitive warrants in Conjecture 5. 
Conjecture 5 asked participants to evaluate the statement "if m and n are 
abundant, then n+m is abundant". This provoked many structural-intuitive 
warrants which justified the conclusion that the conjecture was false. Take Fred, 
for example: 
FRED: Umm. conjecture 5, if m and n are abundant then n+m is abun- 
dant [long pause] 
INTERVIEWER: Is it true or false? 
FRED: I think, going on instinct, it's probably false. 
INTERVIEWER: Why? 
FRED: Because, err, I mean, think of it... Another typical example, like, 
saying whether something is abundant is to do with it's divisors, so 
it's to do with things that divide it, it's to do with multiples. And 
then, when you add two numbers together, it doesn't necessarily 
mean that any properties of the divisors stay the same. I mean, like, 
I don't know, when you add 3 and 5.3 and 5 have certain divisors, 
but 8 has completely different divisors. 
INTERVIEWER: Yeah. 
FRED: Umm, but you never know. So, but abundant is a very sort of wide 
statement, so, I mean, intuitively you'd expect to apply to roughly 
half of all numbers, so maybe it's not so absurd to think they would, 
err, that would hold. So I'll try. (F5) 
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Fred went on to try to prove the statement before abandoning his attempt and 
looking for counterexamples. 
Fred's behaviour here is interesting. Immediately after having read the state- 
ment he seems sure that it is false, and justifies his intuition with a structural- 
intuitive warrant based on the absence of a link between addition and divisors. 
However he seems, during the course of his articulation, to try to convince him- 
self not to trust his original intuition. This was a mistake, as he found that the 
statement is indeed false, and looking for a counterexample is straightforward. 
Similar structural- intuitive warrants were used by other participants: 
EDWARD: If n and m are abundant then n+m is abundant. [long pause] 
I am in general thinking it should be fairly, again, I'm going to eat 
my words, my immediate reaction is that it's going to be fairly easy 
to find a counterexample to this. 
INTERVIEWER: Why do you say that? 
EDWARD: Because, we're thinking of divisors and multiplication, so there's 
lots of abundant numbers, err, there's lots of abundant numbers, 
I'm just thinking more carefully now, but I'm thinking when you 
add them together you could easily end up with a deficient or a 
perfect number. [long pause, looks at examples] Oh, yeah, 18 and 20 
add together to give 38, which according to your list is a deficient 
number. (E5) 
Edward based his decision to look for a counterexample (which he found suc- 
cessfully) on his intuition that the statement was unlikely to be true. Chris used 
a similar structural-intuitive warrant: 
CHRIS: Right, so if m and n are abundant, then m+n is abundant. That 
doesn't look true. 
INTERVIEWER: Why not? 
CHRIS: Because the factors of n+m don't really have anything to do with 
the factors of n or m. So it should be fairly easy to construct a 
counterexample. I say that [laughs]. So if I pick two nice abundants, 
UMM... (C5) 
Chris went on to find a counterexample. His argument is modelled in Figure 
8.11a. 
Andrew's structural-intuitive warrant regaxding Conjecture 5 was slightly 
different. He based his belief that the statement must be false with a structural- 
intuitive waxrant based on the frequency of abundant numbers: 
ANDREW: m, n are abundant, m+n is abundant. Ahh, [laughs] 
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Figure 8.11: Part of Chris's response to Conjectures 5 (fig a) and 6 (fig b). 
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INTERVIEWER: So what's your reaction to that? 
ANDREW: Ah, this is, this is, this is rubbish [laughs]. 
INTERVIEWER: Why do you say that? 
ANDREW: Because you can, get, OK, if I get some for example, some huge 
prime, maybe 11 will be enough! [laughs] Err, yeah, and actually if 
I've got a prime then I can easily decompose it into, because it seems 
there are so many abundant numbers right? 
It is interesting to compare participants immediate responses to Conjecture 5 
with their corresponding responses to Conjecture 6, which followed immediately 
afterwards. Consider Edward's initial reaction: 
INTERVIEWER: What do you make of that then? [hands over conjecture 6]? 
EDWARD: [Reads card] Now that's more likely to be true. (E6) 
Here is Chris's response: 
CHRIS: [Reads card] Right, so if n and m are abundant then nm is abundant. 
That looks more plausible, cos they're going to share factors. 
(C6) 
Chris's argument is modelled, in Figure 8.11b, alongside his argument in Con- 
jecture 5 for comparison. 
Both these excerpts illustrate the use of similar structural-intuitive warrants 
to those used in Conjecture 5, but here they carry plausibility rather than 
unlikeliness. 
The pattern of these responses to Conjecture 5 was uniform. Participants' 
initial intuitions gave them a structural-intuitive warrant which they used to 
decide that the conjecture was unlikely to be true. This then directed their 
attempts at solving the problem. Since they had deduced that the conclusion 
was unlikely to be true, looking for a counterexample was the most appropri- 
ate strategy. In Conjecture 6 the situation was reversed. Participants used 
structural-intuitive warrants to determine that the conjecture was likely to be 
true, and then based their decision to look for a proof on this judgement. 
However, it is also notable that several participants did not fully trust their 
intuition. Fýred, for example, seemed to initially feel strongly that Conjecture 5 
was untrue, but then talked himself out of it, and attempted to prove the state- 
ment. Similarly, Andrew, after he had initially dismissed the same conjecture 
as "rubbish" went on to question whether he was correct to do so or not. 
As noted in Chapter 7, the reliability of intuition in mathematics has been 
a recurring subject of discussion by mathematicians and philosophers of math- 
ematics. Hahn (1933/1960), when reflecting on recent developments such as 
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Peano and Hilbert's work on space-filling curves, even went as far as to ar- 
gue that intuition is entirely unreliable and should be totally "expelled" from 
mathematical reasoning: 
"[Mathematicians] learned that it is unsafe to accept any mathe- 
matical proposition, much less to base any mathematical discipline 
on intuitive convictions. Thus a demand arose for the expulsion of 
intuition from mathematical reasoning, and for the complete formal- 
isation of mathematics. " (p. 1959) 
To back up his argument Hahn gave several examples of counter-intuitive 'mon- 
sters': a map of three regions which meet each other at every point along one 
border, and a curve which intersects itself at every point (e. g. Menger, 1943; 
E. H. Moore, 1900; Whyburn, 1942). These objects, Hahn argued, should are 
impossible to reconcile with intuition, and thus intuition needs to be removed 
from all mathematical reasoning. Other authors have disagreed with this kind 
of analysis, pointing out that although intuition may be sometimes misleading 
it is essential for giving direction to mathematical research (Feferman, 2000; 
Poincar6,1905). The data from Experiment 4 supports this latter stance. Par- 
ticipants used their intuitive structures to establish a belief in whether the con- 
clusion follows from the data. Structural-intuitive warrants were used to reduce 
uncertainty. Although, as the next section shows, these warrants were not al- 
ways mathematically correct. 
Are all abundant numbers even? Incorrect structural-intuitive war- 
rants. 
In several of the interviews the issue of whether abundant numbers need to be 
even was discussed. When Andrew was searching for counterexamples to Con- 
jecture 5, for example, he noticed that none of the given examples of abundant 
numbers were odd: 
ANDREW: Hmm. Strange. 
INTERVIEWER: Why strange? 
ANDREW: Strange that all these numbers are even. All these abundant 
numbers. 
Whilst working on the same conjecture Fred noticed the same thing: 
INTERVIEWER: Well, what numbers are likely to be abundant? 
FRED: Err, well my thinking is, odd numbers are not, generally because 
INTERVIEWER: When you say generally what do you mean? 
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FRED: Just the general idea, cos like if a number is even then one of its 
divisors is half the number, which is a pretty big chunk, but if a 
number is odd it's missing a big chunk. 
INTERVIEWER: So, you reckon no odd numbers are abundant? 
FRED: I think that's quite unlikely. (F5) 
During the course of his inter-view Ben was asked directly about the issue. Ben's 
argument was similar to Fýred's: 
INTERVIEWER: Just as an aside, would you say all abundant numbers have 
to be even? 
BEN: UMM, [long pause] 
INTERVIEWER: I mean that's an incredibly difficult question, but what's 
your sort of, if you had to stab in the dark about it? 
BEN: Umm, [long pause] I think it might have to be true. 
INTERVIEWER: Why? 
BEN: [long pause] I think if they're odd, you lose too much of the, sort 
of, sequence that you can't divide into, if you get what I mean, cos 
you can't, you can't divide past, so say it was odd and the first one 
was 3, you'd only have ones up to .2 and then n, whereas if you 3 
go up to -a you get a lot more, well in theory, you could get a lot 2 
more possible divisors, so it's based on a sort of size argument rather 
than anything particularly... But, intuitively, even numbers would 
certainly be more likely to be abundant than odd numbers. (B5) 
The structure of Ben and Red's arguments is modelled in Figure 8.12. Both 
used structural-intuitive warrants about the structure of abundant numbers, 
understanding that they had built up through working on previous conjectures. 
Interestingly Andrew used a different structural-intuitive warrant regarding 
this issue, and ended up with a different, conclusion: 
ANDREW: Strange that all these numbers are even. All these abundant 
numbers. 
INTERVIEWER: Hmm, interesting, do you think that that will always be 
the case? 
ANDREW: I don't think so. Well, [pause] ah, it'll be the case, if we take, 
for example, 3x7,3 x5 as well, x 11, then I'm pretty confident that 
this is an abundant number. 
INTERVIEWER: Are you? [Andrew laughs] Why are you laughing? 
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Figure 8.12: Ben and Fred's argument regarding the parity of abundant num- 
bers. 
ANDREW: [laughs] Because we just showed many times that I massively 
overuse the word "pretty sure" [laughs]. OK, so for instance if we take 
[pause] well [ ... 
] Well, apparently better if these primes probably 
need to be different, because otherwise one is losing many divisors. 
Actually, would we be, really need it? If one basically checks the 
frequencies of the primes? So take some primes, a few odd primes 
that are very close to each other. I think so. (A5) 
Andrew went on to unsuccessfully attempt to construct an odd abundant num- 
ber, by multiplying together several odd primes. His argument is modelled in 
Figure 8.13 (note that the backing to Andrew's structural-intuitive warrant is 
unknown, as he did not verbalise it). Although Andrew reached a different con- 
clusion to Ben and Fred, his argument was of a similar structure. He used a 
structural-intuitive warrant to draw a conclusion with a 'probable' modal qual- 
ifier. In both cases, the warrant was used to make a probabilistic judgement 
about the conclusion. 
Despite Andrew's self-deprecating view of his use of the words "pretty sure", 
his intuitions were indeed correct. There are an infinite number of odd abun- 
dants, with 945 the first. ' Indeed, surprisingly, it is possible to construct an 
abundant number whose smallest divisor is arbitrarily high. So Ben and Fred's 
(highly reasonable) structural-intuitive warrant that odd abundants are unlikely, 
as the divisors can only 'live' in the lowest third of the number turns out to be 
91f there is one odd abundant then it follows that there is an infinite number: clearly every 
odd multiple of 945 will also be an odd abundant. 
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Figure 8.13: Part of Andrew's response to Conjecture 5. 
quite wrong. An abundant can be constructed where the proper divisors are 
less than L for any kEN (for a proof of this result, see Appendix C). Note that k 
even -though Ben and Fred's argument was incorrect, for them, their warrant 
had the effect of reducing their level of uncertainty about the truth/falsity of 
the conclusion. 
Summary of §8.6.4. 
The use of 'structural-intuitive' warrants was found to be widespread in the 
behaviour of participants in Experiment 4. These warrants refer to the use 
of a justification of a conclusion on the basis of an, often intuitive, argument 
regarding the structure of the mathematical objects in question. These argu- 
ments can take the form of observations of, or intuitions about, the structure 
of the mathematical situation, or thought experiments with properties of the 
structure. In terms of Harel and Sowder's (1998) proof scheme framework, it is 
unclear whether this category of warrant is more closely related to the trans- 
formational scheme or the empirical-perceptual scheme. Either way, when used 
appropriately (aswas the case with all participants in Experiment 4), structural- 
intuitive warrants carry with them modal qualifiers which are not certain, only 
probabilistic. These types of warrants tended to be used to determine the like- 
lihood of a statement's truth, a judgement which was then used to determine 
the most appropriate strategy. 
However, there are examples of warrants used by participants which carry 
different sorts of modal qualifiers to the warrants discussed so far, often de- 
ductive warrants do carry certainty, and axe closer to what would normally be 
regarded as a formal mathematical deduction. 
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8.6.5 The deductive warrant-type. 
Harel (2001) referred to the most sophisticated proof scheme as the 'deductive- 
modern-axiomatic' scheme: people who have this scheme use deductions from 
axioms to establish truth. Harel (2001, in press) sought to distinguish between 
various different forms of the deductive proof scheme; for example, the Greek- 
axiomatic is seen as being different to the structural-axiomatic, which is in 
turn different to the axiomatising-axiomatic. The differences appear to revolve 
around views of the role of the axioms. Whereas someone with the structural 
proof scheme sees axioms as being permanent descriptors of a structure, some- 
one with the axiomatising-axiomatic proof scheme is aware that the axioms 
could be varied, and the consequences of the variation studied. As with the 
transformational and perceptual Proof schemes, it seems extremely difficult to 
see how these different schemes can be distinguished through behaviour, and 
so any philosophical benefit accrued through their inclusion in the taxonomy 
is balanced by an increased confusion for the empirical researcher. No differ- 
ences between the types of deductive warrants used by participants of the sort 
described by Harel were observed in the current study. 
A similar notion to Harel's (2001) deductive proof scheme is the basis of the 
deductive warrant-type: formal mathematical justifications are used to war- 
rant the conclusion of the argument in question. These justifications can be of 
various sorts: deductions from axioms, algebraic manipulations, or the use of 
counterexamples would all be classified as deductive warrants. 
For professional mathematicians, a deductive warrant is seen as carrying for- 
mal mathematical necessity: an argument that uses a deductive warrant admits 
no effective rebuttal. It could be argued that, in complex proofs, mathemati- 
cians do sometimes have non-trivial qualifiers and rebuttals - such as 'unless 
there is a flaw in my argument' - but the aim of these forms of argument is 
to minimise this. Thus, while for professional mathematicians the inductive 
and structural-intuitive warrant types aim to reduce uncertainty, the deductive 
warrant aims to remove uncertainty. Although this is the case for professional 
mathematicians, it may not be for all students: the potential for constructing 
an inappropriate matching between deductive warrants and modal qualifiers is 
discussed later in the thesis. 
Examples of this kind of warrant abound in the data from Experiment 4, 
perhaps because the participants were all highly qualified mathematics post- 
graduates. For example, when Andrew was working on Conjecture 2 he pro- 
duced the following argument (he had used a different approach in Conjecture 
1): 
ANDREW: OK, so if n is perfect, then kn is abundant, for any k. OK, so 
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what does it, yeah it looks, so what does it mean? Yeah so if n is 
perfect, and I take any pi which divides this n, then afterwards the 
sum of these pi's is 2n. This is the definition. Yeah, ok, so actually 
we take kn, then obviously all kpi divide kn, actually, we sum these 
and we get 2kn. Plus, we've got also, for example, we've also got 
k dividing this, dividing kn. So we need to add this. As far, as 
basically, there is no disquiet, k would be the same as this. Yeah. 
And, how would this one go? [long pause] 
INTERVIEWER: So we've got the same problem as up here [Conjecture 1] but 
in general? With a? 
ANDREW: Yeah. Umm, can we find one? Right, so I don't know. Some 
example. 
INTERVIEWER: I've got some examples for you. 
ANDREW: You've got examples of some perfect numbers? OK, so 12, we've 
got 1+2+3+4+6, then, ok, +12. [mutters] But this is not? OK, 
perfect, I wanted perfect numbers. OK, so let's say 6. Yeah, and 
we've got 1+2+3+6 and actually we take 2x6 which is 12. Then 
yes, I've got divisors 2,4,6,12. Plus I claim we've got also divisors. 
Yeah! actually it's simple because, err, because err, the argument is 
that we've also got 1 which is divisor, and this divisor is no longer 
contained here if we multiply. 
INTERVIEWER: Right so we've always got a spare 1? 
ANDREW: OK, so this argument also applies here [Conjecture 1]. (A2) 
There are two quite distinct stages to this argument, which is modelled in Figure 
8.14. Both stages use a deductive warrant. The first establishes that n must be 
either abundant or perfect. At this stage Andrew realises that he needs to reject 
the perfect case, and uses the generic example of 2x6 to do this (Balacheff, 
1988). In both stages the conclusion follows necessarily from the data. No 
rebuttals are possible. 
Although Andrew believed that no rebuttals were possible, in actual fact 
there is a possible rebuttal, the case where k=1. When prompted by the inter- 
viewer, he immediately recognised this trivial case, and modified the conclusion 
appropriately. 
Not all deductive warrants are of this form, where conclusions are deduced 
from data by logical implications. Sometimes, for example, participants used 
counterexamples to warrant their conclusions. 10 Here is part of Fred's argument 
'Oft is unclear where counterexamples fit into Harel and Sowder's (1998) taxonorny, argli- 
ments based on counterexamples do not really fit into either the axiomatic proof scheme or 
the empirical proof scheme. 
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Figure 8.14: Part of Andrew's response to Conjecture 2. 
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in Conjecture 1. After he had successfully shown that all proper multiples of 6 
are abundant, he turned his attention to 6 itself: 
EDWARD: Yeah. [. -] so this leaves the special case of n=6... which is a 
perfect number, I just know that. Or is it? Hmm. I+2+3+6= 12, 
yeah, so it's a perfect number. Abundant, does that mean greater 
or equal to, or just greater? So, that's, that's a counterexample, so 
when n=6 it's not an abundant number. So... we've got rid of the 
Cif 7. (El) 
Another example of the use counterexamples came from Chris's response to 
Conjecture 3: 
CHRIS: So, think, large primes. OK, I shouldn't have to go too large, 
umm, but something like, name a large prime? 97 1 think is. Oh 
dear. Umm, I mean, and probably the other one doesn't need to 
be very big, perhaps 5 would do, because I can multiply by 5. So 
97 times 5 is going to be 485. Err, take away 97,5 and I is clearly 
going to be positive. 
INTERVIEWER: So what does that tell us? 
CHRIS: So I think this is a counterexample. But possibly I've got this sign 
the wrong way round, I'll just plug them into here and see if that 
works. So the question is, is 485 abundant? And I know that the 
divisors are 1,5,97, and the number itself Yeah, so that in fact, I 
was right. OK, so that's a counterexample to this. 
INTERVIEWER: So we've shown the thing's false? 
CHRIS: Yes. (M) 
This argument is modelled in Figure 8.15. Notice that in this model a modal 
qualifier of "it is not the case" has been used. Whilst clearly this is different to 
the "therefore" modal qualifier in Figure 8.14 above, the two modal qualifiers 
carry the same amount of uncertainty, i. e. none. This is the key distinction 
between the deductive warrants and those discussed in previous sections. 
The role of contrapositive arguments, with reference to heuristic biases, was 
discussed in §8.5. It was argued that certain heuristic biases direct attention to- 
wards considering different parts of conditional statements and that this affects 
the strategy adopted. There were several examples of participants using contra- 
positive based proofs when studying the different conjectures. The structure of 
these types of argument is somewhat different to straightforward deductive war- 
rants. With a contrapositive proof, a whole new argument is contained within 
the warrant/backing structure. Take, for example, Fýred's argument in Con- 
jecture 4. After spending some time deducing that a contrapositive argument 
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I no rebuttal I 
PI i P2 are pý 
ýes so, it is not PlP2 must be 
f 01 the case that 
H 
abundant 
485 is not abundant, 
but is of the form PlP2 
the divisors of 485 are 1,5,97 and 485 
which sum to less than 2x 485 
Figure 8.15: Part of Chris's response to Conjecture 3. 
might be fruitful, ned formulated the contrapositive statement, and argued as 
follows: 
FRED: So, let k be non-deficient. This implies, using my notation from 
there, sigma k in brackets is greater than or equal to 2k [using 
standard notation this means o, (k) ý! 2k, FY-ed used the notation (Ek) > 2k] 
... Err... 
[long pause] 
INTERVIEWER: So k here is just any non-deficient number? 
FRED: It is yes. Umm, so... [long pause] no, it's a non-deficient divisor 
of n. Oh, actually, am I... ? I'll go here. So, n equals mk for 
some m natural number. Err... OK, so similarly to the way we did 
Conjecture 1, err... every divisor of k is also a divisor of n. So we've 
got sigma k in brackets, so that's the sum of all the divisors of k, 
times m is actually greater than 2km... which equals 2n, umm,... so, 
and then that, the sigma k times m is less than or equal to sigma 
n in brackets. So, translated that means the sum of divisors of n is 
greater than or equal to blah blah blah, blah blah blah, and you get 
out the end is greater than or equal to 2n. 
INTERVIEWER: So we've shown here that, what? 
FRED: That there is a non deficient divisor of n. So there exists a non 
deficient divisor, I'm going to use 'nd', 'ndd, non deficient divisor, 
of n, implies that n is not deficient. Which I think, yeah, that's 
the statement that I set out to prove, so the conjecture is true. 
Conjecture 4 is true. (F4) 
This two stage argument, is modelled in Figures 8.16 and 8.17. The first diagram 
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models the top level of the argument, it asserts that because a contrapositive 
argument exists the conclusion can be drawn from the data. This deductive 
warrant is backed by two different, factors: that the contrapositive is logically 
identical to the direct statement, and by a whole new argument, shown in Figure 
8.17. 
In is deficient I 
there is a contrapositive I 
argumei 
I 
no rebuttal 
I so, therefore I every 
divisor of 
n is deficient 
I 
j see Figure 8.17 1 
IP =ý, Q -= -Q =>. -P I 
Figure 8.16: Part of Fred's response to Conjecture 4 (part 1). 
I no rebuttal I 
n has a non-deficient i 
divisor (n = mk where k so, therefore 
is non-deficient) -T-ý 
I u(n) ý! a(k) -m> 2km = 2n I 
k is non-deficient, so u(k) = 2k; and 
every divisor of k corresponds to a 
divisor of n, so a (n) > o, (k) - m. 
n is non- 
deficient 
Figure 8.17: Part of Fred's response to Conjecture 4 (part 2). 
This use of an 'nested' argument as part of the warrant/backing structure 
in another argument is an adaptation of Toulmin's (1958) scheme. He does not 
himself use arguments in this way, however, this structure seems to be closer to 
the behavioural reality of Fred's reasoning than any other manner in which his 
argument could be modelled. 
This structure of Fred's argument also ties in with the discussion of the if- 
heuristic in §8-5. Recall that the if-heuristic suggests that attention is directed 
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towards the P part of 'if... then' statements. The use of Toulmin's model of 
argumentation gives further suggestion as to why this preconscious heuristic 
makes ecological sense. If the evaluation of conditional statements revolves 
around bridging the gap between data (P) and conclusion (Q) through the use 
of a warrant, it would be odd to initially focus attention on the possibility of a 
contrapositive argument, buried as it is within a lower level argument. 
The idea that the job of a deductive warrant is to allow the reasoner to 
bridge the gap between data and conclusion - or to, in some sense, travel from 
data to conclusion safely - came across strongly in the language used by several 
participants. Implications were, on occasions, talked of as if they were journeys 
from data to conclusion: 
FRED: I really do think you've got to go from the opposite direction [ ... 
I 
I can think of a way to go I think [ ... 
] that's the statement that I 
set out to prove. (F4, my emphasis) 
EDWARD: I'm going along now a different avenue to see if I can think 
about it. (El, my emphasis) 
In both these cases Fred and Edward seem to be talking as if they are going 
on a journey. They want to traverse the difficult landscape between data and 
conclusion via the use of deductive warrants (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
Summary of §8.6.5. 
This section has only given a few examples of the deductive warrants used 
by participants in Experiment 4. Their use was widespread throughout the 
study and were always of the same type. Some kind of formal, or formalisable, 
mathematical argument that allowed the participants to deduce, with a modal 
qualifier that carries certainty, a conclusion from data. 
Interestingly, these deductive warrants tended to be deployed after the phase 
where structural-intuitive and inductive warrants were most common. Once 
participants had convinced themselves of a statement's probable truth or falsity, 
they could begin to look for a proof that used deductive warrants to bridge 
between data and conclusion. 
Although the vast majority of warrants used by participants fell into the 
categories discussed above, there were a few cases that fit more comfortably 
into other categories, again based upon Harel and Sowder's (1998) taxonomy. 
It is these warrants that are discussed in the next section. 
8.6.6 Other warrant-types. 
Harel and Sowder's (1998) taxonomy of proof schemes included many more 
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than the schemes which correspond with the three types of warrants discussed 
above. One major category of proof schemes they discussed were those based on 
conviction gained externally. Harel and Sowder had three categories of these: 
9 Ritual: conviction gained via the appearance of an argument rather than 
by its correctness. 
9 Authoritarian: conviction gained via an appeal to an authority figure. 
* Symbolic: conviction gained through manipulating symbols "as if they 
possess a life of their own" (p. 250). 
There were only a couple of examples of these types of warrants seen in the data 
gathered in Experiment 4. 
When David was working on Conjecture 2 he had successfully shown that if 
n is perfect then kn must be perfect or abundant, and was convinced that the 
case where kn is perfect could be eliminated. He argued: 
D"ID: Well suppose k divides n and k2 doesn't divide n, umm, then k2 
divides kn, so that's a number that would make this strictly greater 
than, and then I guess you're looking at some sort of induction thing, 
so suppose k2 divides n but V doesn't divide n, 0 divides kn erm, 
and umm, 
INTERVIEWER: Can you assume that though? Can you assume you've got 
ak that divides n? 
D"ID: Well, no, just suppose it does so what you're looking at is you're 
saying let k be a natural number, err, that well k is some natural 
number, if k doesn't divide n then the theorem's true I think, if 
it divides n but k2 doesn't divide n then the theorem's true, if k2 
divides n but k3 doesn't divide n then the theorem's true. And I 
think you can just carry on, and k's either going to umm, err, well 
I mean hopefully, have we done everything now? 
INTERVIEWER: you can keep going for ever? 
DAVID: [ ... 
J Yeah, well I assume that works, as I say, I haven't written it 
down and I would always say to my students you know, I've got, this 
seems like an idea, I now think I believe this conjecture, you've now 
got to sit down and try and write it out. But I wouldn't want to do 
that and say it at the same time, because it would, you know, you'd 
have to do that on your own. But it looks plausible I think. (D2) 
This argument is modelled in Figure 8.18. David appears to have gained convic- 
tion through the appearance of his induction argument. He feels that this kind 
of argument is of the correct structure - it "looks plausible" - so is hopeful that 
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it will work. Note, however, that he admits the possibility that the argument 
may not work. For David, this ritual warrant does not carry an absolute modal 
qualifier. 
Although classified here as being a ritual warrant, David's warrant here 
has some similarities with the structural-intuitive warrants discussed earlier: it 
seems almost to be a structural- intuitive warrant about the appearance of the 
argument he has produced. 
unless there is a mistake 
in the argument 
I 
o, (kn) > 2kn 14o so, it is plausible that ýý kn is abundant 
looks like you can construct an inductive 
argument to find another divisor, so u(kn) > 2kn 
if ktn then k is the spare divisor, 
if kIn and k2 tn then k2 is 
the spare divisor, if k31n and k3 tn 
then k' is the spare divisor. .. 
Figure 8.18: Part of David's response to Conjecture 2. 
Andrew also exhibited some hints of a warrant-type based upon external 
conviction, when attempting to construct an odd abundant number he appealed 
to the fact that you can find large prime numbers that are close together: 
ANDREW: So take some primes, a few odd primes that are very close to 
each other. I think so. 
INTERVIEWER: Is that the way to do it? 
ANDREW: If the differences in these primes is big, which is still the case 
here, because this is twice as big as this one, therefore these primes 
probably need to be really huge. I think there is some theorem, you 
can get these primes close enough, I don't know these theorems, but 
I'm pretty confident that you can find, these are never close these 
primes. (A5) 
Here Andrew seems to be appealing to the authority of a theorem that he 
believes probably exists. He used this theorem to further justify his argument 
in Conjecture 5. 
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Note that the relative lack of externally based warrants in the data may be 
a function of the task design rather than the types of reasoning patterns used 
by mathematics research students. Andrew appealed to a theorem he believed 
probably exists, but presumably, if the task had been set within the context of 
Functional Analysis, his research area, he would have been able to appeal to 
many theorems that he knew did exist. 
8.6.7 Discussion and summary of §8.6. 
There are two major issues that should be drawn from the data presented in 
§8.6: 
* The modal qualifier plays an important role in informal mathematical 
reasoning. 
The close relationship between the notion of warrant and proof scheme 
needs to be clarified, and the implications of this clarification discussed. 
These issues have been discussed during the course of the presentation of the 
data, and will be recapitulated and expanded here. 
The role of the modal qualifier. 
One of the main research questions that this thesis set out to explore was that 
of how successful mathematicians deal with conditional statements. Rav (1999) 
correctly complained that current theories of informal mathematical reason- 
ing are inadequate. This section has attempted to begin to characterise the 
conscious System 2 reasoning of mathematicians with regards to conditional 
statements. 
Any theory of mathematical reasoning needs to model both informal and for- 
mal mathematical thought. Toulmin's (1958) argumentational scheme can do 
this. However, it cannot do it in the manner with which it has previously been 
applied to mathematics. Neither the approaches of Aberdein (2005,2006) or 
of earlier mathematics education researchers (e. g. Hoyles & Kiichemann, 2002; 
Krummheuer, 1995) successfully dealt with informal mathematical reasoning. 
Whereas the mathematics educators sought to eliminate the role of modal qual- 
ifiers, backings and rebuttals in mathematical argumentation, Aberdein sought 
to trivialise them by talking only of "necessary" qualifiers and "mathematics" a's 
backings. The data presented in this section of this thesis suggests that neither 
of these approaches are viable. 
Modal qualifiers that did not carry certainty were widely used by participants 
in Experiment 4. Non-formal explorations of the conjectures under study were 
vital in ascertaining whether the participant believed that the conjecture was 
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true or false. Without such conviction, participants would have no means of 
deciding whether to attempt a proof or a disproof. 
It was found that certain types of warrants were paired with certain types of 
modal qualifiers. Non-deductive warrants were paired with non-certain modal 
qualifiers. To ignore this aspect of mathematical reasoning would be to deny a 
large part of the behaviour of the highly successful mathematicians recorded in 
Experiment 4. 
The relationship between warrant-types and proof schemes. 
The warrant-types discussed in this section are summarised in Table 8.2. The 
use of inductive, structural-intuitive and deductive warrants was widespread 
across the sample. The use of ritual and authoritarian warrants was rare, but 
this may have been a function of the task design. Recall that the quasi-judicial 
approach to data analysis does not seek to generalise from the observed data 
on the basis of a representative sample or a large number of participants. It 
seeks to establish reliability and validity through the rigorous application of the 
theory under inspection to the data. It is important to emphasise, then, that 
Table 8.2 should not be seen as an exhaustive taxonomy of warrant-types, but 
only as a summary of those warrant-types that were observed in the current 
study. " 
Warrant-type Appropriate Qualifier Section 
Inductive Probable 8.6.3 
Structural-intuitive Probable 8.6.4 
Ritual Probable 8.6.6 
Authoritarian Probable 8.6.6 
Deductive Certain 8.6.5 
Table 8.2: A summary of the types of warrants and modal qualifiers discussed 
in §8.6. 
What then, is the relationship between the construct of a proof scheme 
as introduced by Harel and Sowder (1998), and the notion of a warrant-type 
as used in this thesis? Harel and Sowder (2005, p. 33) write that "a person's 
proof scheme consists of what constitutes ascertaining and persuading for that 
person", it is the strategies and arguments which "an individual employs to 
remove her or his own doubts about the truth of an assertion" (Harel, in press). 
All the warrants and modal qualifiers in Table 8.2 were used to ascertain and 
"Indeed it is not even cleax that these warrant-types need be distinct. For example, Chris's 
argument, given in Figure 8.5, seems to combine both inductive properties (he quantitatively 
evaluated several examples) with structural-intuitive properties (he believes that number the- 
ory tends to be monotonic)- 
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persuade the participant about the truth or falsity of the various conjectures. 
The key difference seems to be that, for Harel, a proof scheme is the strategies 
that a person uses to remove doubts, whereas a warrant may merely reduce 
doubts (although as seen in §8.6.5, a warrant may also remove doubts entirely). 
All the participants, at various stages in their work used inductive, structural- 
intuitive and deductive warrants to gain conviction about the truth or falsity of 
mathematical statements. This conviction was often not certain: their doubts 
were often not removed, but instead were merely reduced. This, then, is the key 
distinction between Harel and Sowder's (1998) notion of a proof scheme and 
that of a warrant-type. However, once this broader notion - of the reduction 
of uncertainty rather than the removal of uncertainty - has been adopted there 
are implications for what it means to develop mathematically. 
A new view of mathematical development? 
When developing their proof schemes framework, Harel and Sowder (1998) ar- 
gued that in order to succeed at advanced level mathematics students must 
abandon inductive, transformational and external proof schemes and instead 
adopt a deductive scheme: 
"[T]he goal of instruction must be unambiguous; namely, to gradu- 
ally refine current students' proof schemes toward the proof scheme 
shared and practised by the mathematicians of today" (Harel, 2001) 
Similar arguments have been made by other researchers. Tall (2004), for exam- 
ple, argued that as students deepen their cognitive development, their 'warrants 
for truth' (in the sense of Rodd, 2000) also deepen, hopefully with the result 
that formal proof becomes the only acceptable warrant when working in the 
formal-axiomatic world (Tall, 2004). 
Whilst it is certainly true that no student will be successful at advanced 
mathematics if they accept a conclusion with certainty on the basis of non- 
deductive warrants, the data from this chapter indicates these non-deductive 
warrant-types play a crucial role in mathematical argumentation, as long as 
they are paired with appropriate modal qualifiers. When a person enters Tall's 
(2004) formal-axiomatic world, or when they develop Harel and Sowder's (1998) 
axiomatic-deductive proof scheme, rather than reducing the range of warrant- 
types they use, they retain the use of the warrants that have been used in 
previous 'worlds' or 'proof schemes', but they qualih them appropriately. These 
data show that mathematicians do not abandon inductive and intuitive argu- 
ments; instead, they learn to pair them with appropriate modal qualifiers and 
rebuttals. It is this pairing that is so crucial to successfully developing as a 
mathematician. 
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Inappropriate warrant-qualifier pairings. 
There is evidence that this key skill - the ability to appropriately pair warrants 
with modal qualifiers - is not always present. In this section two examples taken 
from the literature which show students constructing inappropriate pairings are 
briefly discussed. 
Weber (2003) reported a student's purported proof of the statement "for 
every odd integer n, n2-1 is divisible by 8": 
cc12 -I=0 which is divisible by 8.3 2-1=8 which is divisible by 
8.5 2-1= 24 which is divisible by 8. And so on. Therefore if n is 
odd, n2 -1 is divisible by 8. " 
As a consequence of their use of an inductive warrant, Harel and Sowder (1998) 
would describe this student as having an inductive proof scheme, and in terms 
of Tall's (2004) framework they are yet to reach the axiomatic-formal world. In 
terms of Toulmin's (1958) framework for modelling argumentation, this argu- 
ment has a modal qualifier which is inappropriately matched with its warrant. 
The key difference between the perspective developed in this thesis and that of 
Harel and Sowder and Tall, however, is that the use of an inductive warrant is 
not inappropriate per se. It is only when it is inappropriately paired with an 
absolute modal qualifier that the argument become problematic. 
In this case, Weber's (2003) student inappropriately paired a non-deductive 
warrant with an absolute qualifier, but there are also reported cases of students 
doing the reverse: pairing deductive warrants with non-absolute qualifiers. 
As part of his work on learning styles, Simpson (1995) discussed responses 
to the so-called 'Arithmagons' problem (Mason et al., 1982): 
"A secret number is assigned to each vertex of a triangle. On each 
side of the triangle is written the sum of the secret numbers at its 
ends. Find a simple rule revealing the secret numbers. " 
Simpson reported one student's behaviour: 
"Having been asked to prove a result which she had stated after 
some time working on the [Arithmagons problem] she wrote a quite 
delightful little proof which, though just essentially algebraic ma- 
nipulation, made me feel that she had grasped the essence of the 
problem and gave a quite general solution. 
On the next page, she wrote 'I wonder if it works for big numbers? "' 
(Simpson, 1995, see also Duffin & Simpson, 1993). 
This student, despite having presented an apparently perfect deductive proof, 
did not pair it with an absolute modal qualifier. For her, the deductive war- 
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rant she had written only allowed her to conclude that the statement was true 
about small numbers. The possibility that large numbers could form a rebuttal 
remained a concern for her. 
In short, this student used a deductive warrant successfully, but was unable 
to qualify it suitably. The use of deductive warrants alone is not sufficient in 
advanced mathematics: they must be paired with appropriate modal qualifiers. 
8.7 The modified Ramsey Test. 
Looking back at the data presented in this chapter reveals one consistent theme: 
Participants evaluated their belief in the truth/falsity of the statement 'if P 
then Q' by evaluating what type of modal qualifier will allow them to reach the 
conclusion Q from the data P. In short, they assumed P was true, and evaluated 
their level of belief in Q. This is exactly the mechanism that lies behind the 
Ramsey Test (discussed in §3.1.8): Ramsey (1931/1990, p. 247) wrote that, when 
arguing about the truth/falsity of 'if P then Q' participants hypothetically add 
P to their stock of knowledge, and argue on this basis about Q. 
Ramsey's (1931/1990) model for evaluating conditional statements is almost 
a redescription of the manner in which Toulmin's (1958) argumentation scheme 
was used in §8.6. The data suggest the following model: participants hypothet- 
ically add P to their stock of knowledge, and look for a warrant with which to 
conclude (or deny) Q. This warrant is then paired with an appropriate modal 
qualifier, and Q is concluded with the degree of confidence given by this quali- 
fier. The same level of confidence is given to the whole statement 'if P then Q'. 
In short, mathematicians implicitly conduct a kind of Ramsey Test to evaluate 
the level of belief that they have in the conditional statement. However, there 
appear to be some differences between the type of Ramsey Test that is used 
by mathematicians and that proposed by Over and Evans (2003) for standard 
indicative conditionals. 
Over and Evans (2003) suggested that the Ramsey Test for everyday indica- 
tive conditionals takes place in two stages. The degree of belief12 in PAQ and 
PA -Q are separately evaluated, and then compared. If P (P A Q) is higher than 
P(P A -Q) then P(Q I P) is high and, consequently, 1P(P =* Q) is judged to be 
high. Similarly, if P(P A Q) is lower than P(P A -Q), then P(Q I P) is low and 
so P(P =: ý- Q) is judged to be low. 
The crucial difference between the type of Ramsey Test described by Over 
and Evans (2003) and that used by the mathematicians in Experiment 4 is the 
the role of probabilistic warrants. Standard indicative conditionals, Over and 
"Recall that the degree of belief a person has in event X is denoted P(X). 
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Evans suggested, are evaluated by judging P(Q I P), in line with the Ramsey 
Test. However, Over and Evans interpreted the function P(X) (degree of belief 
in event X) as being much closer to the actual formal probability of X than 
seems to be the case in mathematical contexts. For example, Evans et al. (2003) 
described an experiment where participants were given a pack of cards which 
contain a particular (named) distribution of colours and shapes. They were 
then asked "how likely" a series of conditional statements about the situation 
is. Evans et al. found that participants' evaluations are closely correlated with 
the formal probability of Q given P. Over and Evans suggested then, that there 
is a close correspondence between the functions "degree of belief in" and "the 
probability of". 
It is clear that this reliance on pure probabilistic judgements did not happen 
in the mathematical context of Experiment 4. For example, every participant 
noted that Conjecture 1 was still false, despite being true for every multiple of 6 
other than 6 (for example, see the transcript of Edward's response, p. 180). Even 
though the theorem had been established as being true for all natural numbers 
k>1, the statement as a whole was still regarded as being false. Clearly 
this mathematical statement wasn't being evaluated on the purely probabilistic 
grounds that Over and Evans suggest for standard indicative conditionals. 
The data reported in this thesis suggests that, in mathematical contexts, a 
modified version of the Ramsey Test is used. Instead of evaluating P(Q I P), 
mathematicians seemed to evaluate P[ P (Q I P) =1J. That is to say, rather than 
evaluating their degree of belief in Q given P, they evaluated their degree of 
belief in the claim that Q, given P, is certain. 13 
Consider again Conjecture 1 from Experiment 4. Edward had deduced that 
6k is abundant for all k>1, but that this was not the case for k=1. Here P is 
the statement 'n is a multiple of 6' and Q is 'n is abundant'. The two Ramsey 
Tests in this case give different results: 
In the standard test P(Q I P) is evaluated. For this example this quantity 
is very high indeed: P(P A Q) is considerably greater than P(P A -, Q). 
In the modified test P[P(Q I P) = 1] is evaluated. For this example this 
quantity is zero: although P(Q I P) is high, Edward knew it is not 1 because 
of the case n=6. 
"Note that the way Evans et al. (2003) phrased their question prompted participants to 
respond in a probabilistic manner (they were asked "how likely" it was that 'if P then Q'). 
It is clear that the task used by Evans et al. doesn't really make sense in the context of the 
modified Ramsey Test: all the statements are trivially impossible to judge, as no information 
is given about the relations between the colours and shapes, participants only have frequency 
data. It is therefore uncleax how mathematics students would respond to the materials used 
by Evans et al. (2003). 
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It seems clear that, in the mathematical context of the Abundant Number task, 
the modified Ramsey Test was used by the mathematicians. Further evidence 
to support this assertion was reported by Inglis and Simpson (2006) in the con- 
text of the Maze Task (see §3.2.1, Durand-Guerrier, 2003). Inglis and Simpson 
compared a mathematical and non-mathematical version of the Maze Task and 
found that the more mathematical the context, the more likely participants were 
to evaluate conditional statements with a modified Ramsey Test rather than the 
original version. 
The notion of the modified Ramsey Test fits with evidence from other con- 
jectures in Experiment 4. Take Chris's argument in Conjecture 5, for example 
(see Figure 8.11). In the language of suppositional conditional theory, Chris 
hypothetically added the belief that "n and m are abundant" to his stock of 
knowledge. He then argued, on this basis, about the conclusion "n +M is abun- 
dant". He evaluated P[P(Q I P) = 1] as being low (his modal qualifier was "it 
is unlikely that"), by using the warrant "the divisors of n+M have nothing to 
do with the divisors of n and m" . Note that, even if, for a large percentage 
of the abundant pairs (n, m), n+m was abundant, this would probably not 
make Chris change his conclusion. As with the example of Conjecture 1, it is 
simultaneously possible to believe that P(Q I P) is high, but P[P(Q I P) = 1] is 
low. 
It is now possible to tie together the theories of Ramsey (1931/1990) and 
Toulmin (1958) in the context of mathematics: When a mathematician evaluates 
an "if.. then" statement they set up an argument in the sense of Toulmin with 
P as the data and Q as the conclusion. They then judge the modal qualifier of 
the argument using a modified version of the Ramsey Test. Instead of evaluating 
P(Q I P), they evaluate P[P(Q I P) = 1]. The evaluation is based upon the type 
of warrant used to 'transmit' validity from P to Q. 
The important question that this suppositional structure raises is: how does 
a person find their warrant? Where do they begin to look? The evidence 
presented in this thesis suggests that part of the answer can be found in the 
notion of preconscious heuristics. Drawing together the strands of research 
presented in the thesis is the goal of the next, and final, chapter. 
8.8 Summary of Chapter 8. 
This chapter has looked at two distinct stages that are important in under- 
standing how mathematicians use and evaluate conditional statements. Follow- 
ing on from Chapter 6, where it was experimentally demonstrated that Evans's 
(1996) heuristic-analytic dual process theory can successfully account for the 
behaviour of mathematicians when dealing with the Wason Selection Task, the 
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same framework was used to study how conditionals are evaluated in a more 
realistic mathematical context. The main components of the case-law developed 
in this chapter were: 
9 Preconscious System 1 heuristics have a major role in directing the atten- 
tion of mathematicians when they encounter conditional statements. This 
can, and does, influence their choice of proof strategies. 
" To accurately model mathematical argumentation it is necessary to admit 
the role of the modal qualifier and rebuttal in Toulmin's (1958) argumen- 
tation model. Expert mathematicians appear to accurately match up the 
warrants they use with appropriate modal qualifiers. 
" The notion of warrant-type is broader than that of proof scheme. A 
warrant-type does not necessarily remove all doubts, it may only remove 
some doubts. The use of warrants that could be associated with 'inap- 
propriate' proof schernes is not inappropriate as long as they are qualified 
suitably. The goal of instruction should be to help students better tie 
together these warrant-types with appropriate modal qualifiers. 
" Mathematicians evaluate mathematical conditionals using a modified form 
of the Ramsey Test. Rather than evaluating P(Q I P), they evaluate 
PIIP(Q I P) = 11- 
In the concluding chapter that follows the evidence from this and previous 
chapters is reconsidered, and the roles of preconscious heuristics, warrants and 
the modal qualifier and the Ramsey Test are drawn together to develop one 
coherent theory of mathematical conditional evaluation. Particular attention 
is given to distinguishing between the 'intuition' associated with structural- 
intuitive warrants and the 'intuition' associated with System 1 preconscious 
heuristics. 
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Chapter 9 
The Theory 
The research question that this thesis set out to answer was a direct response 
to Rav's (1999) observation that 
"As things stand now, we have remarkable mathematical theories of 
formal logic, but inadequate logical theories of informal mathemat- 
ics. " (p. 14) 
Specifically, the primary goal of the thesis was to develop a model of how math- 
ematicians evaluate mathematical conditionals. To do this two quite separate 
strands of research have been reported in the thesis so far. The purpose of this, 
the concluding chapter, is to surnmarise the content of the experimental work 
reported in earlier chapters, and to synthesise the two strands into one coherent 
theory. 
9.1 Summary of empirical work. 
9.1.1 Picking a framework. 
The experimental work in the thesis began by attempting to distinguish which 
of the various theories of reasoning discussed in Chapter 4 is most applicable 
to studying how mathematicians reason with conditional statements. To this 
end a direct comparison between mathematics students' and history students' 
responses to the Wason Selection Task was conducted (Experiment 1). The 
Wason Selection Task has, historically, been the instrument which has proved to 
be most insightful for reasoning researchers, and the interesting (and surprising) 
results from Experiment 1 confirmed this. 
The results of Experiment I were unexpected: whereas mathematicians did 
select the normatively correct answer more often than the control group, their 
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success was not overwhelming. Moreover, the typical mistakes made the math- 
ematics students were different to those of the control group. Experiment 2 
followed this finding up and demonstrated that success on the Selection Task 
is not related to a mathematics undergraduate's experience of, and attainment 
in, degree level mathematics. Furthermore, it was found that the time taken to 
solve the task by participants who answered correctly was significantly greater 
than those who made either the typical mathematician's mistake or the typi- 
cal general population mistake, but that there was no significant difference in 
length of timings between these latter two groups. The results of Experiments 
1 and 2 provided a challenge to the major theories of reasoning. In Section 
6.3 the adaptations necessary to the various theories in order to accommodate 
the experimental findings were discussed. It was concluded that each of the 
mental models, mental rules and heuristic-analytic dual process theories could 
be adapted successfully. 
In the final experiment in Chapter 6, Experiment 3, the mental models and 
mental rules theories were eliminated. Based on the work of Evans (1996) and 
Ball et al. (2003), an inspection time eye-tracker methodology was used to 
demonstrate that the mathematics students are preconsciously biased towards 
the same cards as the general population, but that they are substantially better 
at analytically considering the cards they are biased towards and overriding 
these biases. It was argued that neither the mental models not the mental rules 
theories can completely account for these data. 
As a consequence of the empirical work in Chapter 6, only one of the ma- 
jor theories of reasoning can be said to efficiently account for the behaviour of 
successful mathematics students on the Wason Selection Task. This is an im- 
portant result both in the context of the goals of this thesis, and of the wider 
psychology of reasoning literature. 
9.1.2 Applying the framework. 
Having demonstrated that only one theory of reasoning can account for the 
empirical data collected during Experiments 1,2 and 3, the next stage of the 
empirical work conducted in this thesis was to apply this framework to more 
genuinely mathematical contexts. This was the goal of Experiment 4. 
As befitting an experiment designed with the dual process framework in 
mind, there were two broad stages to the analysis of Experiment 4. The first 
demonstrated that preconscious heuristics do play an important role in directing 
attention during mathematical work. It was shown that careful manipulation of 
apparently irrelevant surface linguistics content can, as a consequence of the if- 
and matching-heuristics, change an apparently simple problem to a surprisingly 
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difficult one. 
In the second stage of the analysis, conscious processes involved in the eval- 
uation of mathematical conditionals were considered. In line with Bromley's 
(1986) quasi-judicial approach, each participant's interview was considered as 
a case study, and analysed using Toulmin's (1958) framework, with Harel and 
Sowder's (1998) 'proof schemes' theory as a prima facie explanation. 
It was suggested that, when evaluating mathematical conditionals, the role 
of the modal qualifier has been seriously underestimated by earlier researchers. 
Furthermore, in Section 8.7 it was argued that, when evaluating conditionals, 
successful mathematics students search for warrants using a, modified version of 
the Ramsey Test (Ramsey, 1931/1990; Evans & Over, 2004). 
The goal of this, the final chapter, is to integrate these two strands of em- 
pirical work - corresponding to preconscious System 1 thinking, and conscious 
System 2 thinking - together into one coherent theory. This process begins by 
exploring the role of preconscious heuristics in warrant finding. 
9.2 Preconscious heuristics and warrant finding. 
The two strands of argument developed in Chapter 8 can now be drawn together 
to explore how preconscious heuristics interact with the modified version of the 
Ramsey Test. In the context of the standard Ramsey Test, Over and Evans 
(2003) wrote: 
"There are a number of ways in which people can [conduct the stan- 
dard Ramsey Test]. Sometimes they will know relevant frequency 
information, and they can use that to make an explicit compari- 
son. f ... 
j More widely, [preconscious] heuristics will sometimes be 
engaged. " (p. 346) 
The evidence from Experiment 4, reported in §8.5, suggests a similar role for pre- 
conscious heuristics as that postulated by Over and Evans: the if- and matching- 
heuristics direct attention towards considering apparently relevant features of 
the statement, and this affects where the participant looks to find a warrant, 
which in turn affects the type of warrant they may use. 
In short, the evidence presented in this thesis strongly supports the claim 
that preconscious System 1 heuristics play a major role in directing attention 
during the evaluation and use of conditional statements in advanced mathe- 
matics. Experiment 4 showed that changing the surface linguistic features of 
conditional statements can dramatically alter the manner in which they are 
dealt with by mathematics students. The following terminology was adopted in 
this thesis to aid classification of conditional statements: 
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Criterion T. A conditional satisfies Criterion T if it is phrased in such a way as 
to ensure that people tend to be preconsciously biased towards considering 
features of the situation which will hinder them finding warrants. 
Criterion U. A conditional satisfies Criterion U if it is phrased in such a way as 
to ensure that people tend to be preconsciously biased towards considering 
features of the situation which will help them find warrants. 
In Experiment 4 it was shown that, apparently irrelevant surface content can 
significantly influence whether a mathematical problem is either a Criterion U 
or a Criterion T situation. 
Previous research on dual process theories of reasoning, reviewed in Chapter 
7, have used comparatively trivial everyday tasks and tests to investigate the 
bimodal structure of reasoning posited by dual process theorists. As Leron 
and Hazzan (2006) pointed out, evidence that similar heuristics also play a 
role in higher level mathematical reasoning will come as a surprise to many. 
Traditionally higher level mathematics is seen as being abstract and formal, 
it is a situation in which System 2 responses would be expected to dominate. 
That System 1 preconscious heuristics play an important role in the adoption 
of proof strategies - which sometimes leads to non-normative responses - is an 
important finding. This thesis, then, supports and extends the argument put 
forward by Leron and Hazzan (2006). 
However, whilst preconscious heuristics have been shown to play an impor- 
tant role in allocating attention, they should not be confused with the notion 
of structural-intuitive warrants introduced in §8.6.4. Clarification of the differ- 
ences between these somewhat similar constructs - preconscious heuristics on 
the one hand, and structural-intuitions on the other - is the goal of the next 
section. 
9.3 System 1 heuristics and intuition. 
The form of the dual process framework that has been adopted in this thesis is 
Evans's (1984,1989,1996,2006) heuristic-analytic theory. Evans argued that 
there are two stages of reasoning which he originally called heuristic and ana- 
lytic (Evans, 1984). In the first stage of reasoning preconscious heuristics select 
certain aspects of the environment as being relevant. In the second stage con- 
scious analytical attention is 'spent' on these relevant parts of the environment. 
This heuristic-analytic account has since become incorporated into the standard 
dual process framework, and the more generic terms System 1 and System 2 
have overtaken the heuristic-analytic terminology. 
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The role of preconscious heuristics, in the heuristic-analytic theory, is to 
direct attention towards relevant parts of the environment. Specifically, two 
heuristics appear to be of importance when considering conditional statements: 
9 The if-heuristic directs attention towards considering the case when the 
antecedent of the conditional is true. 
The matching-heuristic directs attention towards the surface linguistic 
content of the rule rather than the semantic meaning of the terms in 
the rule. 
These heuristics, when seen from an ecological point of view, are helpful, they 
direct attention towards parts of the the environment that are most relevant. 
However, as this thesis has demonstrated, in unusual situations they can be 
unhelpful: Chapters 6 and 8 gave numerous examples of mathematical Criterion 
T situations: where the reasoner is led to consider unhelpful aspects of the 
environment which disguise normative solutions. 
In the mathematical suppositional conditional model discussed above the 
role of System 1 preconscious heuristics is quite different to that of structural- 
intuitive warrants. Although Fischbein (1987) and Schmalz (1988) saw 'intu- 
itions' as being "immediate", "certain" and standing in opposition to rational 
thought - all characteristics of System I heuristics - they play a different role. 
Structural-intuitive warrants are the result of intuitions about the structure 
of a person's internal representations. Intuitions, in this sense, are about beliefs 
resulting from internal representations, they are not about the way in which 
attention is directed to find these beliefs. Burton's (2004) participants, all 
professional mathematicians introspecting about their work, described the role 
of intuition: 
* "I don't think you would ever start anything without intuition. " 
9 "[Intuition is] a sense of the possible or even likely. " 
"You are always thinking in a not-straightforward, deductive way. You are 
always looking for some hint from within that this might be an interesting 
thing to do" (pp. 76-77). 
These characterisations of intuition fit with this thesis's notion of structural- 
intuitive warrants: when looking for a structural-intuitive warrant you are look- 
ing for a "hint from within" about whether a conclusion is "possible or even 
likely", without this kind of warrant it is unlikely you "would ever start" a 
proof attempt. These characteristics, however, do not fit with the Dual Process 
idea of a preconscious heuristic. Intuition is what you are looking for, but where 
you look is determined by preconscious System 1 heuristics. 
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9.4 The evaluative model: A summary. 
The ground has now been prepared sufficiently for the statement of the evalua- 
tive model of mathematical conditional evaluation as developed in §8.7-9.3. 
Evaluating mathematical conditionals. 
The evaluative model posited by the theory developed in this thesis is shown in 
Figure 9.1. 
Figure 9.1: The model: how mathematicians evaluate mathematical condition- 
als. 
To evaluate a conditional "if P then Q" the mathematician hypothetically 
adds P to their stock of knowledge, by putting P as the data in Toulmin's (1958) 
argumentation scheme. They then attempt to construct an argument where Q is 
the conclusion. Based on System 1 preconscious heuristics, the mathematician's 
attention is directed to certain parts of the environment and they attempt to 
evaluate the modal qualifier using a modified Ramsey Test: P[P(Q I P) = 1] is 
the level of belief the mathematician has in the claim that Q is certain, given P. 
This evaluation is based on the type of warrant that the mathematician finds 
during their investigation. The conditional statement "if P then Q" is then 
concluded with the level of certainty given by the modal qualifier. 
When a conditional is evaluated using a deductive warrant no rebuttal is 
admitted and P[ P(Q I P) = 11 = 1. However, the situation is more complicated 
for a contrapositive deductive warrant. In these cases the backing is an entirely 
new argument, complete with its own data, conclusion, warrant and so on. This 
structure is shown in Figure 9.2. 
The evaluative model versus formal logic. 
The model outlined above is not merely a rephrasal of formal logic. Whereas 
Inhelder and Piaget's (1958) model of reasoning (at least in the stage of formal 
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no rebuttal 
PIP(Q I P) = 11 =1 ý-ý Q 
contrapositive argument exists 
no rebuttal 
lplp(-PI-Q)=J]=Jý-ý-P 
w 
B 
Figure 9.2: The model: how mathematicians evaluate contrapositive arguments. 
operations) was overtly logical, the model proposed here has several important 
differences: 
The role of the modal qualifier. In formal logic "if... then" statements 
are either true or false. In the evaluative model developed in this the- 
sis conditionals admit degrees of confidence. Mathematicians can, and 
do, believe that certain conditionals are 'almost certainly true', 'probably 
true', 'plausibly true' and so on. 
The role of preconscious heuristics in directing attention during the war- 
rant search. In the evaluative model, the various warrants that are possible 
when proving a statement can be hidden or highlighted depending on the 
interaction between the statement's linguistic structure and the mathe- 
matician's preconscious biases. A prover's attention may be directed to- 
wards looking for a warrant in helpful or unhelpful places; this can, and 
does, highlight certain warrants and hide others. Certain arguments can 
therefore be privileged over others. 
The difference in status between direct and indirect arguments. In formal 
logic there is no difference in 'status' between a direct and an indirect proof 
of a statement. They both establish the result with certainty using one 
logical step (modus ponens or modus tollens). In the evaluative model, 
however, this is not the case. Establishing a result indirectly involves 
200 
a complex argument structure with a whole new argument forming the 
backing to the (deductive) warrant that establishes the conclusion with 
certainty. 
The evaluative model, then, is entirely different to formal logic: it posits a 
process by which mathematicians evaluate conditional statements which admits 
the possibility of degrees of confidence, and in which the evaluative process is 
significantly affected by preconscious System 1 heuristics. 
The evaluative model versus everyday reasoning. 
As well as being a different model to the formal logical theory of Inhelder and 
Piaget (1958), the evaluative model developed here is also at odds with cur- 
rent models of everyday reasoning with conditionals. The evaluative model 
is compatible with none of the models discussed in Chapter 3. Instead it is 
an adaptation of the suppositional conditional model described by Edgington 
(2003), Evans and Over (2004) and Over and Evans (2003). To re-emphasise 
the key differences between these two theories: 
9 The suppositional model of indicative conditionals suggests that a person 
fixes their degree of belief in a conditional statement 'if P, then Q' by 
considering their degree of belief in Q, given P. 
9 The evaluative model for mathematical conditionals suggests that a person 
fixes their degree of belief in a conditional statement 'if P, then Q' by 
considering their degree of belief in Q being certain, given P. 
Symbolically, the suppositional model for indicative conditionals argues 
that P(P =* Q) ý P(Q I P), whereas the evaluative model for mathemati- 
cal conditionals suggests P(P =ý Q) = P[P(Q I P) = 1]. 
However, notwithstanding these differences the overall structure is the same. 
When evaluating an 'if... then' statement an argument is constructed with the 
antecedent as the data and the consequent as the conclusion. A warrant is 
sought to bridge between these two parts of the argument and an appropriate 
modal qualifier for this warrant gives the degree of belief in the conditional. 
9.5 Speculations on the sources of the differ- 
ences between mathematical and general cog- 
nition. 
As discussed above, the evaluative model developed in this chapter is different, 
to that proposed by Over and Evans (2003) for the general population. This 
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begs the question: what causes this difference in argumentation practice, and to 
what extent does it extend to non-mathematical settings? Do mathematicians 
evaluate day-to-day indicative conditionals, such as (*) below, using the Ramsey 
Test or the modified Ramsey Test? 
(*) If you're in Coventry, then you have a good choice of Indian food. 
Common sense seems to suggest that mathematicians are only mathematicians 
'in the office': that they would not reject (*) simply because of the possibility 
that you could be in a distant suburb of Coventry where there are no Indian 
restaurants. However, there is currently no empirical evidence upon which to 
base this common sense impression (see also Inglis & Simpson, 2006). More 
research is needed on individual and contextual differences in indicative condi- 
tional evaluation. However, some care is needed when designing such experi- 
ments. As discussed above, the wording of Evans et al. 's (2003) materials' may 
bias participants into evaluating conditionals using the standard Ramsey Test 
rather than the modified version. Experimental materials which do not privi- 
lege one version of the Ramsey Test over another will be required to successfully 
explore this research question. 
The source of the differences in behaviour of mathematicians and non- 
mathematicians on the Wason Selection Task is also of interest. On this task, 
recall, mathematics students were biased in the same manner as the general 
population, but were significantly better at analytically considering the cards 
they were biased towards and detecting mistakes. Further, it seemed that the 
magnitude of difference was not related to the students' degree of experience of, 
or attainment in, advanced mathematics. 
How mathematics students cope with preconscious biases is an area of rea- 
soning research that appears to be underdeveloped. There is, for example, some 
evidence which suggests that mathematics students are significantly less affected 
by belief bias on conditional inference tasks to the general population (Inglis, 
2006). But what is the cause of these differences? 
There are two reasonable hypotheses: 
Mathematics students gain superior analytical skills during their math- 
ematical studies which allow them to override misleading preconscious 
biases. 
Some parts of the population are innately better the kind of analytical 
cognition which is necessary to override misleading heuristic biases, and 
people with this characteristic are more likely to be filtered into mathe- 
matics education. 
'Paxticipants were asked to judge "how likely" a conditional was. 
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The first hypothesis would fit uneasily with the finding that undergraduate 
experience has no relation with success on the Selection Task, but it may be 
possible that the skill required to conduct this analysis is relatively minor - 
Chapter 6 suggested that it may merely be the recognition that P =* Q is not 
the same as P ýý Q- and that this skill might be developed in pre-university 
courses. Research evidence from studies that have looked at the effect of intelli- 
gence and education on reasoning is mixed (e. g. Lehman, Lempert, & Nisbett, 
1988; Lehman & Nisbett, 1990; Stanovich, 1999). 
In order to distinguish between the two hypotheses outlined above further 
empirical work is needed. Alongside the longitudinal study that would be nec- 
essary to answer such questions, the work contained in this thesis raises many 
other, currently open, questions. For example, how are mathematics students 
affected by negative conclusion bias? Do the findings regarding belief bias re- 
ported by Inglis (2006) extend to the more traditional setting of Aristotelian 
syllogisms? Do mathematicians interact with heuristics more associated with 
the decision making literature (as discussed Chapter 7) in the same way as they 
seem to with those more associated with the reasoning literature? There appear 
to be many unanswered questions. 
9.6 Final remarks. 
The purpose of this thesis was to respond to Rav's (1999) comment that there 
is currently an inadequate understanding of the logic of informal mathemat- 
ics. The work reported here has contributed to answering this criticism of the 
literature by developing a coherent empirically based model that accounts for 
how mathematicians evaluate mathematical conditionals. The goal of future 
research should be to further explore and refine the evaluative model, and to 
begin to approach the important questions that this thesis raises with regards 
to the relationship between individual differences in reasoning behaviour and 
the study of advanced mathematics. 
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Appendix A 
Transcript of David's 
interview. 
DAVID: [reads question] OK, OK, my goodness, a number's abundant if and 
only if it's a multiple of 6. Well, I guess 6 is perfect right? [laughs] 
INTERVIEWER: You just knew that? 
DAVID: Well yeah I knew that anyway, so umm, if something's a multiple 
of 6 then you've got, what have you got? so if you've got 6n then 
umm, err as divisors you've got of course 1,2,3 and 6, and n of all 
these, n, 2n, 3n, 6n, so the sum of all them is going to be 12n, is 
that right? yeah. So, but you may have more divisors I guess, cos 
you, so, so you've got at least... so maybe, yeah so it may be perfect 
I guess... I mean 6 is a multiple of 6 and that's perfect [laughs] 
INTERVIEWER: So what does that tell us? 
DAVID: Well that tells us it's false. 
INTERVIEWER: That tells us the whole thing is false? 
DAVID: Yeah, because if and only if it's a mulitple of 6, so that's a coun- 
terexample. So, well, it says 6 is a counterexample to the fact that 
a number is abundant, you know 6 is not abundant. 
INTERVIEWER: Right, so that discounts the whole conjecture, but if you 
had to split it up into an if and an only if what would that tell us? 
DAVID: Umm, er, so a it is a multiple of 6 then it's abundant, well, I mean 
that's not true right? 
INTERVIEWER: Right, so what about the other direction? 
DAVID: If it's abundant then it's a multiple of 6, well umm, I guess you 
just need to find a counterexample to that. Let's have. a look, have. 
we got any examples down here? 
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INTERVIEWER: I've got some examples for you to save having to do any 
work, so there's some examples. 
DAVID: So, the first few abundant numbers, so 20 that's not a multiple of 
6. 
INTERVIEWER: So that's dead easy then? That's the end of the question? 
DAVID: That's the end of the question. 
INTERVIEWER: Marvellous, ok, let me give you another one then. 
DAVID: If n is perfect then kn is abundant for any k. Right, ok, so we 
know that's it's not deficient, that's by the same argument that, we 
have down there, so, why would it be abundant? So you've got, n 
is perfect, so we've got a new n there, and umm, so this will have 
some divisors, I don't know, sum of the divisors, I don't know how 
to write the divisors [laughs], sum of, what shall I call them? m in 
divisors of n, is err, equal to 2n. And then we've got sum of m in 
the divisors of kn, right we know that it's greater than or equal to, 
to 2 of kn by the same argument. 
INTERVIEWER: Sorry, why is that? 
DAVID: That's by this argument again, you see, if you've got umm, so the 
sum of the divisors, so each divisor of err, each divisors of n, well k 
times each divisor of n is a divisor of kn right? so therefore this is 
true. Why would it be a greater than? Umm, I don't know, why 
couldn't it be perfect? I mean you've got some possible counterex- 
amples here, I mean, we might look for one of them, so does 6 divide 
into that? I don't know, no it doesn't does it? So does 6 divide into 
the next thing? So, I can't see any counterexamples there, and for 
example. So I guess, umm, what was we, what would 1, umm, we 
need to find some divisors that aren't of the form 2m for ma divisor 
a n, don't we? 
INTERVIEWER: 2m? 
DAVID: Sorry, km, I'm thinking of that, it's km. So if m is a divisor of n, 
and, I guess k [laughs]. 
INTERVIEWER: k? 
DAVID: Well, k's not necessarily going to be a divisor, so k's going to be 
a divisor of k, so k divides kn, ok? And k may or may not be a 
divisor of n. But that doesn't prove it [laughs]. If n is perfect then 
kn is abundant. Err, so that proves it for any k that doesn't divide 
n. So, let's write that. So if k doesn't divide n, then umm, kn, err, 
whatever, k divides kn, and err, well, it would take me a long time 
to write it down, I don't know if you want me to? 
INTERVIEWER: No, don't worry 
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DAVID: OK, so k doesn't divide n, so suppose k divides n. Umm, I'm 
trusting this is all correct, because I haven't written it down properly 
[laughs]. But this is where I'm going, suppose k divides n, then, well 
suppose P doesn't divide n, then k2 would divide kn. 
INTERVIEWER: Oh, sorry, you'll have to... 
DAVID: Well suppose k divides n and k2 doesn't divide n, umm, then k2 
divides kn, so that's a number that would make this strictly greater 
than, and then I guess you're looking at some sort of induction thing, 
so suppose k2 divides n but k3 doesn't divide n, k3 divides kn erm, 
and umm, 
INTERVIEWER: Can you assume that though? Can you assume you've got 
ak that divides n? 
D"ID: Well, no, just suppose it does so what you're looking at is you're 
saying let k be a natural number, err, that well k is some natural 
number, if k doesn't divide n then the theorem's true I think, if 
it divides n but k2 doesn't divide n then the theorem's true, if k2 
divides n but k3 doesn't divide n then the theorem's true. And I 
think you can just carry on, and Vs either going to umm, err, well 
I mean hopefully, have we done everything now? 
INTERVIEWER: Have we? 
DAVID: Yeah, let's see, probably fundamental theorem of arithmetic or 
something. So if k divides n then the primes of k are in the primes 
of n, err, yeah, umm, I think err, if k divides n, I think that's right, 
cos then we just need to consider that case, but we get left over with 
that case and then, 
INTERVIEWER: you can keep going for ever? 
DAVID: Inductively, that will probably work. Is there a really simple ar- 
gument? [laughs] Have I missed that? 
INTERVIEWER: Well, no, no, I mean the goal is not to find the best answer, 
the goal is to see how people go about it. 
DAVID: Yeah, well I assume that works, as I say, I haven't written it down 
and I would always say to my students you know, I've got, this seems 
like an idea, I now think I believe this conjecture, you've now got to 
sit down and try and write it out. But I wouldn't want to do that 
and say it at the same time, because it would, you know, you'd have 
to do that on your own. But it looks plausible I think. 
INTERVIEWER: Sure, right, the only thing that I would think, what would 
happen if k equalled k2 equalled k1? 
DAVID: Well then k is 1, so it doesn't, so that's just if n is perfect then, oh 
well, so that's [laughs] so that's I guess actually that's if n is perfect 
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then kn is abundant, this has got to be false for k=1, so actually I 
could have just said, if I'd have realised that that's false, but possibly 
for k above 1 this is true, and if k is above 1 then you haven't got 
this problem. So if k=1 then it's false, yeah. 
INTERVIEWER: But otherwise we think it's true? 
DAVID: It looks like it's true [laughs]. 
INTERVIEWER: OK, marvellous let me give you another one then. 
DAVID: OK, if pi and P2 are primes then PlP2 is abundant. Umm, well that 
can't be true, because 2 and 3 are primes and 6 is perfect [laughs]. 
INTERVIEWER: Right, ok, so that's the end of that? 
DAVID: That's the end of that [laughs]. 
INTERVIEWER: If I changed it then, to be not abundant, what would you 
say? 
DAVID: That would seem more reasonable. Because primes look very de- 
ficient. 
INTERVIEWER: Do they? 
DAVID: Well, they only have 1 and themselves as divisors, so they're about 
as deficient as you can get right? Except you know... so, you know, 
PI i P2 , umm, well ok, if it's 
deficient, if it's not abundant, so it might 
be perfect for 2 and 3. So I guess you can do a kind of direct proof. 
Because pi + 1, sorry, PlP2 has as divisors, p, and P2 and PlP2, and 
er, 1. So the only way in which that could be greater than or equal 
to 2plP2 is if PI + P2 +1 is greater than or equal to PlP2. And err, 
ok, so sorry we're trying to show that that's false right, for 2 and 3 
that doesn't work, and for any higher? Well, if pi and P2 are any 
higher than 2 and 3 then you should be able to do some induction 
thing here. So this is false for 2 and 3, so you could do induction 
on p, I mean there's two things, there's two sort of induction things 
isn't there. So, if you add 1 to pi then it's going to add more than 
1 to the right hand side, and if you add 1 to P2 then it's going to 
add more than 1 to the right hand side. So you're never going to 
get this inequality. 
INTERVIEWER: So it's kind of a get's bigger faster argument? 
DAVID: Yeah, this gets bigger faster than that, so you'd need to do an 
induction on p, and then say well, ok, right 
INTERVIEWER: That's going to be quite tedious though 
DAVID: What's that? 
INTERVIEWER: That's going to be quite tedious to do that. 
DAVID: Well, no, it's a proof by induction, but I'm not gonna. That I'm 
very convinced that that is completely false. 
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INTERVIEWER: So, let's just recap then, so this conjecture as it stands, as 
it's written is false? 
D"ID: Yeah. 
INTERVIEWER: But if you change it to not abundant it's? 
DAVID: It's probably a typo [laughs]. 
INTERVIEWER: Let me give you another one. 
DAVID: If n is deficient then every divisor of n is deficient, so the sum of 
the divisors is, right, err, sum of m in divisors of n, right, let's just 
write this down as less than or equal to 2n. And if you've got, err, 
so if you consider, hmm. Umm, if you consider a divisor of n, itself 
then you've got, erm [long pause] 
INTERVIEWER: What are you thinking? 
DAVID: What am I thinking?! I'm not, I'm not sure, I'm trying to take 
away a term from that, but you can't just take away a term because 
you might end up with too many. OK, so let's, a good way to do this 
is sort of fundamental theorem of arithmetic, so n can be written as 
p, up to p,, not necessarily unique primes, and you're saying that 
two of these, so you've got, well certainly this is true, this isn't all 
the divisors of course, this is just the prime divisors. 
INTERVIEWER: [Reading what David has written] So you've got the sum of all 
the prime divisors is less than 2 times PlP2 ... ps = n. 
DAVID: And then a divisor of n is going to be, well you remove at least 
one prime, so let's do an induction thing, so you're subtracting p 
from that side and you're subtracting some pi from that side. Umm, 
and erm, then you're dividing by, so on this side you're, [long pause] 
hmmm. 
INTERVIEWER: Sorry, I'm a bit lost now. 
DAVID: Yeah, so I'm just saying that, maybe I'm not going about this in 
a good way. I'm just saying that this is certainly less than the sum 
of all the divisors, the sum of all the primes. So I'm just trying to 
write this out, so therefore this [p, +.. . +p., 
] is certainly less than that 
IP1 
... p. 
]. And I'm just seeing, well, what is a divisor of n? Well, 
a divisor of n is obtained by taking away some of the primes. So 
just taking away one prime, and then saying let's see what happens. 
But I'm kind of a little bit worried, because, you know, I haven't 
got enough on that side really, so, I haven't got all the divisors on 
the left hand side. So I'm not sure if I want to proceed, so I'm kind 
of pausing. 
INTERVIEWER: You've smelt a rat with that technique. 
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DAVID: Yeah, so if n is deficient then every, ok, so let's think primes again, 
primes are very deficient, what was that previous one? if p, and P2 
are primes then P1P2 is erm, not abundant. So, it's either err, so we 
write our n as a product of primes, p, to p, and each of these are, 
each of these are [long pause] err, oh hang on, that only says pi, P2 
doesn't it? That doesn't help, it won't give us an induction. 
INTERVIEWER: Oh, I see, does that extend to 3 then? If you put a P3 in 
there? 
DAVID: Well, it wouldn't necessarily extend, I mean look at 2 times 2 times 
3, it's 12 which is abundant. I'm just trying to think about going 
the other way, rather than starting with n start with some divisor 
on n, and then see if we can say, OK, so I guess what I'm trying to 
do is the contrapositive. So I'm saying, umm, suppose every divisor 
of n is not deficient, so suppose this is not deficient and then add a 
prime and see if you get something that's still not deficient? Is that 
right? Is that what I'm trying to say? If every divisor of n is not 
deficient then n is not deficient. Umm. 
INTERVIEWER: So what's the contrapositive? 
DAVID: That's what I've just said. If every divisor of n is not deficient 
then n is not deficient. So, this is umm, p, to, why is this taking me 
so long? 
INTERVIEWER: No this is good. 
DAVID: So if p, to p,, is not deficient, so this is umm, [long pause] So, oh, 
I've got that written. So this is where I was, so let's multiply both 
sides by another prime. If we multiply that by another prime, and 
then we want to show that this is, so we're saying that this is not 
deficient, right m divisors of m is not deficient, so it's greater than 
or equal to 2n. And if we multiply by a prime. 
INTERVIEWER: So n here is now a divisor? 
D"ID: Is now a divisor yeah, sorry. Different n. Now if we multiply by a 
prime what do we get? Err, do we get that this is, oh hang on, what 
have I done? I only want to multiply, I want to multiply this side 
by a prime, np, I'm multiplying n by a prime. And then we want, 
so we've got every divisor, inside this sum, we've got every umm, 
mp from this m up here, so this is, and we may have more, so this 
is greater than or equal to, too many crossings out around here, so 
my signs axe going, m in divisors of, oh, hang on, what am I saying? 
The sum of m in divisors of, so I'm trying to use this thing up here, 
in np, is greater than or equal to, err, the sum of k, erm, sorry, not 
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k, pm. m is a divisor of n, which is greater than or equal to 2np. 
Right? So we've assumed that and then got... 
INTERVIEWER: So we've assumed the divisors are deficient. 
DAVID: Yeah, so pick some divisor n, and then umm, err, multiply it by 
p, so you'd need to do some induction to get back up, so assume all 
the divisors are deficient, so assume one of them's deficient, then by 
an induction step np must be deficient, so you're original n whatever 
it was is also deficient. And since you've just picked any divisor, it 
works for every single one. 
INTERVIEWER: So why have you chosen a p? Why is it a prime that you've 
picked? 
DAVID: Umm, yeah there's no need to actually, yeah I picked a prime 
because I was thinking along the lines of prime factorisations, but 
actually looking over this proof you don't need to pick a prime, so 
infact you don't need to do any induction, you just pick some, you 
just pick a number. 
INTERVIEWER: Yeah, so what's the relationship between that one, number 
4, and the one you proved a minute ago [Conjecture 21? If at all? 
DAVID: Umm, if n is perfect then kn is abundant. Errm, oh yeah, so 
it's the same thing isn't it? [laughs]. Gosh! It's the contrapositive, 
well, hang on, it's not quite the contrapositive is it? Because if n 
is perfect, it doesn't mean erm so here we're not assuming perfect, 
we're assuming not deficient, so it's not quite the same, and we're 
not quite proving the same thing, because we're proving that kn is 
not deficient. 
INTERVIEWER: Right, so it's nearly the contrapositive? 
DAVID: So, it's sort of, it's similar to the contrapositive, but it's not quite. 
INTERVIEWER: Yeah, because you've come up with two entirely difFerent 
proofs which is quite interesting 
DAVID: Yeah I have, haven't I? [laughs] 
INTERVIEWER: Can you use this, or that, to prove this and vice versa? 
Or because of the slight difference are they entirely unrelated? 
DAVID: I prefer this one [laughs, points at Conjecture 4] because it doesn't 
have this [points at the k divides k2 argument]. I don't know, can we 
do it? So what do we have? We had if n is perfect, that's what 
we have, and then we say the sum of the divisors of kn is greater 
than or equal to that, yeah I mean you would because you've got 
this greater than or equal to, this thing would be an equals, so you'd 
have, oh hang on, no it's abundant, so you'd have a greater than 
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or equal to, you'd still need to show that it's a greater than, and I 
think this is what this does. 
INTERVIEWER: Right, so that strict inequality makes this difference? 
DAVID: Yeah. 
INTERVIEWER: OK, so can I give you another one then? 
DAVID: OK, this is the sort of thing I hate because, whenever you're 
thinking factors of things, and you're multiplying, and then someone 
throws in an addition and you think right ok, got to be a bit careful 
because you've got two binary operations going on. OK, if m and n 
are abundant then you've got, OK, so umm, let's write this defini- 
tion down so the sum can't be, the sum of k is a divisor of n, err, 
is greater than 2, strictly greater than, k is a divisor of m, greater 
than 2m. Yeah, ok, the divisors of m+n, I mean it would be nice 
and easy if the divisors of m+n were just the sums of those, but 
err, if m and n are abundant then n+m are abundant. Errm, let's 
look at some of these examples again, oh, ok so we've got 12 + 18 is 
30,18 + 20 is 38, so we've got two abundant numbers and the sum of 
them doesn't have it on the list anyway, [laughs] I mean, it says the 
first few abundant numbers, so I'm trusting you [laughs] I'm trusting 
that that list is correct, that it hasn't missed it out, so n+m can't 
be abundant. 
INTERVIEWER: So that's the end of it? 
DAVID: I think so, I mean, 38, is it abundant? I mean, I'm assuming it's 
not. 
INTERVIEWER: No, no, it's not, if it's not on the list, you've got to trust 
my list! I've done all the calculations. So is that enough to disprove 
the whole thing? 
DAVID: If n and m are abundant then, n+m, yeah because n and m 
are abundant, 12 and 18 are abundant but the sum is not, so yeah 
[laughs]. 
INTERVIEWER: Marvellous, good stuff, let's move on to this one. 
DAVID: Oh, so n and m are... oh, hang on, so you've got sums here as 
well, so I've got my two assumptions down there, and then umm, 
I want to say the divisors of nm, so what I do know is the sum k, 
maybe I should use a different k here, multiplied by k', so k is in the 
divisors of m, umm, k is in divisors of n, so this is actually greater 
than 4mn 
INTERVIEWER: So you've just multiplied those two inequalities? 
DAVID: Yeah, I've multiplied those two inequalities, I'm wondering how, 
now I'm doing a very sort of blind thing like that, I'm wondering 
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whether all these terms are going to be divisors of nm, well, if k' is 
a divisor of m, and k is a divisor of n, then kk' is a divisor of nm 
right? 
INTERVIEWER: Yep 
DAVID: So, so yeah, so this is greater than or equal to, sorry, so, it's 
probably equal is it actually? Is it equal? I don't know, anyway it's 
certainly, things of kk' yeah, of course, this is fundamental theorem 
of arithmetic isn't it? You're not going to get, you're going to get 
any other, cos you've got 1 in there. I think that's actually equal 
to, but it's certainly greater than or equal to the sum of the divisors 
maybe V, V in divisors of Tnn. 
INTERVIEWER: Is that right? 
DAVID: It's certainly less than or equal to, because every single kk' of this 
form is some V, but I think V is you see, if V divides nm, so what 
are we saying? If V divides nm then, err, V divides n, so it can 
be written as n= ck" and it divides m, so n= cl", so errm, so 
we've got a divisor, err, well anyway, you don't need, I don't know, 
you need. Well I guess, the other thing is, do you get things more 
than once? Actually, that might not be right [scribbles something out], 
because you might get terms more than once here, if you multiply 
these two sums together, errm, umm, you see, umm, [long pause] if 
n and Tn, I mean we could go back to our examples, but I don't 
particularly want to because we'd be multiplying high numbers and 
it isn't long enough [laughs]. 
INTERVIEWER: I haven't brought a calculator and I should have done. 
DAVID: Yeah, if, if, I mean, [long pause], yeah, so you might, you see my 
problem here? There might be a3 there and a2 there, and there 
might be a2 there and a3 there. So, we've got duplications and 
that would only be counted once in there, so you can't, so that's 
not actually true. Ah, but if you've got a duplication, it's only ever 
going to be twice isn't it? I mean, are you going to get it more than 
once? I mean you might have a2 there and a3 there and a3 there 
and a2 there which would give you two 6s, but you're never going 
to get two different, well, or are you? Yeah, I suppose you could 
have something like a1 and an 8, a4 and a2 and a2 and a 4, so I 
mean, my idea was half that and half that, but errm, 
INTERVIEWER: I suppose it's conceivable that you could only have big 
duplications? 
DAVID: Yeah, I suppose if m and n only have something like 12 as a divisor 
then you could have all sorts of things yeah. Umm, 
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INTERVIEWER: what's the way round that then? 
DAVID: Umm, I think, let's have a look at what we had before. So we 
had, these two corollarys 4 and 2 wasn't it, let's see if we can use 
any of those. If n and m are abundant, so if n's abundant then kn's 
got to be abundant, I mean if n's perfect then kn is abundant, so 
mn's got to be abudant, I mean, I've realised it's kind of a trivial 
consequence of this, I mean you can do the same proof as in here 
can't you? I mean if you, except you start off with greater than or 
equal to, greater than or equal to 2n and then you prove that, so you 
prove something weaker than this, well, not logically weaker but, I 
mean it's got to be, if n is perfect then kn is abundant, well if n's 
abundant already then 
INTERVIEWER: so if you're making it more abundant? 
DAVID: Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so, I mean, you'd need a new proof, you'd 
need to start off with an inequality there and you'd still have in- 
equalities. 
INTERVIEWER: So, why does number 6 follow from that? 
DAVID: It doesn't quite follow, as I say, but the proof works exactly the 
same way because well you just forget that m is, pick one of them, 
say that that's abundant, what I'm going to prove is a stronger 
thing, if n is abundant then nm is abundant for any Tn (E N, right? 
And I think you can just prove it in the same way as here, in the 
same was as conjecture 2, because you start off with the sum of 
the divisors is greater than or equal to 2n, and then you've got the 
sum of the divisors of kn, sorry different, notation and everything, is 
greater than or equal or to, is still going to be greater than or equal 
to, right? And then you have the same process. 
INTERVIEWER: Right, so you're basically saying that numbers 4,6 and 2 
are pretty much the same. 
DAVID: Well, not the same, but they're giving you similar things, you're 
going to prove them using similar techniques. I actually think 4 and 
2 are relatively different because, I think, somehow, 2 required this 
extra step [points at the k2 argument], this kind of simple step was really 
conjecture 4, similar to the one in conjecture 4. 
INTERVIEWER: OK, so where are we? We're happy that number 6 is? 
What's the situation with number 6? 
DAVID: Yeah, yeah, I think it's true. 
INTERVIEWER: Entirely true, good stuff. 
DAVID: And I think there's a stronger statement, that one of these doesn't 
need to be abundant. 
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INTERVIEWER: OK, let's do another one then. 
DAVID: Umm, if n is abundant then n is not of the form p7n for some 
natural n and prime p. Well ok, this is not true for m=2 right? 
Because we've proved that before. 
INTERVIEWER: Errm, have we? 
DAVID: Errr, this was, where is it? PI i P2 primes then PlP2 is not abundant, 
so if it's abundant then it can't be PlP2, but anyway. We only need 
to concern ourselves with n bigger than or equal to 3. So I guess 
what we're proving is p' is not abundant, [laughs], so 
INTERVIEWER: So what have you done there? What are we doing? 
DAVID: OK, so if n is abundant then n is not of the form, err, so in other 
words, it's the contrapositive again, if n is of the form p' then it's, 
then n is not abundant, so we know this, err, right, so what's the 
sum of k in p'? k, err, whatever. Sum of k in divisors of p'. 
Umm, so what is this? Well we've got a 1, we've got a p, we've got 
ap2, etc. plus p'. And, err, well I guess, let's do, we know it's 
true for m=2, so let's do an induction thing. What are we doing? 
We're proving that this is not abundant, so this thing is less than or 
equal to 2p', is that right? Yeah, not abundant, yeah, that's right. 
Umm, so then, so then we want to prove that 2p'+' is greater than 
or equal to all this, so, umm., so what have I got to do? So sum of 
k in divisors of p'+' is equal to 1+p+... + p'+' which is, umm, 
so if you multiply both sides, if you multiply this by p, sorry my 
mind's gone, so we want to show that this is less than or equal to 
2p'+', so umm, that's done by multiplying that by, well 2p'+' is 
certainly less than p+p2+ ah, ha, I think I might have a problem. 
And then I want to put the equality, I mean you've got that haven't 
you? [laughs] you've got inequalities going both ways so you've got 
a bit of a problem, umm, err, so I wonder whether there's a, a false 
thing here. Oh, well hang on, no this is curious, so you've got 36 
here, and 36 is abundant, and is of the form p 2, but hang on, didn't 
we prove that p2, that P1, P2 are primes then PlP2 is not abundant? 
What about 6 and 6? 
INTERVIEWER: So what's gone wrong here? 
DAVID: Sorry, so there's an abundant number 36, right? so 36 is equal to, 
oh, sorry, I'm being right, no, you've been getting me doing maths 
for too long now [laughs] my brain's going funny, 6 is not prime, of 
course [laughs]. Umm, yeah, watch me do maths for long enough and 
I'll do something really stupid. OK, so, err, fine, so 
INTERVIEWER: So you're convinced this is true are you? 
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DAVID: Well, 1,1 think so, I mean I don't know [laughs] I'm not sure, I mean 
it looks, I mean these two things, I mean they're only I apart, this 
is not, I don't know whether, I mean, maybe it isn't, maybe at some 
point, this catches up on you, umm, err, I mean it's difficult, you see, 
there's certainly no counterexamples there, so I wouldn't want to 
look for a counterexample now, I mean I'd plug it into a computer 
or something to see what happens, so I mean it just looks a bit fishy. 
I mean, how else may I, might I prove this? Umm, ok, so I'm using 
induction, maybe I should try to do it more directly. What did I do 
with these two primes then? So, there's a similar sort of thing here? 
So I said, hmm, what other conjectures have we got? Umm, if n and 
m is abundant, so we don't want that that's useless, we want two 
non-abundant numbers, we had some, if n's perfect, so that doesn't 
help us, if n is deficient then every divisor, that doesn't help us. 
Umm, I reckon it may be false, but I'd need to, well, I'd need to 
do a computer program to calculate higher abundant numbers and 
umm, err, see if it happens, and then the next thing I'd do is try to 
find a counterexample, because I have a feeling that each time you 
do your induction step this gets bigger and bigger and bigger and 
maybe it starts to exceed this, something goes wrong. This adding 1 
each time means that the difference between these two things means 
that less and less and less, and then at some point it overtakes. I 
think in fact at some point it would [laughs], I mean, let's, well, so 
assume 2p' -1 +p+.. - +p' is some number, some number, errm, 
err, I'm running out of letters, err, a, start running out of letters 
go to Greek, so err, and err, 2p'+' - (1 +p+... + p'+'), what's 
this equal to? So, err, my mind's gone blank, so we've got a, err, 
2p' - p, so we've got a +pm+l - (1 +p +... +pm) but this, right, 
this now is greater than or equal to p, p is prime so it is greater than 
or equal to 2p' - (I +p+... + pm), which is equal to a, ahh! So 
the difference between this and this thing is actually bigger, so err, 
actually this proves it. 
INTERVIEWER: So that's the end of it? 
DAVID: Yeah, that's the end of it, yeah, ok. So, if a is positive which is 
our induction assumption, our inductive assumption, then, then, the 
difference between that and this thing, the difference between 2p'+' 
and all it's prime factors is even bigger, so therefore has positive, so 
therefore 2p'+"s got to be greater than that. 
INTERVIEWER: And that's your induction step? 
DAVID: And that's your induction step. 
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INTERVIEWER: Marvellous. So are you entirely convinced by that? 
DAVID: Yeah, I'm entirely convinced of this, yeah, but that first way 
doesn't work [laughs]. (Dl-D7) 
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Appendix B 
Details of Coding on 
Experiment 4. 
This appendix details the different codes that, were used during the quasi-judicial 
case study analysis of interviews in Experiment 4. As is appropriate with the 
quasi-judicial method, most of these codes were predetermined based on the 
prima facie theories. However, some non-essential codes were incorporated as a 
result of the analytical process. These codes are marked with a (*). Naturally, 
the codes listed below are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Examples - 
Example - use of examples. 
Counterexamples - use of (or search for) counterexamples. 
Heuristic biases - 
If-heuristic - evidence of the if-heuristic. 
notif-heuristic - evidence of the if-heuristic not playing a role. 
matching-heuristic - evidence of the matching-heuristic. 
Implication as a Journey (*) - language which talks of an implication as if 
it were a journey. 
Meta-comment (*) - miscellaneous comment about meta-mathematics. 
Warrant - 
Authoritarian -a warrant based on authority. 
Deductive - 
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Formalisable - 'Proper' mathematics that can be formalised. 
Non-formalisable - Use of generic examples, for example. 
Hard to classify - difficult to classify. 
Inductive -a warrant involving evaluating one or more specific cases. 
Perceptual - conviction is gained through perceptions of mental images. 
M-ansformational -conviction is gained through 'thought experiments' 
on mental structures. 
Ritual - conviction is gained through the appearance of an argument. 
Syrnbolic - conviction is gained through meaningless symbol manipula- 
tion. 
Logic - 
Contrapositive - mention of the contrapositive. 
interpretation of as '. W. 
interpretation of as '=*'. 
Specific/general -comment on whether'=*' needs to be true in general. 
Negations statements being negated. 
Strategic knowledge (*) - evidence of the application of strategic knowledge. 
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Appendix C 
Constructing Odd 
Abundants 
Theorem. If an integer n is multiplied by a sequence of k consecutive prime 
numbers that are greater than n, then the resultant number is abundant for a 
sufficiently large k. 
Proof. Pick an integer n with prime decomposition n= qlq2q3 ... q,. Pick a 
prime p where p =7ý qj for any i. Assume n has distinct divisors di, d2 7 .... d,, 
which sum to o, (n). Consider the divisors of pn. As p is not a divisor of n 
this ensures that, for every di, pdi is not a member of the set of divisors of n, 
i. e. for every i there is no j such that pdi = dj. This guarantees that all the 
numbers in the list di, d27 .... d,, pd, 7 pd2 i .... pd, are distinct. Also, they are all 
divisors of pn. These divisors sum to o, (n) +p-a (n) = (p + 1) - o, (n). Therefore, 
o, (pn) ý! (p + 1) - o, (n). 
Consider the 'abundance', A(n), of a number n, given by A(n) If n 
A(n) >2 then n is abundant. We know, from the above, that: 
A(pn) = 
O'(Pn) > 
(p + 1) - u(n) 
- 
o, (n) P+ I= A(n) - 
P+ 
pn pn npp 
That is to say, multiplying a number n by an appropriate prime p increases n 
by a factor of p, but it increases A(n) by a factor of at least P+1 > p. P 
Consider the infinite product rj- Pý+', where the pi are consecutive odd I Pi 
primes (i. e. p, 3, P2 5 ... 
). First we will look at the partial product 
rn pj+1 
Pi 
Pi + (1+ (1 
+ 
(1+ 
A Pi P2 Pn 
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When this is factored out we will, for each i, get a term of the form 
A 
Consequently 
nA+n 
>+ =E- 
A P1 P2 Pn 
i=1 
A 
Since the harmonic series of primes, Ej -I-, is known to diverge (e. g. Nagell, Pi 
1951), we know that the sequence n0 
nEN 
diverges. (Ei=l 
P' (rIn 
1 
p, +J) So the sequence i= Pi nC-N 
also diverges, and hence so does the infinite 
product r1i P'+'. Therefore, multiplying a number n by consecutive primes that Pi 
are not in the prime decomposition of n (giving rise to the sequence IniliEN) 
will ensure that A(ni) --). oo. Hence, for some sufficiently large i, A(ni) >2 and 
ni will be abundant. 0 
Corollary. There exist odd abundant numbers. 
Proof. Let n>1 be odd. Then all prime numbers not in the prime decomposi- 
tion of n and that are greater than n will be odd. The product of odd numbers 
is odd, so by the theorem, multiplying by consecutive primes we will eventually 
get an odd abundant number, and all odd multiples of this number will also be 
abundant. 0 
Corollary. The product of the first k odd prime numbers is an odd abundant 
number for some sufficiently large k. 
Proof. If you pick n=3 in the theorem, then the sequence of increasing odd 
primes satisfy the property that they do not coincide with any primes in the 
prime decomposition of n. Hence 3x5x7x... XA will be an odd abundant 
number for a sufficiently large k. El 
Corollary. An abundant number can be constructed which has an arbitarily 
large smallest factor. 
Proof. Choose a large prime number q. Pick the next largest prime pl, and 
form a sequence of consecutive primes PI, P2 i ... , starting with pl. 
Then, by the 
theorem, qPIP2 ... Pk will be abundant 
for a sufficiently large k, and the smallest 
factor Of qP1P2 ... Pk is q. 
0 
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